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Summary
This thesis consists of three self-contained essays. It examines the impact of institu-
tions and cross-border policies on socio-economic outcomes.
The first essay focuses on the impact of religiosity, general and political trust, local
participation, and welfare metrics on well-being in rural areas using the Ethiopian Rural
Household Survey. Ordered probit methods reveal distinctive determinants of overall life
satisfaction and momentary happiness. Broader socio-economic factors such as religiosity
and political governance strongly predict life satisfaction, while largely welfare metrics
drive momentary happiness.
The second essay studies the determinants of cross-border flows of people for tourism,
personal, or business purposes with a particular emphasis on the role of visa policies using
instrumental variable estimation for outbound travel to a cross-section of countries for
2005 and 2010. We adopt the UN General Assembly Affinity Index, a measure of the
quality of bilateral relations between nations, to instrument for bilateral visa policy. The
affinity index explains 22% of the variation in visa policies in both 2005 and 2010. We find
that, ceteris paribus, imposing visa reduces travel by about 80% and 73% in 2005 and 2010
respectively implying restrictive visa policies discourage cross-border travel significantly.
We also find an adverse impact of restrictive visa policies on travel and tourism-related
revenues and employment.
The third essay addresses the role of the United States Visa Waiver Program (VWP)
on inbound travel. We employ Difference-in-Difference (Diff-in-Diff) estimation on panel
data in respect of US inbound travel from eight countries newly admitted to the pro-
gram in 2008, versus several comparison (control) groups including ten aspirant - so-called
‘roadmap’ - countries in the process of negotiation at the same time. We also restrict the
treatment and comparison groups to Europe to reduce potential bias arising from het-
erogeneity and unobserved country characteristics. Treating the policy as a quasi-natural
experiment allows a neater identification of the impact of visa policies on travel. We con-
clude, ceteris paribus, admitting a country to the program increases inbound travel from
that country to the US by 29% to 44%.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Institutions and Socio-economic Outcomes
The economics of growth literature has identified institutions, trade, geography and cli-
mate as the deep determinants of economic performance. The conventional wisdom is that
they affect economic outcomes by influencing the proximate determinants of economic
growth, namely factor accumulation and technological progress. Studies that highlight
the importance of institutions include North (1989), Acemoglu et al. (2000), Acemoglu
et al. (2002), Hall and Jones (1999), and Rodrik et al. (2004). Sachs et al. (1995) and
Frankel and Romer (1999) among others emphasise the role of trade; while proponents of
geography and climate include Gallup and Sachs (2001), Sachs and Warner (2001), and
Sachs (2003). While the relative importance of each determinant has been debated, the
majority of research has gravitated to the primacy of institutions over geography, climate,
and trade (Rodrik et al., 2004; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2010).
Douglas North defines institutions as “rules, enforcement characteristics of rules, and
norms of behaviour that structure repeated human interaction.” (North, 1989, p. 1321).
Hence, institutions involve both formal rules such as constitutions, statutes and common
laws, and contracts; and informal constraints (norms) such as codes of conduct, taboos,
and standards of behaviour. North (1989) argues that there is a bidirectional relationship
2between the formal and informal aspects of institutions. On the one hand, norms and
other forms of informal constraints are partly derivatives or extensions of formal rules (see
also Acemoglu (2008), Nunn and Wantchekon (2009)). On the other hand, the informal
institutions are partly shaped and moulded by organised ideologies such as religions, and
social and political values. Once formed, the informal norms and constraints play a crucial
role in the evolution of formal institutions through time (see also Aghion et al. (2010) for
a bi-directional relationship between trust and formal institutions).
Bardhan (2005) states that the plethora of recent research on the role of institutions on
economic performance focuses only on very limited types of institutions, mainly property
rights due to the difficulty of quantifying the effect of other institutions. Moreover, the
main practise in recent economic research has been bundling institutional measures into an
index and exploring the effect on the aggregate economy. While such a practise provides
an overall correlation between institutional qualities and economic performance, it does
not inform in detail how institutions evolve and affect the economy. While Acemoglu et al.
(2005b) assert that the quality of institutions is at the heart of economic development,
social science research has yet to explain the mechanism through which institutions persist
or change.
To better understand the mechanism by which institutions matter for socio-economic
outcomes, some researchers focused on specific aspects of institutions and economic out-
comes. For example, Eichengreen and Iversen (1999) and Nickell and Layard (1999) fo-
cused on labour market institutions and economic performance; Banerjee and Iyer (2005)
focused on historical land tenure system and its effect on economic performance in rural
India; Acemoglu et al. (2005b) categorise institutions into “property rights institutions”
and “contracting institutions” and explore their effect on various measures of economic
performance. Similarly, Bhattacharyya (2009) using Rodrik’s (2005) categorisation of
institutions into market creating, market stabilising, market regulating, and market legit-
3imising finds varying impacts of each on economic growth. Unbundling institutions and
studying their effects on various aspects of socio-economic matters helps to understand
better the mechanism at work.
In the first essay of this thesis, we focus on micro aspects of institutions and their
impact on selected socio-economic outcomes. The micro aspect relates to mainly informal
institutions and their impact on well-being in rural areas. It focuses on the role of religi-
osity, general and political trust, and local participation on subjective well-being (SWB)
using the Ethiopian Rural Household Survey (ERHS). The role of welfare metrics such as
consumption and livestock ownership in SWB is also explored.
In recent years, there has been increasing interest in research on the role of religiosity,
rather than the religious denomination per se, and social capital on economic outcomes.1
Putnam (2001) and Sacerdote and Glaeser (2001) view places of worship as important
civic Organisations in the sense that networks and interactions fostered by churches are
important elements of social capital, which, when productive, have a positive impact on
growth. Tabellini (2010) finds that historical, cultural attributes such as trust strongly
predicted current economic performance. On the downside, Barro and McCleary (2003)
argue that given religious beliefs, an increase in church attendance signifies a decline
in productivity of the religion sector as more resources in terms of time and goods are
consumed for a given output (belief).
Religious institutions and religiosity can also affect well-being directly. Social support
and the positive emotions created by religious participation lead to physical health through
reduced immune system suppression (Koenig et al., 1998; Myers, 2000). Religious insti-
tutions bring people together which strengthens their bonds creating a sense of solidarity
in times of crisis (McIntosh et al., 1993). Moreover, in societies where social safety nets
1Religiosity reflects the degree of religious involvement and belief. It is often measured by the religious
participation of individuals, for example attending religious services or the extent of belief in God, and the
frequency of prayers. See McCleary and Barro (2006) for the various measures of religiosity.
4are absent, religious institutions create social security by encouraging sharing and mutual
support (Frey and Stutzer, 2002; Inglehart, 2010).
Utility functions of religious people can systematically differ from those of less religious
or non-religious as the former takes after-life gains from religiosity into account. This can
have implications on aspirations and hence an impact on the work behaviour, consumption
and wealth patterns of individuals. In this thesis, we focus on the first part of the story
- whether religiosity impacts current happiness and life satisfaction differently. Future
research can then explore whether religiosity affects economic status, (i.e. consumption
and income) through the aspiration channel.
Trust is another important factor for well-being. Trust is regarded as a crucial com-
ponent of social capital specially in areas where formal institutions are not developed. It
plays an important role in enforcing agreements, improving access to credit, and facilitat-
ing investment (Fafchamps, 1996; Fafchamps and Minten, 2002; Knack and Keefer, 1997).
Several studies have found a direct positive effect of trust on subjective well-being (see,
for example, Bjørnskov (2003), Helliwell (2003), Helliwell et al. (2004)).
Political trust and participation can raise subjective well-being in at least two possible
ways (Frey and Stutzer, 2000). Firstly, an increased participation of citizens in government
activities means their wishes and interests are reflected in public decision making as they
can better monitor and control politicians. Secondly, an increased voice of citizens in
local political institutions means politicians and administrators have better information
regarding preferences of residents, and this enhances well-being.
Our analysis reveals that religiosity, general trust, confidence in the local political
administration, and participation in formal and informal institutions are strongly and
positively associated with SWB in addition to standard economic variables. From a meth-
odological point of view, the results indicate happiness responses tend to reflect welfare
metrics; while responses to general satisfaction questions indicate that respondents evalu-
5ate their overall status of well-being taking into consideration broader socio-economic and
institutional characteristics. Hence, happiness and general life satisfaction data convey
related, yet distinctive information. The differential impact of institutions on life satisfac-
tion and momentary happiness is in comport with the propositions of Deaton (2008) and
Stevenson and Wolfers (2008) that life satisfaction and happiness are not synonymous.
1.2 Political Economic Policies and Cross-Border Travel
The travel and tourism sector is a fast-growing sector in many economies. In 2013, in-
cluding the direct and indirect contributions, the share of travel and tourism expenditures
to GDP and employment was 9.5% and 8.5% respectively worldwide (WTTC, 2014). In
addition to the direct contribution to revenue and employment, the travel and tourism
sector can play an important role in fostering trade in goods and other types of services
by reducing information asymmetry between potential traders in the countries of origin
and destination.2
The literature on growth and productivity has focused on the role of aggregate trade
and foreign direct investment as conduits for technology transfer. The role of imports
(Coe and Helpman, 1995), exports (Clerides et al., 1998), and foreign direct investment
(De La Potterie and Lichtenberg, 2001) on technology diffusion are some examples of
studies on cross-border knowledge transfer.
Another plausible channel of technology transfer is the physical contact of people.
Inbound and outbound cross-border travel of people can facilitate technology diffusion.
This is especially true as some aspects of technology are not fully coded, and hence easier
when exchanged interpersonally face-to-face than written or broadcast. Arrow (1969)
argued that lack of personal contact outside a country’s territory could be an important
2For the relationship between immigration and trade see, for example, Gould (1994), Herander and
Saavedra (2005), Bandyopadhyay et al. (2008), and Ghatak et al. (2009).
6impediment to technology adoption. Frankel and Romer (1999) emphasise the informal
exchange of ideas as an important income-enhancing factor along with trade. Andersen and
Dalgaard (2011) argue that cross-border interaction of people plays a significant role in the
diffusion of knowledge and technology. Another potential benefit of cross-border travel is
a favourable attitude towards people of other countries which can further positively affect
cross-border trade and other economic ties. For example, Amir and Ben-Ari (1985) found
that Israelis’ negative attitude towards Egyptians changed after visiting Egypt.3 Hence,
studying the determinants of cross-border travel can inform policy makers on ways of
boosting links among people and countries of the world.
The second and third essays of this thesis focus on the main institutional barrier to
cross-border travel, namely visa policy. Despite visa policies being the main institutional
tools for countries to control inflows of foreigners, research on the extent of their impact
on cross-border travel is scarce. The second essay studies the determinants of cross-
border flows of people for tourism, personal, or business purposes that have been from
at least one night up to one year with a particular emphasis on the role of visas. Visa
policies are potentially endogenous due to unobserved common factors affecting both visas
and travel. We use the United Nations General Assembly Voting Affinity Scores (Voting
Affinity Scores) to instrument for visas. The affinity scores reflect the voting behaviour of
member states in voting at UN general assemblies and are widely used in political science
and international relations to measure the quality of the bilateral relationship between
countries. As such they reflect preferences of states about foreign policy. The similarity
of voting can reflect the quality of the bilateral relationship between countries and hence
can directly affect visa policies while there are no theoretical or empirical grounds to think
that voting behaviour is systematically related to income. We use the Heckman two-step
3The literature on the impact of tourism on attitude is not conclusive. For instance, Pizam et al. (1991)
found that a group of US students who visited Russia did not change their opinion after the visit compared
to a control group who did not take part in the visit.
7procedure to correct for potential selection bias due to the presence of a large number of
zeros in the bilateral travel data.
We find, ceteris paribus, imposing visa restriction reduces travel flows by about 80%
and 73% in 2005 and 2010 respectively. This suggests that restrictive visa policies decrease
cross-border travel significantly. We find consistent results with Poisson and Zero-Inflated
Poisson models. In economic terms, we find that restrictive visa policies adversely affect
travel and tourism-related revenues and employment. Moreover, the study reveals that
the quality of bilateral foreign relations between countries, measured by the similarity of
voting in the UN General Assembly, predicts 22% of the variation in bilateral visa policies
depending on the specification.
In the third essay, we address the role the United States (US) Visa Waiver Program
(VWP) plays in inbound travel. We employ Diff-in-Diff estimation with panel data on
US inbound travel from eight countries newly admitted to the program in 2008, versus
several comparison (control) groups. The comparison groups include ten aspirant - so-
called ‘roadmap’ - countries in the process of negotiation at the same time; the rest of
the world, which are not in the VWP; and the rest of the world excluding those admitted
in 2008.4 We also restrict the treatment and comparison groups to countries in Europe
to reduce potential bias of estimates arising from heterogeneity and unobserved country
characteristics. We conclude that, ceteris paribus, admitting a country to the program
increases inbound travel from that country to the US by between 29% and 44%. Our
results also suggest a mild persistent effect of the program over time.
4The eight countries admitted to the VWP in 2008 were the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia, and South Korea. The ‘roadmap countries’ in 2008 were Argentina, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Israel, Malaysia, Poland, Romania, Turkey, and Uruguay.
8Chapter 2
Subjective Well-being and
Institutions: The Case of Rural
Ethiopia
2.1 Introduction
Research on subjective well-being (SWB), mainly conducted through surveys on overall life
satisfaction and happiness, complements the conventional measures of well-being such as
the level of consumption, income, and wealth. It can inform policy makers about economic
and other factors that society values most. The increased availability of SWB data and
empirical evidence of a high correlation with the conventional measures of well-being has
spurred an increased use of such information by economists in recent years (Krueger and
Schkade, 2008).1
Research on the determinants of SWB has mainly focused on either cross-country or
within-country analysis of developed and transition countries. The study on SWB for de-
veloping countries, however, remains limited. Developing countries, especially their rural
parts, exhibit several distinctive features and merit separate treatment to understand
determinants of well-being in these areas of the world. Some of the distinguishing char-
1In this thesis, unless specified SWB refers to both life satisfaction and momentary happiness.
9acteristics of rural communities include more interdependence among rural community
members, higher levels of religiosity and the importance of informal institutions.
People in developing countries, especially in rural areas, are more religious as shown
by various editions of the World Values Surveys. Hence, the role of religion in well-being
would be more apparent in these areas. In religious societies, it is quite tenable to assume
that people are concerned both about their current and expected after-life status when
evaluating their overall well-being.2 Hence, in a rural religious context, the concepts of life
satisfaction (potentially taking into account worldly experience and the expected after-life
utility) and momentary happiness (usually associated with hedonic experiences) can have
different implications. The distinction between life satisfaction and happiness outcomes in
a rural context can give insights into the mechanisms through which religious and other
institutions affect well-being.
Furthermore, rural communities have developed a network of informal institutions such
as funeral associations and friendly societies based on religion or geographic proximity
with direct implication for well-being. Due to the absence of formal institutions, informal
institutions often based on trust and custom play a crucial role in rural life. Hence, in the
absence of a strong formal judiciary system coupled with informational asymmetries, trust
in individual and community engagement is important and can have strong implications
for well-being (See, for example, Fafchamps (1996), Bigsten et al. (2000), and Fafchamps
and Minten (2002)).
This essay attempts to contribute to the study of the determinants of SWB in poor,
vulnerable areas using data from a rich survey in rural Ethiopia. We pay particular at-
tention to the role of religious and political institutions as well as informal institutions
such as general trust. Religious attendance brings people together and strengthens their
bonds, which creates a sense of solidarity in times of crisis due to idiosyncratic or covariate
2See, for example, Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975) for the determinants of religious participation.
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shocks. In societies where social security is absent, religious institutions create informal
social security by encouraging sharing and mutual support. In areas where formal insti-
tutions are not developed, general trust plays a significant role in enforcing agreements,
improving access to credit, and facilitating investment. In rural communities in developing
countries, local administrations are in involved in managing agricultural land distribution,
agricultural extension, and safety nets among others. Hence, trust in local political in-
stitutions and participation can affect the well-being of households. Using ordered probit
models, we estimate life satisfaction and happiness equations for rural areas to inform on
the issues alluded to above.
Our analysis reveals that religiosity, general trust (trust on people), confidence in the
local political administration (political trust), and participation in formal and informal
institutions are strongly and positively associated with well-being in addition to standard
economic variables. We find evidence for distinctive determinants of life satisfaction and
happiness. Broader socio-economic factors such as religiosity and the quality of political
governance strongly correlate with satisfaction while mainly welfare metrics drive happi-
ness.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 reviews related literature. Section 2.3
provides an overview of social and political institutions in Ethiopia. Section 2.4 describes
the data and presents some descriptive analysis. The econometric model is outlined in
section 2.5. Section 2.6 presents the results and an accompanying discussion. Finally,
Section 2.7 offers some concluding remarks.3
2.2 Review of Literature
Potential determinants of SWB identified by existing research include:
3The statistical softwares used to estimate the models in this chapter are LIMDEP/NLOGIT V.4
(Greene, 2007) and Stata 13 (StataCorp, 2013).
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• income (absolute and relative),
• personal characteristics (age, gender, and personality),
• social development (education, health, and employment),
• family (marital status and number of children),
• social capital (community activities, religious involvement, and trust), and
• macroeconomic conditions (income inequality, inflation, welfare, and institutions).
Research has uncovered varying evidence on these factors (for example, see Frey and
Stutzer (2002) and Dolan et al. (2008) for more detailed reviews of the determinants of
SWB). This review focuses on selected major determinants.
The link between income and SWB has been at the centre of well-being research.
Cross-sectional studies across countries reveal people in richer countries are on average
more satisfied than people in poorer countries. Similarly, cross-sectional studies within
countries show that more aﬄuent individuals are more satisfied on average than their
poorer counterparts. Moreover, most studies find a concave relationship between income
and SWB indicating decreasing marginal returns of well-being from income (Easterlin,
2001; Frey and Stutzer, 2002; Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004; Diener et al., 1995).
On the other hand, there is less agreement on the relationship between income and
SWB in papers that utilise time series and panel data. For example, Easterlin (1974)
and Smith (1979) for the US, and Easterlin (1995) for the US, Japan, and nine European
countries find no relationship between growth in income and SWB. The phenomenon
of economic gains not buying life satisfaction or happiness is known as the ‘Easterlin
Paradox’. Studies that broadly support this paradox in the sense that economic gains
affect well-being slightly or only up to a certain point (until basic needs are fulfilled) include
Oswald (1997), Blanchflower and Oswald (2004), Layard (2005), and Diener and Seligman
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(2004). The main factors that give rise to the ‘Easterlin Paradox’ are the importance of
relative income, adaptation to higher income, and the rise of aspirations with income.
Other studies have refuted the ‘Easterlin Paradox’ claiming that there is a positive
relationship between own income and reported well-being. Studies such as Deaton (2008),
Stevenson and Wolfers (2008), and Sacks et al. (2012) argue the availability of broader
data sets for more countries and over longer time spans have helped uncover a positive
relationship between income and well-being across and within countries through time.
Clark et al. (2008) assert that income can be measured relative to others (social com-
parison) and relative to ones past income (habituation), and incorporating these into a
utility function can explain the Easterlin Paradox. On the other hand, Veenhoven (1991)
attempts to explain partially the Easterlin paradox by reference to what he calls ‘content-
ment’, instead of ‘comparison to others’. He argues income yields higher satisfaction up
to a point after which people become contented, and hence additional income may not
lead to any further enhancement in satisfaction.
Research on the role of economic factors on SWB has focused on developed countries
and the transition economies of Eastern and Central Europe. Only a handful of papers
studied SWB in developing countries. Kingdon and Knight (2007) using the 1993 South
African national household survey find support for a positive role of absolute income on
SWB, but a mixed role for relative income. They find that the income of close neighbours
surprisingly affects SWB positively, which is in contrast to findings in developed countries;
but can be explained by risk sharing and solidarity behaviour in poorer communities. Using
surveys of two separate villages in Northern Ethiopia Akay and Martinsson (2011) and
Akay et al. (2012) studied the role of ‘positional concern’ using experimental methods and
find no evidence for the existence of positional concern as defined by the income of others
in the community.4 Similarly, Asadullah and Chaudhury (2012) find a stronger effect
4Positional concern refers to the degree to which individuals compare their income or consumption to
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of absolute income on SWB than relative measures for rural Bangladesh. Ravallion and
Lokshin (2010) find little support for positional concern (measured by relative deprivation)
for most poor households in Malawi with the exception of the relatively well-off. On the
other hand, Knight et al. (2009) find a stronger effect of relative income compared to own
past income and the income of others than for own income in explaining SWB in China
using the 2002 national household survey. Therefore, the majority of the studies in poorer
countries find a relatively stronger effect of absolute income compared to relative income.
In addition to economic factors, social and institutional aspects that matter to well-
being include religious involvement, general trust, political trust (governance), and family
(marital status). Weber (1904) provides an analysis of the impact of religion on economic
development. Religion potentially influences economic performance through the develop-
ment of personal traits such as trust, honesty, thriftiness, openness to strangers, and work
ethic among others, all of which enhance productivity.
Putnam (2001) and Sacerdote and Glaeser (2001) view places of worship as important
civic entities where networks and interactions fostered by religious centres are vital ele-
ments for the development of social capital, which could positively impact growth. On the
downside, Barro and McCleary (2003) argue that, given religious beliefs, an increase in
church attendance reflects a decline in productivity of the religion sector as more resources
in terms of time and goods are being consumed.
Religious people tend to be healthier, on average, due to reduced drinking, smoking and
promiscuity (Jarvis and Northcott, 1987; McCullough et al., 2000). Hence, religion can
result in a higher level of well-being through its impact on health. Moreover, other aspects
of religiosity such as social support and positive emotions lead to physical health through
reduced immune system suppression (Koenig et al., 1998; Myers, 2000). In addition, to
other reference groups. Hence, it implies that the utility a person gets from a certain income level or
consumption not only depends on the absolute level but also relative to others (See, for example, Akay
et al. (2012))
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an indirect effect through income and health research has found a direct link between
religion and well-being (Frey and Stutzer, 2002). Literature in psychology, sociology and
economics identify several attributes of religion that enhance well-being.
Religious attendance brings together people and strengthens their bonds, which creates
a sense of solidarity in times of crisis such as the loss of a spouse or child or during old age
(for example, see Moberg and Taves (1965) as cited in Deiner et al. (1999); and Harvey
et al. (1987) as cited in Myers (2000); McIntosh et al. (1993)). In societies where social
security is absent, religious institutions create social security by encouraging sharing and
mutual support (Inglehart, 2010). Lim and Putnam (2010) use panel data for the US,
and find that religious people are more satisfied because they build social capital through
their frequent attendance at churches.
Religion provides hope and an ability to cope with adverse circumstances by attrib-
uting events to the ‘will of God’, and provides purpose and meaning of life in times of
stability and security (for example, see (Pollner, 1989; Ellison, 1991; Frey and Stutzer,
2002; Inglehart and Norris, 2004).
Trust is another important factor enhancing well-being. Trust is regarded as a cru-
cial component of social capital (Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 1993). In areas where formal
institutions are not developed trust plays a significant role in enforcing agreements, im-
proving access to credit, and facilitating investment. Using data for 29 market economies,
Knack and Keefer (1997) finds a strong positive effect of trust on economic performance.
Similarly, Fafchamps and Minten (2002) find that agricultural traders in Madagascar with
larger networks are significantly more productive than less connected traders. Fafchamps
(1996) finds that compliance with contractual obligations is mainly driven by a mutual
trust for Ghanaian manufacturing and trading firms.
Furthermore, through its effect on the economy, trust can directly affect well-being.
In a cross-country study of 32 nations from Europe, the Americas, and Asia, Bjørnskov
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(2003) estimates the effect of social capital changes on satisfaction as equivalent to a
halving of inflation or increasing per capita income by as much as 25%. Using three
waves of the World Value Survey (WVS) data for groups of countries mainly consisting of
developed and transition economies, Helliwell (2003) finds a positive impact of individual
trust level even after controlling for national levels of trust. Helliwell et al. (2004), using
cross-country and national surveys, find a positive effect of trust on SWB directly and
through enhancing physical health. This is consistent with Berkman and Syme (1979),
who find community and social ties improve physical health.
The direct and indirect role of social capital in general and trust, in particular, are likely
to be even higher in poorer countries where formal institutions are either absent or weak
(Fafchamps, 1996; Bigsten et al., 2000; Fafchamps and Minten, 2002). However, empirical
research on developing countries on this subject is small. Asadullah and Chaudhury (2012)
find a positive impact of general and institutional trust on SWB in rural Bangladesh.
Political governance and the efficacy of political institutions is another factor that can
affect well-being. The effect can be indirect through its impact on income as confidence
in institutions affects investment and asset building. It can also directly influence the
subjective well-being of people as local political institutions exert a direct involvement in
rural households including through land and fertiliser distribution.
The role of institutions in the economy has received significant attention from re-
searchers in recent years (see, for example, North (1994) and Acemoglu et al. (2000)).
On the other hand, the link between institutions and SWB remains largely unexplored.
Hudson (2006) finds a positive role of institutional trusts such as in national government,
European Central Bank, the UN, and the law on SWB. Helliwell (2006) finds the qual-
ity of governance as one of the predictors of cross-country difference in SWB. Similarly,
Diener and Diener (2009) using data for 55 countries find that political freedom is one of
the explanations for cross-country differences in SWB. At the local level, Frey and Stutzer
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(2000) find political participation rights leads to higher SWB in Switzerland. In contrast,
Veenhoven (2000) finds that political freedom is associated with higher SWB in richer but
not poorer countries.
The handful of studies on the impact of political institutions on SWB is either based
on cross-country analysis comprised of predominantly developed countries, or national
level studies in advanced economies. Research on the evolution of institutions and SWB
in developing countries is merited to understand the mechanism through which political
institutions matter for SWB.
The role of marital status is one of the factors on which the literature reports consistent
results. The majority of studies find married people reporting higher satisfaction levels
than single, divorced, or widowed individuals (see, for example, cross-country studies such
as Headey et al. (1991) and Gohm et al. (1998); and country case studies such as Carroll
(2007) for Australia, and Asadullah and Chaudhury (2012) for Bangladesh). Some studies
have expressed concern of reverse causality, as happy people are likely to get married and
remain so (Veenhoven, 1989; Lucas et al., 2003)
Other factors identified in the literature as determinants of SWB are education, health,
age, and gender. Blanchflower and Oswald (2004) for the US and UK, and Litchfield et al.
(2012) for Albania, for example, find a positive role for education. Ferrer-i Carbonell
and Frijters (2004) find a positive role for education for the eastern part of Germany
(poorer), but no impact for the richer western part. Health status has been one of the
widely studied factors in well-being in general and SWB in particular. The literature finds
a strong positive relationship between self-rated health status and SWB (Palmore and
Luikart, 1972; Mahudin et al., 2012). On the other hand, the link between objectively
measured health status (reports by physicians of individuals) and SWB is either weaker
though positive, or not significant at all (Ravallion and Lokshin, 2002; Deaton, 2008;
Litchfield et al., 2012). Cross-sectional empirical studies in economics have found a ‘U’
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shaped relationship between age and SWB (See, for example, Blanchflower and Oswald
(2004)). The role of gender on SWB is mixed. For example, Alesina et al. (2004) and
Litchfield et al. (2012) find women report higher well-being levels. However, Alesina et al.
(2004) find men being happier than women, and Ravallion and Lokshin (2002) find no
effect for gender.
To sum up, the last decade has witnessed a proliferation of research on SWB. However,
most studies have focused on developed countries, and the main subject has been the role
of income and relative income on SWB. SWB research in developing countries remains
scant, and the handful of studies focus mostly on the role of income. The role of formal and
informal institutions such as religion, religiosity, trust in the general public (people) and
government, and participation on well-being have not been adequately studied (see Table
2.1 for a list of papers reviewed in this chapter that deal with the determinants of SWB
and whether they address the issue of institutions or not). Moreover, most studies of SWB
published in economics journals do not make a clear distinction between life satisfaction
and happiness as shown in Table 2.1 (for a sample of published articles). On the one
hand, some studies in developed countries such as Blanchflower and Oswald (2004) and
Alesina et al. (2004) treat life satisfaction and happiness interchangeably. On the other
hand, as Deaton (2008) reiterates, ‘life satisfaction’ and ‘happiness’ are not synonyms.
Life Satisfaction questions ask respondents to make an overall evaluation, while happiness
captures affect or temporary feelings.5 Stevenson and Wolfers (2008) in a cross-country
empirical study find GDP to be more strongly correlated with satisfaction than happiness
suggesting the two measures of SWB may not be synonymous as previously noted. They
also find several puzzling outliers. For example, they observe that two of the poorest
5Literature in psychology divides aspects of well-being as ‘cognitive (evaluative)’ and ‘affect (emotional)’.
The cognitive aspects are ‘evaluative’ which compares well-being against targets (benchmarks), and ‘affect’
which is related to ‘positive and negative’ feelings. We argue that general life satisfaction questions are
likely to elicit the evaluative aspect of well-being, while happiness questions are more likely to reflect the
emotional aspect.
18
countries in their sample, Tanzania and Nigeria, report the highest average happiness
levels despite both reporting lower average satisfaction with Tanzania reporting the lowest
average satisfaction in their sample.
In this chapter, we study the determinants of SWB in rural Ethiopia with a particular
focus on the role of trust, religion, and political institutions. Our primary variables of
interest are particularly relevant to the context of developing countries. Due to the absence
of strong formal institutions such as media, banking, and a judiciary system, people rely
on networks for information, credit, and arbitration. Religion, in addition to fostering
networks, helps as a coping mechanism in times of despair. Due to the high level of
intervention of local governments in household lives in rural areas from land distribution
to food aid distribution in times of crisis, trust in local officials has a direct bearing on the
well-being of rural areas. Hence, focusing on institutional variables as determinants of well-
being in rural areas provides useful insights for policy. Comparison of the determinants
of life satisfaction and happiness measures can highlight the mechanism through which
various institutional measures affect welfare of households.6 In addition, the treatment of
these two concepts separately allows us to investigate whether happiness and satisfaction
are distinct from one another or synonymous for the case of our Ethiopian sample.
6We are not aware of any study that evaluates the two aspects in a developing country context.
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Table 2.1: Comparison of Selected SWB Studies Published in Economics Journals
Author Main Outcome Variable A Measure of formal Sample Coverage Published Journal
or informal Institutions
Akay and Martinsson (2011) Ambiguousa - Ethiopia Economic Letters
Alesina et al. (2004) Happiness and Satisfaction - Europe and USA Journal of Public Economics
Interchangeably
Asadullah and Chaudhury (2012) Satisfaction Religion, Social and Bangladesh Journal of Economic Psychology
Institutional Trust
Blanchflower and Oswald (2004) Happiness and Satisfaction Religiosity UK and USA Journal of Public Economics
(not reported)
Clark et al. (2008) Happiness and Satisfaction - Cross-country Journal of Economic Literature
Interchangeably over time
Deaton (2008) Life Satisfaction - Cross-country Journal of Economic Perspectives
Life Satisfaction over time
Easterlin (1995) Happiness and Satisfaction - Cross-country Journal of Economic
Interchangeably over time Behavior and Organization
Easterlin (2001) Happiness and Satisfaction - Cross-country The Economic Journal
Interchangeably over time
Ferrer-i Carbonell and Frijters (2004) Happiness - West Germany The Economic Journal
Frey and Stutzer (2000) Satisfaction Political Institutions , Switzerland The Economic Journal
and Participation,
Frey and Stutzer (2002) Happiness and Satisfaction Political freedom Review of Journal of Economic Literature
Interchangeably Political freedom Various studies
Helliwell (2003) Satisfaction Quality of governance, Cross-country Economic Modelling
trust, and religion samples Economic Modelling
Helliwell (2006) Satisfaction Quality of governance, Cross-country The Economics Journal
social capital samples
Kingdon and Knight (2007) Satisfaction - South Africa Journal of Economic
Behavior and Organization
Knight et al. (2009) Happiness - China China Economic Review
Litchfield et al. (2012) Satisfaction Religion and Albania Journal of Economic
community organization Behavior and Organization
Oswald (1997) Happiness and Satisfaction - Europe and USA The Economic Journal
Stevenson and Wolfers (2008) Happiness and Satisfaction - Cross country Brookings Papers
and over time on Economic Activity
aSurvey questions concern satisfaction, but responses are in terms of happiness.
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2.3 Religious and Socio-Political Institutions in Ethiopia
2.3.1 Religion and Religiosity in Ethiopia
According to the Ethiopian Population and Housing Census of 2007, 43.5% of the popu-
lation belongs to the Ethiopian Orthodox Church (EOC), while 33.9% are Muslim. Prot-
estants account for 18.6% while traditionalists, Catholics and others account for the re-
mainder. There is a clear geographic pattern in the distribution of religion in the coun-
try. The EOC followers dominate the north and central highlands while the eastern and
southeastern lowlands are predominantly Muslim areas. Protestantism boasts a strong
and rising presence in the South while Catholicism is scattered in some pockets in differ-
ent parts of the country. Traditional religions can be observed in the southern regions of
the country.
The Ethiopian people can be regarded as religious. Direct and indirect measures of
religiosity computed using the WVS confirm this. Ethiopians spend relatively more time
in prayer (religious centres) and exhibit a higher aversion to divorce as shown in Tables
A.1 and A.2 in the appendix.7
Christianity and Islam have had a long presence in the country. A traditional form of
Judaism is also practised by a small minority in some parts of the northwestern region of
the country.8 Christianity became the state religion during the reign of King Ezana of the
Axumite Kingdom in the 4th century and continued to be so until 1974. Islam emerged
in Ethiopia immediately after its foundation in the 7th century when several disciples
of Mohamed, including his relatives, took refuge in the country to escape persecution in
7According to the revised family law (2000), Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (2000), property
allocation between spouses in the event of divorce shall be made in accordance with an agreement during
marriage. Each partner has the right to claim a share of common properties owned or developed after
marriage.
8In 1991, more than 14,000 Ethiopian Jews were airlifted to Israel under a covert operation, known as
’Operation Solomon’ as the civil war in Ethiopia reached its climax, and shortly before then president,
Mengistu, was toppled from power (see Spector (2005) for details).
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Arabia. Throughout the period, Islam was firmly established primarily in eastern and
southeastern parts of the country. Occasional conflicts between Christian and Muslim
kingdoms erupted during the medieval period, especially in the 16th century. However,
political hegemony, and not religion, was the primary source of the tension in this period
(Ephraim, 1971). Historically government machinery was for the most part controlled
by Christian Highlanders while Muslims were active in commerce (Ofcansky and Berry,
1991).
In the South, where traditional religions were more common, Christianity and Islam
co-existed since the early 20th century. Protestantism and Catholicism became popular
from the 1950s due to advantages in education and the potential to gain status among a
growing minority of converts (Hamer and Hamer, 1994).
In the period up to 1974, when Christianity was the state religion of the country, the
church played an important role in society specially shaping local institutions such as the
family, community arbitration, and education. As reviewed by Pankhurst (1992) many
19th century and earlier foreign writers were amused by the multitude of churches, mon-
asteries, and the number of clergy. Some writers estimated that in the 19th century about
a quarter of the population in the north and central highlands of present-day Ethiopia
comprised clergy (Dufton, 1867) as cited in Pankhurst (1992). The abundance of religious
centres and communities is still evident in rural Ethiopia. However, with the expansion of
the modern school system allowing parents to send their children to schools, the number
of priests and deacons has been on the decline in recent years. On the other hand, more
religious freedom has increased religiosity, which is reflected in increased participation in
religious activities and teaching in the urban parts of the country.
After the 1974 revolution and the subsequent replacement of the monarchy by a so-
cialist junta, Ethiopia became a secular country with no state religion. Between 1974 and
1991 the Marxist leaning military government suppressed religious activities in various
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ways such as confiscating religious properties and abducting and jailing religious leaders.
The harassment was directed at all religious denominations, but it was particularly severe
for the newly introduced Western religions such as Lutherans and Jehovah Witnesses;
as it was easier for the government to accuse them of being linked to imperialism and
the CIA (Brown, 1981). After the 1991 change of government, the new market-oriented
administration allowed freedom of religion and religious activities. Church and mosque
construction began in earnest.
Faith-based charities are common in Ethiopia and are engaged mainly in supporting
orphans, older people, and the physically challenged. Moreover, they also engage in the
construction of schools, clinics, and drinking water facilities often in remote and vulnerable
areas. The charity activities are common to all major religions in the country.9
In ethnically diverse societies, religion can have a significant role as a unifying force.
Ethiopia is ethnically very diversified with more than 70 different languages spoken. How-
ever, more than 96% of the total population follows one of the three major religions (EOC,
Islam, and Protestantism), which means that individuals with different ethnic backgrounds
are likely to share a religion. Hence, in the Ethiopian context, religion is more of a unifying
than a dividing force.
Religious congregations also serve as a crucial platform for information sharing. In
rural Ethiopia, even local politicians use religious congregations to announce important
administrative decisions. Ethiopians also have a high regard for religious people. In rural
Ethiopia, a churchgoer is almost synonymous with a good person. A person that regularly
visits a church or a mosque is regarded as trustworthy, disciplined, honest, and responsible.
Hence, religious entrepreneurs can benefit from their religiosity in at least two ways: 1)
in networking and obtaining information benefits directly from interaction with people in
places of worship; 2) by virtue of being known to people as religious, they easily command
9For a discussion of the state of non-state actors in Ethiopia, see Cerritelli et al. (2008).
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trust from customers, which could foster their access to informal credits and markets for
their products (Azzi and Ehrenberg, 1975).
Hence, religion and religiosity have potentially far-reaching implication for well-being
in Ethiopia. Studying the role of religion and religiosity in well-being in a religious country
can help policy makers to foster the positive aspects of such institutions for the benefit of
society.
2.3.2 Social and Political Institutions in Ethiopia
Ethiopia experienced two extreme regime changes in the last four decades: from monarchy
to socialism in 1975, and to free market orientation in 1991. The overthrow of Emperor
Haileselassie’s monarchy occurred through a popular revolution initiated by army dis-
contents and student movements that soon eventuated in a dictatorship by a military
junta known as the ‘Dergue’. The replacement of the socialist military dictatorship by a
more free-market oriented government in 1991 occurred in the wake of an armed guerrilla
struggle in many parts of the country, particularly the North.
The current government ratified a new constitution in 1995 which established the cur-
rent ethnic based federal system comprising nine regional states (Federal Negarit Gazeta,
1995). The regional states are divided into Zones that comprise ‘Woredas’ (districts).
Woredas are then subdivided into ‘Kebelles’, the lowest government administrative units.
Since 2002, the government has been actively engaged in decentralising power to lower
administrative units particularly Woredas through its District-Level Decentralisation Pro-
gram (DLDP) (see Ayenew (2007) for a review of the progress of the DLDP).
Hence, the local political administration is strongly linked to the economic and social
life of households in rural Ethiopia. Decisions on who participates in agricultural extension
programs (for example, the distribution of fertilisers and other inputs), conflict resolution,
and participation in food security schemes such as cash transfer and public work are some
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of the responsibilities of the local administration. More power has trickled down to local
authorities in recent years as part of the country’s decentralisation program. The Woredas
have assumed more authority in planning, collecting local taxes, and budgeting. Hence,
the degree of confidence and trust in government, particularly in local administration is a
potentially important element of well-being for households.
2.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
2.4.1 Data and Variable Definitions
In this chapter, we use the sixth round of the Ethiopian Rural Household Survey (ERHS).
It was undertaken in 2004 by the Department of Economics at Addis Ababa University
in collaboration with the International Food Policy Research Institute and the Centre for
the Study of African Economies at the University of Oxford. The ERHS had a 7th round
conducted in 2009. However, this round does not have complete religion information as
the type of religious denomination was not asked. Moreover, only female members of the
households provide religiosity information in this round as the question was only directed
to them. Hence, unless the household head is a female, the level of religiosity of the head is
not known. Earlier rounds (prior 2004) do not have SWB information. Thus, the current
study focuses on the 2004 wave. The data are obtained from Hoddinott and Yohannes
(2011).
The survey was conducted in 15 villages from 15 Woredas (Districts) scattered across
the major agricultural zones of the country in the four major regions, namely Tigray,
Amhara, Oromia, and The Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples Region (SNNPR).
The survey is not nationally representative as it excludes pastoral and semi-pastoral areas
of the country, but can broadly capture farming household behaviour in the country.
Overall a total of 1477 households has been covered in at least one of the surveys until
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2004.10 Random sampling was applied within each village, stratified by female-headed
and non-female headed households (Dercon and Hoddinott, 2011).
The survey contains household-level demographics and socio - economic characterist-
ics, agriculture and livestock information, consumption11, and health among others. It
also contains detailed information on SWB (life satisfaction and happiness) and informal
institutions such as general trust, government trust, participation, and religion.
We use two indicators of the subjective assessment of well-being, namely ‘general life
satisfaction’ and ‘momentary level of happiness’. In the life satisfaction question, respond-
ents were asked level of agreement with a statement “I am satisfied with my life”. Respond-
ents are presented with seven possible responses ‘Strongly Disagree’,‘Disagree’,‘Slightly
Disagree’,‘Neither Agree or Disagree’, ‘Slightly Agree’, ‘Agree’, and ‘Strongly agree’. The
happiness question is framed as “Taken all together, how would you say things are for you
these days: would you say you are: ‘Not too happy’, ‘Pretty happy’, or ‘Very happy’.12
The units of analysis are the heads of households as some of our key covariates such as
religion, trust, and participation in formal and informal institutions are directed to them.
Satisfaction and Happiness questions are asked twice in the survey. We use the responses
of the head of households.13
Our main covariates of interest are as follows. The logarithm of real consumption per
capita and wealth ( a buffer against shocks) measured by the logarithm of tropical livestock
10In the 2004 round, 1371 households were interviewed.
11Consumption includes all food consumption in the last week comprising from own stock, purchased,
and obtained as gifts in adult-equivalent terms; and non-food consumption such as cloths converted into
monthly levels. It is then deflated by food price index based on local (roughly Woreda) level 1994 as a base
year. Livestock is measured by tropical livestock units (TLU) by associating different weights to poultry,
sheep, goats, oxen, camels, etc. based on their values.
12In this thesis, ‘satisfaction’ and ’life satisfaction’ are used interchangeably. Likewise, ‘happiness’ and
’momentary happiness’ are treated as synonymous.
13The SWB responses by male household heads are provided in the first part of the survey while responses
by female household heads are given in part 3 of the survey. The survey has four parts conducted in the
course of several days.
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units, both of which can be regarded as welfare metrics. We address the role of institu-
tional factors using religion (dummy for Catholic, Muslim, and Protestant where Orthodox
Christian is the base), religiosity measured by the number of visits to places of worship
in the last month before the interview, general trust, political trust, and participation in
political and informal institutions.
We measure the level of general trust from a respondent’s level of agreement with the
statement “Most people can be trusted”.14 Respondents are asked to express their level of
agreement with this statement from one of seven choices ranging from ‘strongly disagree’
indicating strong distrust to ‘strongly agree’ for a high level of trust. By the same manner,
we measure political (government) trust from a respondent’s level of agreement with the
statement “I am Confident in local officials ability”.
Out of 1371 households surveyed in the 2004 round, our final dataset comprises 1,114.
Some households are excluded due to missing information on variables of interest and
information on some variables being provided by a member of household other than the
head.
The frequency distributions of satisfaction and happiness responses are given in Tables
2.2 and 2.3 respectively. The satisfaction distribution indicates that the two extremes
(‘strongly disagree’ and ‘strongly agree’) and the median category (‘neither agree nor dis-
agree’ have a very small proportion of responses. Hence, to avoid potential instability of
our model, we conflate the satisfaction responses into three categories. The first category
consists of the ‘strongly disagree and disagree’ ; the second comprising the three middle
responses, i.e. ‘slightly disagree, neutral, and slightly agree’ ; and the third category with
‘agree and strongly agree’. Moreover, such conflation facilitates comparison with the hap-
piness model. Table 2.4 reports the frequency distribution of the conflated satisfaction
14In this thesis, ‘trust’ refers to the level of general trust individuals have in other individuals such as
their neighbours or community members. We use ’general trust’ and ‘trust’ interchangeably.
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each of its cells with sizable proportions.
Table 2.5 presents a description of the variables and selected summary statistics.
Table 2.2: Frequency Distribution of Satisfaction Responses
I am satisfied with my life Freq. Percent Cum.
Strongly disagree 81 7.27 7.27
Disagree 260 23.34 30.61
Slightly disagree 172 15.44 46.05
Neither agree nor disagree 82 7.36 53.41
Slightly agree 257 23.07 76.48
Agree 240 21.54 98.03
Strongly agree 22 1.97 100
Total 1,114 100
Table 2.3: Frequency Distribution of Happiness Responses
Happiness Freq. Percent Cum.
Not too happy 394 35.37 35.37
Pretty happy 586 52.6 87.97
Very happy 134 12.03 100
Total 1,114 100
Table 2.4: Frequency Distribution of the Conflated Satisfaction Responses
satisfaction Freq. Percent Cum.
Dissatisfied 341 30.61 30.61
Neutral 511 45.87 76.48
Satisfied 262 23.52 100
Total 1,114 100
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Table 2.5: Summary Statistics
Variable Description N Mean SD Min Max
LIFE SATISFACTION Life Satisfaction 1114 0.93 0.73 0 2
HAPPINESS Happiness 1114 0.77 0.65 0 2
LIFE SATISFACTION LADDER Where on the ladder is your standing? 10 best possible life, 0 the worst possible life 1114 4.42 1.81 0 10
LRCONSUMPTION PC Logarithm of real per capita consumption 1114 4.17 0.81 0.87 7.01
LLIVESTOCK Logarithm of Tropical Livestock Units 1114 1.1 0.72 0 3.2
LAND PC Per capital farm-land owned in Hectares 1114 0.34 0.47 0 7.24
MARITAL STATUS Base reference: Married =0
SINGLE 1 if Single, 0 otherwise 1114 0.02 0.15 0 1
WIDOWED 1 if Widowed, 0 otherwise 1114 0.18 0.38 0 1
DIVORCED 1 if Divorced, 0 otherwise 1114 0.08 0.26 0 1
TRUST Most people can be trusted: 1(Strongly disagree) - 7(Strongly agree) 1114 4.37 1.71 1 7
POLITICAL TRUST I am Confident in the ability of local officials: 1(Strongly disagree) - 7(Strongly agree) 1114 4.19 1.7 1 7
PARTICIPATION 1 if Head of household has official position in local institutions, 0 otherwise 1114 0.25 0.43 0 1
RELIGIOSITY Church/Mosque visits per month 1114 6.3 7.15 0 45
CATHOLIC15 1 if Catholic, 0 otherwise 1114 0.04 0.19 0 1
MUSLIM 1 if Muslim, 0 otherwise 1114 0.23 0.42 0 1
PROTESTANT 1 if protestant, 0 otherwise 1114 0.2 0.4 0 1
CATHOLIC*RELIGIOSITY Interaction: CATHOLIC and RELIGSTY 1114 0.34 2.07 0 30
MUSLIM*RELIGIOSITY Interaction: MUSLIM and RELIGSTY 1114 1.68 5.7 0 45
PROTESTANT*RELIGIOSITY Interaction: PROTSTNT and RELIGSTY 1114 1.35 3.54 0 40
EDUCATION Reference: No Education=0
BASIC EDU 1 if up to four years of formal education and other informal education, 0 otherwise 1114 0.26 0.44 0 1
POST PRIMARY 1 if 5 and more years of education, 0 otherwise 1114 0.13 0.34 0 1
MISSING EDU Missing Education Information =1 1114 0.03 0.17 0 1
FEMALE 1 = Female, 0=Male 1114 0.27 0.44 0 1
HOUSEHOLD SIZE Number of members of household 1114 5.76 2.52 1 15
YOUNG 1 if less than 40 years of age, 0 otherwise (middle age 40-60 is the base) 1114 0.31 0.46 0 1
OLD 1 if more than 60 years of age, 0 otherwise (middle age 40-60 is the base) 1114 0.31 0.46 0 1
OLD CHILDREN Number of children in households aged 7 and 14 1114 1.15 1.02 0 6
YOUNG CHILDREN Number of children in household aged 7 and younger 1114 1.24 1.21 0 5
ILLNESS 1 if respondent had an illness within the two weeks prior to interview, 0 otherwise 1114 0.2 0.4 0 1
15Catholic includes both followers of Catholicism and other minority religions. Merged due to small number of followers in both categories
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2.4.2 Descriptive Statistics
In this section, we briefly examine the potential relationships between measures of SWB
and other socioeconomic characteristics briefly.
Mean satisfaction and happiness across social groups based on the status of reported
poverty, religion, general trust, government trust, marital status, age and gender are
shown in Figures 2.1 and 2.2 respectively. The mean levels of satisfaction and happiness
are different across the lower and upper bounds in each category using a 95% confidence
level. For example, mean satisfaction among the households that consider themselves
poor is significantly lower than that of the non-poor households. Similarly, we observe
significant differences among the various groups in the happiness data.
Figure 2.3 shows whether someone is satisfied or dissatisfied with their life when mov-
ing along the percentile spectrum of log per capita consumption. Figure 2.4 shows whether
someone is happy or unhappy with their life when moving along the percentile spectrum
of log per capita consumption. The incidence of being satisfied increases as consumption
increases. The same pattern can be detected for happiness. The reverse is true for dissat-
isfaction and unhappiness. The strength of the role of consumption for well-being slightly
declines as consumption increases pointing to the well-known concave relationship between
income and well-being found in the literature (for example, Easterlin (1974, 2001)).16
Table 2.6 provides Spearman’s pairwise correlations of SWB and our main covariates.
Life satisfaction is significantly correlated with all the main welfare, religious and insti-
tutional variables. Momentary happiness is similarly correlated with the welfare metrics
and some of the institutional variables.17
16The concave relationship between consumption and SWB in remote poor areas could be due to the
absence of markets catering for diverse demand for goods and services in rural areas.
17Since satisfaction and happiness are both ordinal, we use Spearman’s pairwise correlation coefficient
instead of Pearson’s pairwise correlation. Using Pearson’s correlation coefficient reveals similar results (not
reported).
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Note: Satisfaction takes values 0, 1, and 2 created by conflation of the 7 scale response.
‘Poverty’ is obtained from respondents evaluation of their household. Respondents choose
any of seven possible categories (‘very rich’, ‘rich’, ‘comfortable’, ‘can manage to get by’,
‘never have quite enough’, ‘poor’, and ‘destitute’). We conflated the last three (never have
quite enough, poor, and destitute) as representing reported ‘Poverty’.
Catholic includes both followers of Catholicism and other minority religions.
Figure 2.1: Mean Values of Satisfaction Across Socio-Economic Characteristics
Note: Poverty and the ’Catholic’ category as defined in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.2: Mean Values of Happiness Across Socio-Economic Characteristics
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Note: Vertical axis (Proportion of satisfied, dissatisfied); Horizontal axis (Decile groups
based on real per capita consumption)
Figure 2.3: Satisfaction and Consumption
Note: Vertical axis (Proportion of happy, unhappy); Horizontal axis (Decile groups based
on real per capita consumption)
Figure 2.4: Happiness and Consumption
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Table 2.6: Spearman’s Pairwise Correlations: SWB and Main Covariates
SATISFACTION HAPPINESS LRCONSUMPTION PC LLIVSTOCK RELIGIOSITY TRUST POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
TRUST
SATISFACTION 1.00
HAPPINESS 0.42*** 1.00
[0.00]
LRCONSUMPTION PC 0.19*** 0.15*** 1.00
[0.0] [0.00]
LLIVSTOCK 0.33*** 0.31*** 0.27*** 1.00
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
RELIGIOSITY 0.02 0.02 -0.06 -0.08** 1.00
[0.54] [0.49] [0.06] [0.01]
TRUST 0.19*** 0.11*** 0.00 0.03 -0.04 1.00
[0.00] [0.00] [0.92[ [0.37] [0.24]
POLITICAL TRUST 0.10*** 0.05 0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.29*** 1.00
[0.00] [0.09] [0.35] [0.62] [0.65] [0.00]
PARTICIPATION 0.15*** 0.09*** 0.07** 0.18*** 0.05 0.02 0.05* 1.00
[0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.10] [0.55] [0.08]
Note
p-values in brackets
Table 2.7: Well-being and Religiosity by Religious Denomination
Religion Satisfaction Happiness Religiosity
Orthodox 1.02 0.79 5.65
(0.73) (0.65) (6.25)
Catholic 0.74 0.62 6.13
(0.70) (0.69) (6.49)
Muslim 0.87 0.74 7.42
(0.77) (0.65) (10.04)
Protestant 0.82 0.78 6.73
(0.68) (0.64) (5.15)
Total 0.93 0.77 6.30
(0.73) (0.65) (7.15)
Note
Catholic includes both followers of Catholicism and other minority religions
Using a non-parametric version of ANOVA test of equality of Populations, the Kruskal Wallis test, we reject equality of the means of satisfaction and religiosity
across the religious denominations. However. The difference in happiness among the religions is not statistically significant at conventional levels.
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Table 2.7 depicts well-being and religiosity levels by religious denominations. Followers
of the Orthodox religion reported the highest life satisfaction among the denominations.
However, the difference in momentary happiness among the major religious denominations
is not statistically different at a 10% significance level. Muslims report the highest average
religiosity levels, followed by Protestants. Protestant, however, report the least variance
in religiosity levels. The lower variance among Protestants can be explained by relatively
more organised weekly Sunday services compared to followers of the other denominations
(for example, EOC followers are more likely to go to church during the days dedicated
to their local saint in addition to Sundays). Hence, the level of religiosity and variability
among followers is correlated to the religious denomination.18 Our measure of religiosity
only captures the participation but not the faith aspect religion. The faith element is
measured by whether individuals believe in God or not, or the number of times they pray.
District level characteristics are shown in Table A.3 of the appendix. Mean satisfaction
and happiness levels differ among the villages.19
The correlations are indicative of a potential predictive relationship between the set of
our main covariates and SWB. The nature of these relationships will be explored in more
detail using econometric analysis.
2.5 Econometric Methodology
Our analysis uses ordered probit methods in common with most of the economic literature
on the determinants of SWB. However, this specification of the standard ordered probit
18The proportion of zero religiosity (individual not going to religious centres) is our sample is about 15%.
Protestant report the least percentage of zero religiosity (4%), followed by Orthodox (14%), Catholics
(21%), and Muslims (28%).
19Using a non-parametric version of ANOVA test of equality of populations, the Kruskal Wallis test,
we reject equality of the means of satisfaction levels across villages (chi-squared = 86.016 with 14 D.F.
probability = 0.0001). The test also rejects equality of happiness across villages (chi-squared = 86.002
with 14 D.F. probability = 0.0001). This implies that some village level characteristics may be driving
part of the differences in well-being levels both among individuals and across villages.
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is based on several assumptions such as normality, homoscedasticity, threshold stability,
which in practise may not be satisfied by the data. Hence, we subject our regression
models to a battery of tests to check for their adequacy.
2.5.1 Standard Ordered Probit
Previous and current SWB surveys are designed to elicit a respondent’s level of agreement
to questions such as whether the person is satisfied with life or not, or to rate the level
of well-being within a certain range. Since there are no units of cardinal measurements
of preference, these responses are ordinal in nature. Hence, only the ordering matters
without any quantitative interpretation attached to the specific number or scale used to
represent such preferences.20
Let y∗i represent the latent index of an individual’s utility level, which is continuous,
and can take any value in the range −∞ < y∗i < ∞ . We assume the latent utility is
related to the observed ordinal satisfaction data as follows:21
y = 0 [Dissatisfied ] if −∞ < y∗i < θ0
y = 1 [Neutral ] if θ0 ≤ y∗i < θ1
y = 2 [Satisfied ] if θ1 ≤ y∗i <∞
A similar formulation applies for happiness.
The unobserved outcome can be expressed as a function of the respondents character-
istics that are assumed to be correlates of the underlying utility (satisfaction or happiness)
function. The literature assumes the latent relationship to be linear as follows:
y∗i = x
′
iβ + ui, ui ∼ N(0, 1) (2.1)
20This is the more common practise in most economic research on SWB while the psychology literature
has, for the most part, assumed cardinality in the SWB response, and hence uses Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS) estimation methods (Ferrer-i Carbonell and Frijters, 2004).
21As discussed in section 2.4, we conflate the original satisfaction responses into three categories.
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With the standard normal assumption of the error term, we can derive the conditional
distribution of the SWB responses (y) given the correlates (x) by computing the general
formulation:
P (y) = Φ(θj − x′β)− Φ(θj−1 − x′β), j = 0, 1, 2 (2.2)
where Φ(.) denotes the cumulative distribution function operator for the standard
normal.
To ensure the identification of the parameters of the model ‘location/reference’ and
‘scale’ need to be defined. In this paper, we estimate the model with a ‘constant ’ term,
and to ensure identification of the thresholds we impose ‘ θ0 = 0 ’ for the first threshold.
The normalisation of the variance of the error term to 1, assumes homoscedasticity.
With these assumptions, Equation (2.2) represents a well-behaved probability model amen-
able to estimation by maximum likelihood methods. The log-likelihood function for the
model is formulated as
logL =
n∑
i=1
2∑
j=0
mij log[Φ(θj − x′β)− Φ(θj−1 − x′β)] (2.3)
Where mij = 1 if individual i’s response falls within the j’s category, and 0 otherwise.
2.5.2 Heteroscedastic Ordered Probit
Subjective well-being data, like in many microeconomic applications, may be susceptible
to heteroscedastic errors. Income is an example of a possible source of such variance that
results in individuals having different extremes in their responses to well-being questions.
It is likely that people at higher ends of the consumption spectrum exhibit greater variation
in satisfaction from consumption compared to those at the lower end in the spirit of
Engle’s Law. After a certain level of income (for example, after basic needs are fulfilled),
individuals are likely to have more diverse demands and hence likely to exhibit more
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divergent responses to specific covariates. Other potential sources of variation in responses
given covariates include the level of emotional stability and age in the case of health-related
well-being questions (Greene et al., 2014). More emotionally unstable individuals are likely
to give more varied responses than emotionally stable ones. Moreover, older individuals
are likely to have a more varied assessment of their health than younger individuals, who
are more likely to consider themselves healthy. The existence of heteroscedasticity results
in biased and inconsistent estimates of the ordered probit model (Litchfield et al., 2012;
Greene and Hensher, 2010).
We use diagnostic tests derived by Machin and Stewart (1990) based on general resid-
uals developed by Gourieroux et al. (1987) to test for heteroscedasticity. The details of the
derivation of the test adopted from Machin and Stewart (1990) are provided in Appendix
A.3.
We account for heteroscedasticity by incorporating a variance function in the ordered
probit model.
σ2i = (e
ω′iγ)2 (2.4)
Where ωi comprises a vector of variables that are the source of the residual variance
and γ is a vector of unknown parameters. We modify the standard probability response
to incorporate the variance function resulting in a modified form of Equation (2.3). The
modified likelihood function now becomes [with standardised mean functions ( β ), and
thresholds ( θ’s)].
logLHetero =
n∑
i=1
2∑
j=0
mij log[Φ(
θj − x′β
eω
′
iγ
)− Φ(θj−1 − x
′β
eω
′
iγ
)] (2.5)
Since there are no strong theoretical foundations as to how the sources of variance can
be modelled, we follow Lemp et al. (2011), Ritter and Vance (2011), and Litchfield et al.
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(2012) in modelling all of the covariates in the variance component using the modified
likelihood function (2.5) and conduct tests to determine the significant variables to be
included in the variance function (2.4). Our analysis reveals that logarithm of per capita
consumption and location (district dummies) to be the significant sources of variation for
the satisfaction model. For the happiness model, we find logarithm of livestock-holding
and location to be the sources of heteroscedastic errors.
2.6 Results and Discussion
2.6.1 Overall Results
Table 2.8 reports Standard and Heteroscedastic Ordered Probit regressions for satisfaction
and happiness without including religion-religiosity interaction terms. In comport with the
literature on the subject, own and relative consumption per capita, livestock ownership,
general trust, government trust, participation in formal and informal institutions, and
religiosity all positively predict life satisfaction. Own consumption per capita,Omitted
livestock ownership, and general trust positively correlate with momentary happiness.
However, as discussed in section 2.4 religiosity levels are correlated with religious de-
nominations. Moreover, since some of the denominations, typically Catholicism and Prot-
estantism, are relatively new to the country and a minority, the implication of religiosity on
well-being can depend on the type of religion. Hence, the inclusion of ‘religion-religiosity’
interactions terms is essential.22
Regression results of the standard ordered probit models are reported in Table 2.9. As
shown in the table, the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is rejected for both the life
satisfaction happiness models at conventional significance level. Hence, we incorporate a
variance function based on the logarithm of real consumption per capita, and the district
22Omitted variables tests (not reported) of the interactions of religion and religiosity with general trust
indicate that omitting those variables is empirically justified.
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controls for the satisfaction model. Similarly, a variance function based on the logarithm
of livestock holding and the district controls is adopted to address the heteroscedasticity
for the happiness model. Hence, our main analysis relies on the heteroscedastic model.
The variance functions based on the log of consumption per capita and the log of
livestock holdings are significant at conventional levels for the satisfaction and happiness
models respectively. Likewise, district dummies are also significant in both models. As
expected households at the high-end of consumption per capita report higher variability of
responses in satisfaction to changes in the covariates as indicated by a significant positive
coefficient in the variance function. In the happiness model, the log of livestock holding
has been found to be the significant source of variation. The significant negative coefficient
of log livestock in the variance function means that livestock-rich households exhibit a less
varied response to happiness than their poorer counterparts. This might be taken to reflect
the importance of livestock as an insulator against shocks for livestock-rich households
(see, for example, Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) for the role of bullocks for consumption
smoothing in India, and Gilligan and Hoddinott (2007) in Ethiopia).23 However, it is
puzzling that this variance effect is not detected in the satisfaction equation itself. The
more standard variables such as ’illness’ and ’age’ that are expected to be sources of
variances in health-related well-being as suggested by (Greene et al., 2014), do not yield
significant variance effects in our models.
23Gilligan and Hoddinott (2007) finds that 40% of households in the ERHS data sold livestock to smooth
consumption during the 2002 drought.
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Table 2.8: Determinants of SWB: Ordered Probit Estimates Without Interaction Terms
STANDARED ORDERED PROBIT HETEROSCEDASTIC ORDERED PROBIT
Satisfaction Happiness Satisfaction Happiness
Coef. St.Er. Coef. St.Er. Coef. St.Er. Coef. St.Er.
Constant -1.66*** 0.36 -0.92** 0.36 -2.09*** 0.75 -0.62** 0.26
Welfare Metrics
LRCONSUMPTION PC .25*** 0.06 .16** 0.06 0.36*** 0.12 0.11** 0.04
LLIVESTOCK .51*** 0.07 .48*** 0.07 0.60*** 0.19 0.36*** 0.07
Institutions
TRUST .11*** 0.02 .05** 0.02 0.11*** 0.04 0.03** 0.02
POLITICAL TRUST .07*** 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.08** 0.04 0.02 0.02
PARTICIPATION .21** 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.27** 0.13 0.02 0.06
Religion and Religiosity
RELIGIOSITY .014*** 0.005 0.01 0.01 0.015* 0.008 0.005 0.003
CATHOLIC -0.16 0.18 0.16 0.19 -0.06 0.21 0.11 0.10
MUSLIM -0.21 0.15 -0.10 0.15 -0.25 0.20 -0.09 0.11
PROTESTANT 0.09 0.16 0.22 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.15 0.10
Others
VILLAGE CONTROLS Yes Yes Yes Yes
CONTROLS Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mu (1) 1.48*** 0.06 1.81*** 0.06 1.82** 0.52 1.16*** 0.20
OBSERVATIONS 1114 1114 1114 1114
Variance Function
LRCONSP 0.11** 0.06
LLIVESTOCK -0.19*** 0.06
VILLAGE CONTROLS Yes Yes
Note
Control variables not reported include land holding size, education, illness, gender, age, and
number of younger and older children.
Mu (1) refers to the first cut-off/threshold
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively using
two-tailed tests.
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Table 2.9: Determinants of Subjective Well-being: Standard Ordered Probit
DEP.VAR. SATISFACTION HAPPINESS
Coef. St.Er. Coef. St.Er.
CONSTANT -1.5*** 0.36 -0.86*** 0.37
Welfare Metrics
LRCONSUMPTION PC .24*** 0.06 .17** 0.06
LLIVESTOCK .51*** 0.07 .48*** 0.07
Institutions
TRUST .11*** 0.02 .05** 0.02
POLITICAL TRUST .07*** 0.02 0.04 0.02
PARTICIPATION .21** 0.09 0.01 0.09
Religion and Religiosity
RELIGIOSITY -0.001 0.01 0.003 0.01
CATHOLIC -0.12 0.24 0.3 0.24
MUSLIM -.33** 0.16 -0.13 0.17
PROTESTANT -0.13 0.19 0.02 0.2
CATHOLIC*RELIGIOSITY -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.03
MUSLIM*RELIGIOSITY .02* 0.01 0.002 0.01
PROTESTANT*RELIGIOSITY .04** 0.02 .03* 0.02
Others
VILLAGE CONTROLS Yes - Yes -
CONTROLS Yes - Yes -
Mu (1) 1.48* 0.06 1.81* 0.06
Diagnostics [P-Values in Parenthesis]
OBSERVATIONS 1114 1114
LOG-LIKELIHOOD VALUE -1017.59 -930.5
HETEROSCEDASTICITY 82.5*** (0.00) 75.3*** (0.00)
Note
Control variables not reported include land holding size, education, illness, gender, Household
Size age, and number of younger and older children.
Mu (1) refers to the first cut-off/threshold
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively using
two-tailed tests.
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Table 2.10: Determinants of Subjective Well-being: Heteroscedastic Ordered
Probit
DEP.VAR. SATISFACTION HAPPINESS
Coef. St.Er. Coef. St.Er.
CONSTANT -1.83*** 0.68 -0.55** 0.26
Welfare Metricss
LRCONSUMPTION PC 0.34*** 0.11 0.11** 0.04
LLIVESTOCK 0.57*** 0.18 0.36*** 0.07
Institutions
TRUST 0.11*** 0.04 0.03* 0.02
POLITICAL TRUST 0.08** 0.04 0.02 0.02
PARTICIPATION 0.26** 0.13 0.02 0.06
Religion and Religiosity
RELIGIOSITY -0.004 0.01 0.001 0.01
CATHOLIC -0.09 0.25 0.22 0.14
MUSLIM -0.40* 0.22 -0.13 0.12
PROTESTANT -0.07 0.2 0.05 0.12
CATHOLIC*RELIGIOSITY 0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.02
MUSLIM*RELIGIOSITY 0.03* 0.02 0.004 0.01
PROTESTANT*RELIGIOSITY 0.04** 0.02 0.02 0.01
Others
VILLAGE CONTROLS Yes - Yes -
CONTROLS Yes - Yes -
Mu (1) 1.75*** 0.5 1.17*** 0.2
Variance Function
LRCONSUMPTION PC 0.10* 0.06
LLIVESTOCK - - -0.18* 0.06
VILLAGE CONTROLS Yes - Yes -
Diagnostics [P-Values in Parenthesis]
OBSERVATIONS 1114 1114
LOG-LIKELIHOOD VALUE -998.3 -913.7
PSEUDO R-Sq. 0.15 0.15
Note
Control variables not reported include land holding size, education, illness, gender, age, and
number of younger and older children.
Mu (1) refers to the first cut-off/threshold
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively
using two-tailed tests.
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Table 2.8 reveals that religiosity positively predicts satisfaction in both the standard
and heteroscedastic regressions without religion-religiosity interactions. However, the level
of religiosity is related to the religious denomination in our data as shown in Table 2.7. A
possible explanation for religious denomination affecting religiosity levels is that some of
the religions are relatively new and small in size, and hence are more active in expanding
their faiths and tend to have more active followers. This is especially true of Protestants
and Catholics.
Therefore, we focus on the ordered probit estimates that involve religion-religiosity
interactions. Tables 2.9 and 2.10 report estimates with religion-religiosity interactions.
Following the results of the heteroscedasticity tests, our analysis focuses on the Heteros-
cedastic model reported in Table 2.10. The results are qualitatively comparable to that
of the standard model, but the coefficients and the standard errors are larger in absolute
terms.
The results are generally in comport with the findings reported in previous studies
with some interesting differences. Economic status and social-institutional factors such
as religiosity, trust, quality of local governance, marital status, and participation in local
institutions significantly affect well-being. The results indicate that happiness tends to
reflect welfare metrics and more recent events such as a current illness, while responses to
general satisfaction questions indicate respondents’ evaluations of their overall status of
well-being taking into consideration broader socio-economic characteristics. Happiness has
fewer significant predictors compared to life satisfaction. This could be because happiness
is momentary, thus more fickle.24
24Some covariates such as marital status, education, illness, gender are not reported in our main regres-
sion tables.
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2.6.2 Main Results
Consumption per capita and livestock holding emerge as strong predictors of both life
satisfaction and happiness. An analysis of the marginal effects from the Heteroscedastic
model reported in Table 2.11 reveals each additional consumption (in logarithmic form)
makes an average individual nine percentage points less likely to report ‘dissatisfied’ and
eight percentage points more likely to report ‘satisfied. This implies that a 5% increase in
consumption decreases the probability of reporting ‘dissatisfied’ by 0.45 of a percentage
point, and increase the probability of reporting ‘satisfied’ by 0.4 of a percentage point.The
positive role of these welfare metrics is evident in all specifications.
In addition to own income, relative income (relative consumption) compared to neigh-
bours or peers can potentially affect SWB. However, due to lack appropriate information
on neighbours or smaller geographic unit, we have not included a measure of relative in-
come in our main models. Most studies in developing countries have reported little or no
effect of relative income on SWB. For example, Ravallion and Lokshin (2010) find little
support for positional concern (measured by relative deprivation) for most poor house-
holds in Malawi with the exception of the relatively well-off. Similarly, Using surveys of
two separate villages in Northern Ethiopia Akay and Martinsson (2011) and Akay et al.
(2012) studied the role of ‘positional concern’ using experimental methods and find no
evidence for the existence of positional concern as defined by the income of others in the
community. One potential measure of relative income could be per capita consumption
quartiles by village and include an indicator of which quartiles an individual belongs to.
Regression results of our satisfaction and happiness models with this measure are provided
in Table A.4 in the appendix. The overall results remain robust to the inclusion of the
quartiles of consumption. For the life satisfaction model, the fourth quartile report sur-
prisingly lower satisfaction than the first which could reflect the concave nature of the role
of income (consumption) on satisfaction rather than an indication of the role of relative
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income. The other quartiles do not report a significant difference in satisfaction relative
to the first one. There are no significance differences in happiness among the difference
quartiles. However, since we also have a measure of consumption and village fixed effects,
we can not identify the role of relative income (consumption) in this context. Hence, the
results could only be taken as only indicative.
Table 2.11: Marginal Effects of Selected Variables
MARGINAL EFFECTS
LIFE SATISFACTION HAPPINESS
0 1 2 0 1 2
LRCONSUMPTION PC -0.09 0.01 0.08 -0.06 0.04 0.02
LLIVESTOCK -0.16 0.03 0.13 -0.21 0.12 0.08
RELIGIOSITY 0.001 -0.0002 -0.0009 -0.0005 0.003 0.0004
CATHOLIC*RELIGIOSITY -0.003 0.0004 0.002 0.01 -0.005 -0.004
MUSLIM*RELIGIOSITY -0.008 0.001 0.007 -0.003 0.002 0.001
PROTESTANT*RELIGIOSITY -0.01 0.002 0.01 -0.01 0.007 0.004
TRUST -0.03 0.005 0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.01
POLITICAL TRUST -0.03 0.003 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.004
PARTICIPATION -0.07 0.01 0.06 -0.012 0.007 0.005
Note
The Marginal Effects are based the the Heteroscedastic Ordered Probit estimates reported in
Table 2.10
The results reveal that religiosity has a differential impact on SWB based on religious
denomination. Muslims report significantly lower satisfaction levels than Orthodox Chris-
tians. Catholics and Protestants also exhibit lower satisfaction levels albeit the difference
is not statistically different at a conventional level of significance. On the other hand,
religious Muslims and Protestants report significantly higher satisfaction levels than Or-
thodox Christians revealing a differentiated role for religiosity on well-being. Muslims and
Protestants report significantly higher religiosity levels than their Orthodox counterparts
in the survey. The marginal effects reported in Table 2.11 reveal that being a religious
Muslim makes an individual 0.8 percentage points less likely to report dissatisfied and 0.7
percentage points more likely to report satisfied. Similarly, being a religious protestant
makes an individual one percentage points less likely to report being dissatisfied and one
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percentage points more likely to report being satisfied. The positive role of religiosity in
newly introduced religions in Ethiopia such as Protestantism can be indicative that reli-
gion can create a platform for the development of social capital for minority groups. Azzi
and Ehrenberg (1975) find a similar result for racial minorities for the US.
Unlike with the general life satisfaction model, religion and religiosity do not feature
as significant determinants in the happiness model. This is indicative of a subtle charac-
teristic, often overlooked in well-being studies, which is that respondents can differentiate
between general satisfaction and momentary happiness. This is especially so in religious
communities that consider future gains from religion (such as going to heaven) in their
general satisfaction function but not so in happiness function as it tends to be temporary
in nature. For example, a religious person who fasts and avoids feasts may report low
responses for momentary happiness, but higher in the overall response to life satisfaction.
Moreover, in the event of adverse circumstances, while temporary happiness can drop for
religious and non-religious people alike, the overall satisfaction of religious people may not
drop significantly as they are likely to attribute the bad events to the will of God (see
for example Pollner (1989), Ellison (1991), Frey and Stutzer (2002), Inglehart and Norris
(2004) regarding the soothing role of religion in times adversary)).
As in many studies in developing and developed economies general trust among the
people and trust in local political officials emerge as strong correlates of satisfaction and
happiness in our data. In developing countries, people are dependent on each other and
their community in everyday life. Labour sharing in farming and sharing of costs dur-
ing important social events such as weddings and mourning are hallmarks of life in rural
areas. Hence, social capital in the form of trust is an important element. Moreover, in
those regions where formal political and administrative institutions are not fully developed,
informal institutions based on trust play an important role in society by creating peace
and stability in the community and the management of communal resources. A measure of
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general trust emerges as a robust determinant of SWB in our satisfaction model as reflec-
ted in its large magnitude of 0.11 of a standard deviation and its statistical significance at
the 1% level. The marginal effects from the Heteroscedastic model reported in Table 2.11
reveal each additional level of trust makes an average individual three percentage points
less likely to report ‘dissatisfied’ and three percentage points more likely to report ‘satis-
fied’. Other studies that find as strong a direct effect of trust on SWB include Bjørnskov
(2003) for more aﬄuent countries, Helliwell (2003) for individual-level data across many
countries controlling for national trust levels; Helliwell and Putnam (1995) using cross-
country and national surveys for US and Canada; and Asadullah and Chaudhury (2012)
in rural Bangladesh.
Confidence in political institutions (government trust) is a statistically robust predictor
of SWB. The role of political trust on life satisfaction is not statistically different from that
of the effect of general trust.25 However, while the general trust positively affects both life
satisfaction and happiness, confidence in local political institutions affects life satisfaction,
but not happiness. The role of local political institutions in rural households is paramount.
In the context of rural Ethiopia, the role of local administrative units includes land and
agricultural input allocation, arbitration during conflict, food aid distribution, and safety
net participation. Hence, the confidence that households have in such institutions that
play a significant role in their lives affects them directly through a sense of security and
indirectly through effects on resource allocation. Studies that find a positive role of quality
of governance and political freedom on SWB include Helliwell (2006) and Diener and
Diener (2009), both using cross-country data. On the other hand, Veenhoven (2000)
finds that a stronger role of political freedom on SWB in richer countries, while economic
freedom has a stronger effect in poorer countries. Our finding implies that effective and
25The Wald test indicates that we can not reject the null hypothesis that the difference between the
effects of general and political trust on life satisfaction is zero.
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transparent political institutions at a local level are highly beneficial for household self-
reported satisfaction.
It is interesting to note that general trust significantly predicts life satisfaction and
momentary happiness while political trust affects life satisfaction but not momentary
happiness. This is a sensible result as an individual’s trust in political institutions affects
their overall welfare but has little significance in momentary emotions. On the other hand
general trust that is crucial in the day to day interactions with people surrounding the
individual is important for both an overall well-being and a momentary happiness.
Participation in local institutions in the form of having an official position in com-
munity organisations, local administrative committees, or religious institutions, is posit-
ively associated with life satisfaction while not so with happiness.26 This implies that
such positions can be fulfilling regarding the overall objective and purpose of life and the
sense of contribution to society. However, shouldering the responsibility and ensuring the
smooth operation of institutions in poor areas may involve stress and also use up time
which otherwise would have been spent on family or other domestic activities.27 This
implies that participatory political and socio-economic institutions can boost well-being.
Using survey data from Switzerland, Frey and Stutzer (2000) find people in regions with
more developed institutions of direct democracy report significantly higher levels of self-
reported well-being.
Similarly, the distinctive effective of religiosity on life satisfaction and happiness is
another interesting finding. In line with Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975) individuals take
the after-life utility into account when evaluating their overall well-being as reflected in
religiosity being a predictor of life satisfaction but not of momentary happiness.
26Such positions are usually voluntary and hence not paid.
27The marginal effects from the Heteroscedastic model reported in Table 2.11 reveal that participation
decreases the probability of reporting ‘dissatisfied’ by seven percentage and increases the probability of
reporting ‘satisfied’ by six percentage points.
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Table 2.12: Trade-offs between Selected Covariates: Slopes of Indifference
Curves
Slope for a given Satisfaction level Standard Heteroscedastic
Order Probit Order Probit
Change in per capita consumption required
to compensate for extra day in church/mosque
-0.056**
(0.03)
-0.04**
(0.02)
Change in livestock holdings required
to compensate for extra day in church/mosque
-0.027**
(0.01)
-0.025**
(0.01)
Change in per capita consumption required
to compensate for an extra trust level
-0.43***
(0.13)
-0.32***
(0.1)
Change in per capita consumption required
to compensate for an extra government trust level
-0.29***
(0.11)
-0.23***
(0.09)
Note
Based on Table 2.8 for a more straightforward treatment of religiosity as we don’t include
interactions
Standard Errors are calculated by the Delta Method
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively
using two-tailed tests;
In summary, the differential impact of institutions on life satisfaction and moment-
ary happiness is in comport with Deaton’s (2008) and Stevenson and Wolfers’s (2008)
proposition that life satisfaction and happiness are not synonymous.
To get a sense of the relative importance of the determinants of SWB, we can construct
‘indifference curves’ between any two continuous covariates whose slopes represent the
‘marginal rate of substitution’ between them. The indifference curves represent various
combinations of two covariates that yield the same level of satisfaction. In the current
application, the slopes of the indifference curves are given by the minus of the ratio of their
β-coefficients (see, for example, Stewart et al. (2004) and Litchfield et al. (2012)). Table
2.12 reports indifference curves for an average individual for selected covariates based on
the estimates of Table 2.8.
Focusing on the heteroscedastic models, the slopes of the indifference curves reveal
that individuals are willing to sacrifice a 5% of consumption for an additional visit to a
church/mosque to stay at the same level of satisfaction. This implies that the value of a
visit to a church/mosque is equivalent to 5% of their per capita consumption. Similarly,
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one extra visit to a church/mosque per month offsets the loss in satisfaction due to a
reduction of 2.6% of livestock holdings. A one point increase, which is large relative to the
mean, in general trust or government trust, can compensate for 32% and 23% reduction in
consumption per capita respectively. With a mean of 4.37, a one-point increase in general
trust corresponds to 23% in percentage terms. Similarly, with an average of 4.19, a one-
point increase in government trust corresponds to 24% in percentage terms. Therefore, a
23% increase in general trust compensates a reduction in consumption of 32%. Moreover,
a 24% increase in government trust compensates for a decrease in consumption of 23%.28
The sizes of the effects of trust (general and government) are surprisingly large. It can
be due to the absence of formal institutions in rural areas. Since we have not adequately
controlled for potential endogeneity of these factors, the results should be taken only as
indicative.
2.6.3 Robustness, Alternative Measures and Estimation
To test the robustness of the coefficients of our main variables of interest to the inclusion
of controls, we run ordered probit regression for general life satisfaction with and without
various control variables. As shown in Table A.5 in the appendix, our main variables of
interest are robust to the inclusion of controls.
To check whether conflation of our main measure of life satisfaction results in difference
estimates, we run an ordered probit estimation using the seven scale category. Column
1 of Table 2.13 reports the result of this exercise. The result is broadly similar to the
one with conflated satisfaction measure. Column 2 provides OLS estimates of an 11-rung
satisfaction question (satisfaction ladder) where respondents were asked to put themselves
in a satisfaction ladder from ‘0’ to ‘10’ where ‘0’ is the worst and ‘10’ the best possible
satisfaction level. Similarly, the OLS estimates are comparable to that of our main results
28A t-test shows that the increase required either in general trust or government trust to offset a reduction
in consumption are not statistically different at conventional levels.
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based on ordered probit methods. For example, the OLS estimates reveal that, ceteris
paribus, that a 10% increase in consumption per capita is associated with 0.029 points
increase in the satisfaction. Moreover, a one point increase in the general trust and
government trust is related to a 0.12 and 0.05 increase in satisfaction responses respectively.
With mean values of 4.42 for the satisfaction ladder, and 4.37 and 4.19 for the general
trust and political trust , respectively, the impacts of such institutions on satisfaction
are not trivial. The broadly similar result for the different specifications and measures of
well-being is indicative of the robustness of our models.
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Table 2.13: Alternative Definitions and Estimation: Ordered Probit and OLS
Dep. Var. 7-Category satisfaction 11- Category Satisfaction
(not conflated)
Ordered Probit OLS
Welfare Metrics
LRCONSUMPTION PC 0.18*** 0.29***
LLIVESTOCK 0.49*** 0.90***
Institutions
TRUST 0.10*** 0.12***
POLITICAL TRUST 0.06*** 0.05*
PARTICIPATION 0.23*** 0.01
Religion and Religiosity
RELIGIOSITY 0.0003 -0.01
CATHOLIC -0.42 0.23
MUSLIM -0.27 -0.21
PROTESTANT 0.07 -0.08
OTHER RELIGION -0.07 0.23
CATHOLIC*RELIGIOSITY -0.00 -0.05
MUSLIM*RELIGIOSITY 0.02* 0.03*
PROTESTANT*RELIGIOSITY 0.04** 0.04*
RELOTHER 0.06* -0.05
CONSTANT -0.27
Others
VILLAGE CONTROLS Yes Yes
CONTROLS Yes Yes
Mu(1) 0.98
Mu(2) 2.10***
Mu(3) 2.60***
Mu(4) 2.83***
Mu(5) 3.61***
Mu(6) 5.19***
N 1114 1114
R-Sq. 0.321
PSEUDO R-Sq. 0.096
Note
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively
using two-tailed tests;
Mu(i) refers to the ’i’ s’ cut-off/threshold
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2.7 Conclusions and Recommendations
Using rich survey data from rural Ethiopia this chapter has studied the determinants of
subjective well-being using a heteroscedastic ordered probit model with particular em-
phasis on the role religious, social, and political institutions. While our results are gener-
ally in comport with the literature, there are some differences that reflect the specificity
of rural areas in developing countries.
Trust in the general public and trust in local political officials emerge as strong correl-
ates of satisfaction and happiness. This signifies the importance of trust in areas where
formal institutions are not developed. The recent devolution of power to lower adminis-
tration levels in Ethiopia means well functioning political institutions are important for
household well-being. On a related issue, participation in formal and informal institu-
tions emerges as a strong predictor of life satisfaction implying participatory democratic
institutions even in rural areas play a crucial role in determining well-being.
Religiosity has a differential impact on well-being based on the religious denomina-
tions. Religious Muslims and Protestants report higher satisfaction levels than Orthodox
Christians. However, religiosity has no statistically significant impact on momentary hap-
piness. The positive role of religiosity on general life satisfaction but not on momentary
happiness could indicate religious individuals incorporate after-life-gains such as going to
heaven, in their utility function.
The level of consumption, which can capture income levels, is positively related to both
general life satisfaction and happiness. The relationship is concave. Given that most of
the districts in the sample are drawn from poor, vulnerable areas, it is not conceivable to
think the concave relationship stems from richer households being able to meet basic ma-
terial needs. A more plausible explanation is well functioning markets catering for diverse
demands are weak or non-existent, and hence additional income not being translated into
immediate utility.
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From a methodological point of view, the results indicate happiness responses tend
to reflect welfare metrics; while responses to general satisfaction questions indicate that
respondents evaluate their overall status of well-being taking into consideration broader
socio-economic and institutional characteristics. Hence, happiness and general life satis-
faction data convey related, yet distinctive information. The differential impact of insti-
tutions on life satisfaction and momentary happiness is in comport with Deaton’s (2008)
and Stevenson and Wolfers’s (2008) proposition that life satisfaction and happiness are
not synonymous.
54
Chapter 3
Tall Paper Walls: The Political
Economy of Visas and
Cross-border Travel
3.1 Introduction
People have always travelled across villages, towns, districts, and regions on a temporary
or permanent basis to varying degrees. After the birth of nation states, people crossed
borders for many reasons (see, for example, Nayyar (2002) for a brief history of labour
migration). They travelled for potential economic gains, safety reasons (such as fleeing
persecution or the outbreak of diseases), business, tourism, and personal purposes. Some
movements were random and on a small scale, while others, such as the Jewish exodus,
were in large numbers.
In this study, we investigate the determinants of the temporary cross-border flow of
people. We focus on short-term outbound travel, as defined by the United Nations World
Tourism Organization (UNWTO), where travellers stay from one night up to (but not
more than) one year in destinations other than their permanent country of residence. This
bilateral data constitute travel for business and leisure (personal and tourism) purposes.
Travel and tourism is one of the fastest growing sectors in many economies. In 2013,
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the direct share of travel and tourism in world GDP was about 3%. In the same year,
including the indirect benefits (wider effects from investment and supply chains) the share
of travel and tourism expenditure to GDP was 9.5%. Similarly, in the same year, it
contributed 3.4% of employment directly, and 8.5% of employment when indirect sectors
are also included (WTTC, 2014).1
In addition to its contribution to GDP and employment, cross-border travel boosts
knowledge exchange and technology transfer (see, for example, Andersen and Dalgaard
(2011) for the role of cross-border travel on aggregate productivity). It can also generate
trade, FDI, and associated benefits. Hence, studying the determinants of cross-border
travel can help identify the appropriate policy tools to enhance it. The determinants of
cross-border travel have been vastly studied in the context of tourism demand focusing
mainly on economic factors such as currency exchange rates and income. However, research
on the role of policy interventions such as visas remains thin.
Despite a visa being the main tool for allowing or inhibiting access to foreign borders,
its effect on the flow of people has rarely been studied. Lack of readily available data
has often been cited as one of the main reasons for a lack of research on visa policies.
Neumayer (2010) finds visa restrictions reduce cross-border travel significantly with sub-
stantial regional variation. By restricting personal contact across borders, visas hamper
trade and FDI flows (Neumayer, 2011). Li and Song (2013) find that a restrictive visa
policy was a major factor in the 2008 Beijing Olympics resulting in substantial economic
and welfare losses for China.
This essay mainly aims to contribute to the research on visa policies and their impact
on cross-border travel. It is based on a gravity model of a cross-section of countries for
2005 and 2010. Visa policies are persistent and slow-changing; hence, the change in such
1For detailed data on the contribution of the travel and tourism sector, see the World Travel and
Tourism Council website http://www.wttc.org/datagateway.
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policies between 2005 and 2010 is small. Moreover, most of the covariates are geography
based, and hence do not vary with time. For these reasons, we conduct a cross-sectional
analysis for 2005 and 2010 separately instead of panel analysis.
A potential source of endogeneity is that unobserved factors could affect both travel
and visas simultaneously. We use Instrumental Variable (IV) methods to address this
problem. In particular, we use the United Nations General Assembly Voting Affinity
Scores - a measure of how similar or different countries vote, as instruments for visa
policies. To tackle the challenge posed by the existence of many zeros in the travel data
in estimation, we use the Heckman Two-Step procedure to account for truncation.
We find that imposing a visa restriction results in an 80% and 73% reduction in cross-
border travel in 2005 and 2010 respectively. We find similar results using alternative
Poisson and Zero-Inflated Poisson models. Our analysis reveals that 22% of bilateral visa
policies can be predicted by the quality of the bilateral relationship between countries as
measured by the voting affinity scores in the UN General Assembly.
Using aggregate country-level data, we also find an adverse impact of restrictive visa
policies on travel and tourism-related revenues and employment. On average a 10 per-
centage point increase in visa restrictions induces a 11% and 8.6% decreases in travel and
tourism-related expenditures and employment respectively.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 presents a review of the
related literature. Section 3.3 provides a description of the data used and summary statist-
ics. Section 3.4 presents the econometric methodology and specifies the empirical model,
and is followed by section 3.5 containing results and a discussion of the main models.
Section 3.6 provides a brief analysis of the impact of visa policies on travel and tourism
related expenditure and employment. Section 3.7 concludes.2
2The statistical software used to estimate the models in this chapter is Stata 13 (StataCorp, 2013).
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3.2 Literature Review
Research on the determinants of the temporary cross-border flows of people has taken two
main strands (Eilat and Einav, 2004). One strand considers travel as a form of trade in
services and applies gravity models. As pointed out in Eilat and Einav (2004), despite
trade in services comprising up to 20% of all trade, research on this topic is limited.
Kimura and Lee (2006) find that gravity models fit trade in services better than trade in
goods. Several studies have separately studied tourism (as opposed to other components
of trade in services) in the context of trade-gravity models. Early studies of this kind
include Malamud (1973), Durden and Silberman (1975), and Kliman (1981). Due to the
lack of a strong theoretical background for the gravity models, interest in travel research
using such models declined throughout the 1980s and 1990s.
After Anderson and Van Wincoop (2001) developed a theoretical foundation for the
gravity models of trade, however, there has been a re-emergence of gravity models in
travel research. Morley et al. (2014) developed a theoretical framework for gravity models
of travel based on individual utility. In a travel-gravity model context, Eilat and Einav
(2004) and Culiuc (2014), among others, study the determinants of bilateral travel flow by
analysing a vast array of geographic, cultural and economic variables through time. Keum
(2010) and Massidda and Etzo (2012) use panel data methods to explore the determinants
of inbound tourism to South Korea and Italy respectively. Other studies have used the
gravity model to explore the role of specific policies or events on cross-border travel.
For example, the role of infrastructure on tourism (Khadaroo and Seetanah, 2008), the
impact of visa restriction on travel (Neumayer, 2010), the role of mega-sporting events
on inbound tourism (Fourie and Santana-Gallego, 2011), and the effect of cultural ties
(especially religious affiliation) on inbound tourism to the US (Vietze, 2012).
In general, the gravity-based models find that income (in countries of origin and des-
tination), relative price levels (including exchange rate in some cases), cultural and geo-
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graphic proximity, and shocks and policies matter for cross-border travel. Specifically
higher income of countries of origin and destination, geographic proximity, cultural simil-
arity (for example same language) boost travel. On the other hand, prices in the country
of destination and exchange rates (domestic currency in terms foreign currency), and visa
requirements discourage travel. However, responses of travel to those variables are not
uniform across regions. For example, Eilat and Einav (2004) find exchange rates matter
mainly for tourism to developed countries.
The second category of studies views tourism as a distinct sector from other forms of
trade that requires a separate treatment. Most studies in this category focus on tourism
demand modelling and forecasting dealing with specific factors such as income, prices
(consumer prices index or exchange rate), and transportation costs (Crouch, 1994). Most
of these studies focus on tourist arrivals to a single country from either a specific selection
of countries or from the rest of the world. Out of 119 published papers on tourism between
2000 and 2006 reviewed by Song and Li (2008), more than 95% focus on arrivals of tourists
to a single country. While such studies can shed useful insights on the evolution of tourism
patterns in a single country, comparison among various tourist destinations is not possible.
A detailed review of 80 empirical studies on international tourism demand conducted
from the 1960s up to late 1980s by Crouch (1994) reveals that 84% of them employed OLS.
Several studies have also used the old-fashioned Cochrane-Orcutt based regressions as a
means of dealing with serial correlation issues. The majority of these studies were based
on annual time-series data. A meta-analysis of these studies by the same author Crouch
(1995) finds that in 70% of the cases the income elasticity of demand is found to be greater
than unity, indicating that tourism is a luxury commodity. He also finds the sensitivity
of tourism to income varying from region to region. For example, the developed part of
Asia (mainly Japan) has the highest elasticity of income. In 69% of cases, income has
had a positive effect on tourism demand as expected. The remaining negative elasticity
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of income could point to a strong income effect (budget constraint) or complementarity
with alternative destinations (Crouch (1992) as cited in Crouch (1994)). Studies that
modelled exchange rate separately from destination prices (assuming traveller would be
more sensitive to such measures) find a stronger exchange rate effect of tourism rather
than price. In addition to economic factors (income and prices), several early studies
included dummies to account for shocks such as political unrest, special events (such as
Olympics), and travel restrictions (limits on foreign spending).
Studies on determinants of tourist demand in the last five decades have consistently
(but to varying degrees) shown that income of origin country, relative prices in origin
and destination country, and exchange rates as the most important factors (Crouch, 1994;
Li et al., 2005; Song and Li, 2008). Most studies focus on tourism flows into a single
country or into a select set of countries, which mainly comprise countries from Europe,
North America and the developed parts of Asia. As pointed out in Li et al. (2005) tourism
studies in the 1990s onwards paid more attention to regression model diagnostics than
those conducted earlier.
Most of the travel studies have tried to incorporate the role of various shocks that
can affect estimation such as the incidence of Olympics or the oil price shocks of the
1970s. However, a crucial policy tool in cross-border travel (i.e., visa policy) has been
rarely studied. Countries use visas as the ultimate tool to allow or hinder access to their
borders. Many countries exempt the citizens of certain countries from visa requirement
to boost tourism.
Two notable studies that deal with student visas are Jena and Reilly (2013) and
Shih (2016). Jena and Reilly (2013) investigate the determinants of UK student visa
demand from developing countries and find bilateral exchange rate to be a more important
factor than GDP of the source country. They also find no statistically significant effect
of monetary cost of visas on demand for student visas. Shih (2016) finds that issuance of
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H-1B visa (a non-immigrant visa that allows US companies to employ foreign workers) to
a country significantly increases the number of international students from that country
implying that flexible visa policies encourage inbound student mobility.
The few studies that incorporated visa in the context of cross-border travel include
Neiman and Swagel (2009), Neumayer (2006), and Neumayer (2010). Neiman and Swagel
(2009) explores the reasons for reduction of inbound travel to the US after the 9/11
terrorist attacks by comparing travel from countries the under the US Visa Waiver program
with those that are not. Neumayer (2006) and Neumayer (2010) investigate the role of
visas on cross-border flows of people, and find a detrimental impact of visas on travel.
However, Neumayer acknowledges that the impact of visas in his studies may have been
underestimated due to potential multicollinearity as the other covariates that affect travel
such as distance could also affect visas.
3.3 Data, Definitions, and Descriptive Statistics
3.3.1 Travel and Visa Policies
We measure bilateral outbound travel by the log of the total number of travellers from
country ‘i’ to country ‘j’ in 2005 and 2010 for tourism, personal and business purposes.
We construct dyads of the bilateral outbound travel from arrival data recorded by na-
tional statistical offices and reported to UNWTO. The data on arrivals are obtained from
UNWTO (UNWTO, 2014).3
The bilateral outbound travel data constitutes travel for business and leisure (personal
and tourism) purposes. However, the data are not disaggregated into business and leisure.
Disaggregated data for business and leisure are only available on a country basis, but not
a bilateral basis from the UNWTO. For example, a country disaggregates total arrivals
3We construct the dyads by consolidating the separate excel files that the UNWTO keeps for each
country.
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from the rest of the world as ’business’ and ’leisure’, but not arrivals from each country
(bilateral basis). From aggregate country-level data, the proportion of business and leisure
arrivals differs from country to country. In countries where the tourism sector contributes
a significant share of GDP, the proportion of arrival for leisure is higher than for business.
For example, in 2012 Dominican Republic, a highly tourism-dependent country, had 97%
of arrivals for leisure. Similarly, in the same year France, with a strong tourism sector,
had 88% of its arrival for leisure. On the other hand, China, Ethiopia, and the UK had
77%, 68%, and 77.5% of their arrival for leisure (UNWTO, 2014).
The collection and recording of inbound travel differ across countries. Some countries
record arrivals at borders while others report arrivals at hotels and similar establishments.
Close to 90% of the countries report arrivals at borders. Among those countries that record
arrivals at borders more than 70% of them exclude same-day travellers. Such variation
in collection and recording methods could pose a bias in cross-country analysis. However,
since each country’s way of recording applies consistently to all its sources of travellers,
the potential bias due to a difference in measurement approaches is attenuated in gravity-
based models. Examples of recent studies that use these data in gravity models include
Eilat and Einav (2004), Andersen and Dalgaard (2011), and Culiuc (2014).
Visa policies take three forms - visas before arrival, on arrival, and exemption. Visas
on arrival are mainly motivated by a need to generate revenue from fees rather than
prohibiting inbound travellers (Neumayer, 2010). Hence, for the purpose of this study we
construct a dummy variable for visa where ‘visa on arrival ’ and ‘visa exemption’ are taken
as ‘non-restrictive’; and the ‘visa prior to arrival ’ as ‘restrictive’. The ‘non-restrictive’
takes a value of zero and ‘restrictive’ takes a value of one. Visa data for 2005 and 2010
are obtained from Neumayer (2006) and Lawson and Lemke (2012) respectively.4 Since
4In the 2010 visa data if a visa is in principle available upon arrival, but is very difficult to obtain; it is
categorised as restrictive and hence assigned a value of one. These are very few cases and do not prohibit
comparison of the 2005 and 2010 data.
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visa policies hardly changed between 2005 and 2010, a fixed effect panel data analysis is
not appropriate, as nearly all of main variables of interest do not vary with time. Hence,
we separately analyse the 2005 and 2010 data on a strictly cross-sectional analysis basis.5
Data on bilateral visa policies of our sample countries reveal that about 62% and 74%
of the cases are characterised by reciprocity in 2005 and 2010 respectively. Among those
with reciprocal visa policies around a third exempt visa between each other, while the
remainder imposes them on each other. In the remaining 38% (for 2005) and 26% (2010)
of cases, however, visas are not reciprocal; and generally travellers from richer countries are
exempted from visa while travellers from poorer countries require them. We address the
endogeneity concern by controlling for GDP of origin and destination countries. However,
the key source of endogeneity is unobserved common factors affecting both visas and travel
that prompted us to use Instrument Variable Estimator.
We use the United Nations General Assembly Voting Affinity Scores (henceforth simply
‘Affinity Scores’) as instruments for visas. The affinity scores reflect the voting behaviour
of member states in voting at UN general assemblies. As such they reflect preferences of
states about foreign policy. The similarity of voting can reflect the quality of the bilateral
relationship between countries and hence can directly affect visa policies. Data on UN
Voter affinity scores are from Strezhnev and Voeten (2012). Details of its construction
are provided in the next section. We construct 5-year averages of the affinity scores to
minimise potential measurement errors.
The destination of travellers, shown in Table 3.1 reveals that the majority of travel
is intra-continental in nature. About 60% or more of all temporary cross-border travel
takes place within the travellers continent in all continents except Oceania, emphasising
the potential importance of distance as an opportunity cost of travel. Moreover, language
and cultural similarity could also play a decisive role in such trips. In addition, geographic
5Visa data for the 2005 and 2010 analyses are collected in 2004 and 2008/09 respectively.
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Table 3.1: Direction of Travel: Average of 2005 and 2010
Destination (%)
Origin Africa Asia Caribbean Europe
North
America
Oceania
South
America
Africa 83.02 10.70 0.01 4.34 1.31 0.31 0.30
Asia 2.33 71.25 0.07 17.56 6.58 1.88 0.32
Caribbean 0.53 1.04 59.31 1.57 33.19 0.03 4.32
Europe 4.17 8.93 0.46 82.43 3.01 0.29 0.72
North America 1.23 8.53 6.42 18.00 62.97 0.57 2.29
Oceania 3.33 50.32 0.25 26.33 12.24 6.19 1.34
South America 1.38 2.96 4.25 10.55 17.10 0.23 63.54
Source: author’s computation based on UNWTO (2014)
proximity could imply countries are more likely to be in regional trade agreements or local
customs unions of some sort, which entails fewer visa restrictions among members thus
boosting cross-border travel.
A limitation of the travel dataset is that although, in principle, it covers all countries
of the world; a few missing values and many zeros are observed. The missing values
could indicate non-existence of bilateral travel and hence are not recorded or could be a
measurement error. Andersen and Dalgaard (2011) who use the same dataset, argue that
potential measurement error arising from this is knowable under classical assumptions
as it only increases the variance of the error term, and hence the estimated variance of
the parameters. Missing values in our dataset account for only 2.8% and 4.6% of the
bilateral outbound travel in 2005 and 2010 respectively. The majority of the sources of
missing values are a few developing countries not keeping records of inbound travellers and
countries in conflict.6 Countries that did not record inbound travellers in both 2005 and
2010 are not included in our sample. Moreover, countries that kept track of records for
only either 2005 or 2010 are also dropped (Iran, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Mali, and Sierra Leone
for 2005; and Antigua and Barbuda, Bangladesh, Guinea, Ghana, Kenya, Libya, Guinea-
Bissau, and St. Kitts and Nevis for 2010). This is done to ensure the same sample of
6As discussed preceding sections, we construct dyads of the bilateral outbound travel from arrival data
recorded by national statistical offices and reported to UNWTO.
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countries is used for 2005 and 2010 to facilitate comparison. However, outbound travellers
from these countries as recorded by the respective destination countries are included in
the study. Hence, some of these countries appear in the list of origin countries used in the
analysis reported in Table B.1 in the appendix. In cases where countries recorded zero
travel in either of the year and missing in the other year; the missing values are replaced
by zero as they likely show zero travel (these account for about 1% of all bilateral flows
in 2005 and about 0.6% in 2010).
Zero bilateral outbound travel accounts for nearly two-thirds of our sample. Under
log-linearised models, zero values in the dependent variables are not defined which entails
selection problem for the analysis. If the zero values have a similar distribution as the
non-zeros (zeros simply indicating lower values), there would not be selection problem.
However, if the zeros indicate some unobserved unique characteristics, simply omitting
them from the analysis results in biased estimates. To tackle this problem we use a
‘Heckman two-stage selection’ procedure.
As shown in Table 3.2, and as also indicated in Eilat and Einav (2004), the zeros tend
to be concentrated in smaller countries. Regarding area of origin countries, the proportion
of countries with zero values ranges from about 78% for the smallest countries (first decile)
to 46.5% for the largest countries (tenth decile). Hence, since country size measured by
area affects whether a country has non-zero travel or not, it can serve as an instrument
for selection as long as it does not influence the level of travel.7
Due to the count nature of travel data, we also use the Poisson model. To tackle a
large number of zeros in the data, we use the Zero-Inflated Poisson (ZIP) Model.
A descriptive comparison of travel patterns of a typical developed country (United
7As shown in subsequent sections among the various measure of size of a country, the area size of the
origin countries is a significant determinant of whether bilateral travel is positive or not, while it does not
affect the level of bilateral trips (Table 3.6 suggests that it can be an appropriate instrument for selection
in the Heckman model).
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Table 3.2: Incidence of Zeros in Bilateral Travel and Country Size
Deciles of area size of countries of origin
Travel (%) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total
Zeros 78.18 77.70 61.68 71.07 62.98 70.86 50.49 58.00 66.15 46.51 64.43
Non-Zeros 21.82 2.30 38.32 28.93 37.02 29.14 49.51 42.00 33.85 53.49 35.57
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: author’s computation based on UNWTO (2014)
Kingdom) and developing country (Nigeria) in more detail can shed light on the nature of
travel. Table 3.3 compares travel patterns of the UK with Nigeria. It reveals the UK with
a population size of less than half of Nigeria, had five times the GDP per capita, five times
inbound travel, and 102 times outbound travel than that of Nigeria in 2010. Moreover,
a British traveller faces visa restrictions in about 41% of the 185 countries with data on
visas. The corresponding figure for Nigeria is only 89%. In addition, the UK has much
more outbound traveller than inbound, the reverse is the case for Nigeria.
Table 3.4 provides top ten destinations and origins for the UK and Nigeria based
travellers. Seven out of the main ten destinations for British traveller are also sources of
British inbound travel implying symmetric travel pattern. On the other hand, Nigeria’s
main outbound destinations are different from its primary sources of inbound travellers.
Like the UK, Nigeria has a large number of visitors from its neighbours signifying the
importance of local geographic and cultural ties in travel. However, Nigeria’s leading
travel destinations comprise the UK, USA and Saudi Arabia, which are all located farther
away. As indicated in Andersen and Dalgaard (2011) the popularity of these destinations
could be a result of colonial ties (UK), and Nigeria’s religious composition (to the Haj in
Saudi Arabia due to its large Muslim population). Nigeria’s top three visitors are members
of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as is Nigeria. This allows,
among other things, visa exemptions to citizens of member states. British travellers do
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not require visas in nine of their top destinations (Egypt being an exception). Citizens of
the top-ten visitors to the UK do not need a visa to visit the UK. This indicates that visa
exemption can have a positive role in boosting travel.
Table 3.3: Aggregate Characteristics: UK vs. Nigeria in 2010
UK Nigeria
POP (millions) 63 160
GDP per capita (USD) 26984.1 5375
Total Outbound (millions) 63.5 0.6
Total Inbound (millions) 28 6
Visa Restrictions (%) 41 89.1
Source: author’s computation based on UNWTO (2014), Lawson and Lemke (2012), and World
Bank (2013)
Table 3.4: Travel Patterns of United Kingdom and Nigeria in 2010
Top 10 Destinations
UK Nigeria
Destination Visa Required Outbound Destination Visa Required In Millions
(Millions)
Spain No 12.4 UK Yes 0.17
France No 11.6 USA Yes 0.08
Ireland No 3.9 Egypt Yes 0.06
USA No 3.9 Saudi Arabia Yes 0.05
Italy No 3.3 South Africa Yes 0.05
Turkey No 2.7 China Yes 0.04
Greece No 1.8 Israel Yes 0.03
Germany No 1.8 India Yes 0.02
Netherlands No 1.5 Benin Yes 0.02
Egypt Yes 1.5 Senegal No 0.01
Top 10 Visitors
UK Nigeria
Origin Visa Required Inbound Origin Visa Required In Millions
(Millions)
France No 3.62 Niger No 1.27
Germany No 3 Benin No 0.86
USA No 2.71 Liberia No 0.23
Ireland No 2.63 Cameroon Yes 0.23
Spain No 1.81 Chad Yes 0.19
Netherlands No 1.76 Italy Yes 0.14
Italy No 1.47 Sudan Yes 0.14
Belgium No 1.14 France Yes 0.13
Poland No 1.1 Germany Yes 0.13
Australia No 0.99 Senegal No 0.13
Source: author’s computation based on (UNWTO, 2014) and Lawson and Lemke (2012)
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3.3.2 Other Covariates
Other main determinants of cross-border travel identified in the literature are the following.
• Economic factors - GDP and price levels of countries of origin and destination
• Geographic characteristics (distance, contiguity, areas of countries of origin and des-
tination)
• Historical ties (colonialism and common languages)
• Population size of countries of origin and destination
• Trade and custom’s union (World Trade Organization (WTO) and Schengen areas).8
Data on geographic characteristics and historical ties are obtained from the Centre
d’Etudes Prospectives et d’nformations Internationales (CEPII).9 GDP, Population and
price data are obtained from World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI).10 Data
on travel and related expenditure and employment are obtained from the World Travel
and Tourism Council (WTTC, 2014).
Definitions and summary statistics of major variables of interest are provided in Table
3.5. The list of countries included in the study are reported in Table B.1 of the appendix.
8Before 1995, the WTO was under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) framework.
9Available in CEPII at www.cepii.fr
10World Bank (2013)
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Table 3.5: Summary Statistics of Cross-Country Data for 2005 and 2010
2005 2010
Variable Description N Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max
OUTBOUND Outbound Travel (in thousands) 11637 38 583 0 37400 41 491 0 25900
OUTBOUND P 1 if outbound travel is non-zero 11637 0.36 0.48 0 1.00 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00
LOUTBOUND Log of Outbound Travel 4139 7.51 3.11 0 17.44 7.92 3.02 0.00 17.07
VISA 1 if travellers from country i to j need a visa before arrival 11637 0.59 0.49 0 1.00 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00
UN VOTE AFFINITY UN Voting Affinity Scores 11637 0.61 0.34 -0.77 1.00 0.66 0.31 -1.00 1.00
LGDP PC ORIGIN Log of Real GDP per capita of origin country
(2005 constant prices) 11637 7.96 1.59 4.57 10.86 8.06 1.56 4.65 10.86
LGDP PC DEST Log of Real GDP per capita of destination country
(2005 constant prices) 11637 7.39 1.53 4.57 10.86 7.51 1.50 4.65 10.86
CONTIGUITY 1 for contiguity 11637 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00
LDISTANCE Weighted distance (pop-wt, km) 11637 8.74 0.77 4.74 9.89 8.74 0.77 4.74 9.89
LPOP ORIG Log of population of origin country 11637 15.75 1.77 9.90 20.99 15.81 1.77 9.93 21.01
LPOP DEST Log of population of destination country 11637 15.80 2.12 9.90 20.99 15.88 2.13 9.93 21.01
LAREA ORIG Log of Areal size of origin 11637 11.70 2.21 5.20 16.65 11.70 2.21 5.20 16.65
LAREA DEST Log of Areal size of destination 11637 11.71 2.49 5.20 16.65 11.71 2.49 5.20 16.65
COMMON LANGUAGE 1 if origin and destination share common official language 11637 0.16 0.37 0 1 0.16 0.37 0 1
COLONY Origin and destination had colonial relationship 11637 0.01 0.12 0 1 0.01 0.12 0 1
WTO 1 if origin and destination are members of WTO 11637 0.65 0.48 0 1 0.65 0.48 0 1
SCHENGEN ORIGIN 1 if origin is a member of Schengen 11637 0.19 0.39 0 1 0.19 0.39 0 1
SCHENGEN DEST 1 if destination is a member of Schengen 11637 0.08 0.28 0 1 0.08 0.28 0 1
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A visa is probably the most powerful tool a country has in controlling the volume
of inbound travellers. Some countries establish bilateral agreements for visa exemption
allowing citizens to enter each other’s country for a limited period of time. This is usually
the case among pairs of more developed countries. Others require symmetric visa require-
ments on both sides. In some cases, usually less developed countries, exempt citizens of
some countries (usually developed ones) from visa requirement unilaterally for a limited
period. Hence, this renders visas dependent on income. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show maps
of visa barrier and travel patterns for most countries of the world. Countries with fewer
visa constraints enjoy higher travel levels and vice versa. However, countries that face
less visa constraints tend to be richer countries. Hence, the higher travel levels of these
countries are a result of a combination of higher income (affordability) and fewer visa
barriers (access).
In summary, an overview of the key findings in the descriptive data suggests that
richer countries face fewer visa restriction, travel more, and geographic proximity and
socio-economic ties favour cross-border travel. The apparent negative correlation between
visa restriction and travel depicted in Figure 3.3 and 3.4 can also be observed within
continents as shown in B.2 in the appendix.
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Note: Average of 2005 and 2010 Visa Restriciton Data.
Number of countries included 158 (with data) .
Mean bilateral visa requirement for a country of origin is the proportion of destination countries that require visas for travellers from that country.
For example, if half of the destination countries require visas from travellers from an individual origin country, the mean visa requirement for that
country would be 0.5.
Source: Computed from Neumayer (2006) and Lawson and Lemke (2012).
Figure 3.1: Access beyond Borders: Visa Restrictions
71
Note: Average of 2005 and 2010 Per Capita Travel .
Number of countries included 158 (with data) .
Source: Computed from (UNWTO, 2014) and World Bank (2013) .
Figure 3.2: Outbound Travel Per Capita
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Source: Computed from (UNWTO, 2014) and Neumayer (2006).
Note: Mean bilateral visa requirement for a country of origin is the proportion of destin-
ation countries that require visas for travellers from that country. For example, if half of
the destination countries require visas from travellers from an individual origin country,
the mean visa requirement for that country would be 0.5.
Number of countries included 158 (with data) .
Figure 3.3: A Scatter Plot of Visas and Outbound Travel: 2005
Source: Computed from (UNWTO, 2014) and Lawson and Lemke (2012).
Note: Mean bilateral visa requirement for a country of origin is the proportion of destin-
ation countries that require visas for travellers from that country. For example, if half of
the destination countries require visas from travellers from an individual origin country,
the mean visa requirement for that country would be 0.5.
Number of countries included 158 (with data) .
Figure 3.4: A Scatter Plot of Visas and Outbound Travel: 2010
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3.4 Econometric Methodology
Gravity models stipulate that trading interactions among countries are negatively correl-
ated with distance and positively correlated with country size as measured by their GDP.
This relationship has become an empirical regularity in the literature. Since travel can be
considered as a type of trade in services, gravity models have been widely used to study it.
As indicated in section 3.2, several studies have found that gravity models explain trade in
services including cross-border travel at least as well as trade in goods (see, for example,
Kimura and Lee (2006) and Culiuc (2014)). We use this basic model and extend it to in-
clude other relevant variables such as visa requirements for investigating the determinants
of cross-border flows of people. A basic version of the gravity equation (see, for example,
Deardorff (1995)) is specified as
Fij =
YiYj
Dij
(3.1)
where Fij captures flow of exports, FDI, or cross-border travel depending on the context
of the study from country i to j , Yi is GDP per capita of origin; Yj GDP per capita of
destination, and Dij is the distance between them.
For estimation purposes, the literature has specified a natural logarithm form of the
gravity model permitting coefficients to be interpreted as elasticities. As indicated in
Frankel and Romer (1999) and other studies, the log-linear specification fits the data well.
Extending the basic gravity model with other relevant covariates and taking the log form,
our cross-border travel model is specified as
ln(Tij) = µ+ α1 ln(Yi) + α2 ln(Yj) + βVij + δ ln(Dij) + γ
′Xij + θ′Wi + φ′Zj + εij (3.2)
Where is ln(Tij) logarithm of travel from country i to j; Yi is GDP per capita of
country of origin; Yj is GDP per capita of country of destination; Vij is a dummy variable
for visa (whether travellers from country i require visa to travel to country j; Dij is distance
74
between country i and j ; Xij a vector of geographic and socio-economic variables common
to origin and destination, namely common border, common language, colonial relationship
post 1945, and whether both are members of WTO; Wi is a vector of origin characteristics
(population, area size, and Schengen membership), and Zj is destination characteristics
(population, area size, and Schengen membership).11
As indicated in the previous section, a significant challenge in empirical studies of bi-
lateral travel data is that each country does not necessarily have travellers to each other
country in the world, and hence there are many ‘zero’ values. This is also a common
problem in similar bilateral data such as trade, migration and FDI. The problem is that
applying the logarithm automatically discards observations with ‘zero’ values potentially
resulting in information loss and potential econometric problems. Hence, it is imperative,
to explore whether countries with zero travel levels are systematically different from coun-
tries with positive travel levels. We use Heckman Two-Step Procedure to check if there is
potential selection into having a non-zero travel level. Exploring travel patterns in terms
of the size of outbound travel and the probability of having non-zero travel reveals that
smaller countries in terms of area size and population are less likely to have positive travel
as discussed in section 3.3 and reported in Table 3.2. The reason is that travellers from
very small countries are likely to be concentrated in a limited number of destinations,
while having very few travellers to the rest of the world. Therefore, travellers from smaller
countries, due to their small number, are likely to be recorded as zero in many destina-
tions. We formally test this proposition by running a regression on levels of travel (log of
outbound travel) and the probability of positive outbound travel using a set of covariates.
Columns 1 and 4 of Table 3.6 provide regression estimates on levels for 2005 and 2010
respectively, while the corresponding probability regressions (probit) are given in columns
11We include a dummy for Schengen areas as there is free movement of labour among members and
due to their common visa policies. Moreover, Frankel and Rose (2002) find a significant positive effect of
common currency on trade, which may potentially also affect bilateral travel.
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2 and 5 of the same table. The results show area size of origin country significantly affects
the probability of having positive travel flows, while it does not significantly affect the
level of travel indicating that it can serve as a valid instrument for the Heckman selection
model. In order to explore the OLS estimates of column 1 and 4 of Table 3.6 with the
full set of observations (which include zeros), we replicate it in Table B.2 of the appendix.
The results remain robust.
OLS and Heckman two-step estimates are reported in Tables 3.6 revealing that selection
is important as indicated by a negative and significant selection term (λ). Hence, ignoring
the observations with zero values does lead to an incorrect specification. We use country
area size of origin as the identifying variable for the Heckman selection process. The
negative and significant selection term implies that the unobserved variables determining
travel are negatively correlated with unobserved variables determining the probability of
selection.
76
Table 3.6: Determinants of Cross-border Travel: OLS with Heckman Selection
2005 2010
ESTIMATION OLS SELECTION HECKMAN OLS SELECTION HECKMAN
METHOD (PROBIT) (PROBIT)
DEP VAR. LOUT- OUT- LOU- LOUT- OUT- LOUT-
DEP VAR. BOUND BOUND P BOUND BOUND BOUND P BOUND
VISA -1.107*** -0.145*** -1.049*** -0.958*** -0.190*** -0.865***
(0.067) (0.031) (0.069) (0.065) (0.036) (0.068)
LGDP PC ORIGIN 0.740*** 0.258*** 0.646*** 0.735*** 0.260*** 0.606***
(0.020) (0.011) (0.036) (0.021) (0.012) (0.035)
LGDP PC DEST 0.529*** 0.302*** 0.424*** 0.476*** 0.337*** 0.317***
(0.020) (0.011) (0.038) (0.022) (0.011) (0.040)
CONTIGUITY 1.659*** 0.216* 1.653*** 1.539*** 0.211* 1.547***
(0.179) (0.122) (0.173) (0.176) (0.123) (0.169)
LDISTSANCE -1.319*** -0.545*** -1.119*** -1.303*** -0.548*** -1.028***
(0.034) (0.021) (0.066) (0.035) (0.021) (0.065)
LPOP ORIGIN 0.838*** 0.234*** 0.746*** 0.830*** 0.231*** 0.719***
(0.025) (0.015) (0.033) (0.026) (0.015) (0.032)
LPOP DEST 0.715*** 0.288*** 0.606*** 0.685*** 0.265*** 0.549***
(0.019) (0.012) (0.040) (0.019) (0.012) (0.036)
LAREA ORIGIN 0.007 0.027** 0.023 0.029**
(0.021) (0.012) (0.022) (0.012)
LAREA DEST -0.044*** -0.070*** -0.018 -0.057*** -0.049*** -0.033**
(0.016) (0.011) (0.018) (0.016) (0.011) (0.017)
COMMON
LANGUAGE 0.930*** 0.450*** 0.756*** 0.787*** 0.461*** 0.548***
(0.065) (0.041) (0.087) (0.066) (0.041) (0.086)
COLONY 0.998*** 0.047 1.009*** 0.969*** 0.064 0.971***
(0.168) (0.127) (0.166) (0.160) (0.128) (0.156)
WTO 0.298*** 0.220*** 0.223*** 0.497*** 0.250*** 0.380***
(0.068) (0.032) (0.071) (0.066) (0.032) (0.071)
SCHENGEN ORIGIN 0.219*** 0.140*** 0.159** 0.229*** 0.175*** 0.122*
(0.069) (0.042) (0.068) (0.067) (0.042) (0.066)
SCHENGEN DEST -0.290*** -1.195*** 0.133 -0.317*** -1.254*** 0.285*
(0.089) (0.059) (0.148) (0.088) (0.060) (0.148)
LAMBDA -0.683*** -0.932***
(0.210) (0.203)
CONSTANT -16.74*** -7.84*** -13.23*** -15.74*** -8.02*** -10.95***
(0.480) (0.301) (1.205) (0.492) (0.305) (1.174)
OBSERVATIONS 4139 11637 4139 4139 11637 4139
R-SQUARED 0.754 0.754 0.736 0.737
Note
Robust Standard errors in parentheses.
***, **, * indicate Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level
OUTBOUND P is a dummy variable that takes one for non-zero outbound travel, and zero for zero
outbound travel
LAMBDA is the inverse mills ratio from a first stage probit
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3.4.1 Instrumental Variable Estimation and Identification
OLS estimates of Equation (3.2) could be potentially biased due to the endogeneity of visas
as discussed above. The main potential source of bias is that unobserved factors could
affect both travel and visas simultaneously. Moreover, since some of the covariates in
our model such as distance affect travel and visas simultaneously, OLS estimates possibly
underestimate the role of visas (Neumayer, 2010).12
To overcome these empirical challenges, we use instruments for visas to effectively
discern its causal impact on travel. Following the Czaika and de Haas (2014) study on the
impact of visa policies on migration, we use the UN Voting Affinity Scores as instruments
for visas. The affinity scores reflect the voting behaviour of member states in voting in UN
general assemblies. As such they reflect preferences of states about foreign policy. The
scores are constructed by Strezhnev and Voeten (2012). The affinity scores are computed
based on Signorino and Ritter (1999) measure of similarity, which in the spirit of Euclidean
distance, is computed as follows:
Sij = 1− 2|P
i − P j |
dmax
(3.3)
Where Pi and Pj are votes of country ‘i’ and ‘j’ on certain policies. The policy space
(range of options) has a maximum disagreement (difference) of dmax.
In the UN general assembly let N be the number of issues that need decision in year
‘t’. Each vote on a certain policy/motion has one of three possible outcomes: Yes=1,
Abstain=2, and No=3. The maximum possible difference in votes is 2. Hence, the S−score
in our case would be
Sunij =
∑N
1 1− |P i − P j |
N
(3.4)
12Using the Durban-Wu-Hausman test of exogeneity of visas indicates that visas are indeed endogenous
as shown in Table B.3 of the appendix B. Residuals estimated from regressions of visa and GDP on all
exogenous variables are found to be significant in the original model of travel indicating that OLS estimates
are not consistent.
78
The S-score ranges from −1 (if the two states maximally disagree) to 1 (if they agree on
all resolutions).13 Those affinity scores indicate the quality of bilateral relations between
countries and hence can directly affect bilateral visa policies (see Czaika and de Haas
(2014)).14 On the other hand, there is no reason to assume that they would be system-
atically linked to GDP per capita of the countries involved. Figure 3.5 shows a scatter
plot of the log of GDP per capita and average affinity scores of the countries included in
the study. The Figure shows a weak correlation between income and affinity scores. The
same scatter plot is provided in Figure B.1 in the appendix with country labels. The two
high-income countries with very low-affinity scores are the United States and Israel. The
correlation between income and affinity scores for the whole sample is weak.
Note: Log of GDP per capital (at 2005 constant prices) and Mean UN Voting Affinity
Scores for the main sample fo countries: 2010.
Source: Computed from World Bank (2013) and Lawson and Lemke (2012).
Figure 3.5: Scatter Plot of GDP per capita and Voting Affinity Scores: 2010
13See Signorino and Ritter (1999) for derivation of the S-score.
14Czaika and de Haas (2014) use the UN Voting affinity scores as instruments for visa for their study on
migration.
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We use the affinity scores of 2004 for the 2005 study. Likewise, we use the affinity
scores of 2009 for the 2010 analysis. This is because the visa data of 2005 were collected
in 2004 and the visa data for 2010 were collected throughout in 2008/09.
In the first stage, we regress the endogenous variable separately on the instruments
and the remaining exogenous variables. Thus, the reduced form equation is:
Vij = δ +$S
un
ij + ϑ
′Xij + κ′Wi + pi′Zj + ξij (3.5)
Where Sunij represents ’Affinity’; Vij is a dummy variable for visa (whether travellers
from country i require visa to travel to country j). Xij , Wi, and Zj capture common origin
- destination, origin-only, and destination-only characteristics respectively as defined in
Equation (3.2) above.
The exclusion restriction is that Sunij does not appear in Equation (3.2).
Following Wooldridge (2002), we include the instrument for selection along with all
exogenous variables in the selection model from which we compute the inverse Mills ratio
(λ). We then include λ as a regressor in the structural-equation originally specified as
Equation 3.2.15
The strength of instrumental variables (relevance) is a key requirement in IV estima-
tions. A weak instrument exacerbates finite sample bias in the IV estimates (Bound et al.,
1995; Angrist and Pischke, 2008). Moreover, with weak instruments the IV estimator
has also a significance bias and is poorly approximated by normal distribution making
standard tests unreliable (Stock and Andrews, 2005).
We assess the strength of our instruments (relevance) based on the ‘Anderson LM
statistic’ and ‘Cragg-Donald’ tests of weak instruments. For the instruments to be strong,
the statistic should be above the critical values reported in Stock and Yogo (2005), which
15See Wooldridge (2002), Chapter seven, section 4, pages 567-569 for details regarding selection in models
with endogenous regressors.
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is the case in the regression models reported here. In both cases, hypotheses of weak
instruments are strongly rejected implying negligible finite-sample biases. The F-stats for
exclusion of instruments from the first stage regressions are well above the threshold of 10
suggested by Stock and Yogo (2005).
First stage results of the Instrumental Variables estimates are provided in Table B.5
for 2005 and 2010 in the appendix.16 The instrument is significant at 1% level with the
expected sign indicating a strong support for its relevance. A similarity of voting in the
UN general assembly reflects the quality of the bilateral relationship between countries
and hence is associated with fewer visa restrictions. The affinity scores explain about 20%
of the variation in visa policies in both 2005 and 2010.
Since we use two instruments in our analysis (one to instrument for visa policy and
another for selection), we can conduct an overidentification test. As reported in subsequent
sections (Table 3.8), with the Hansen J Statistics of 0.07 [p-value 0.4] and 0.03 [p-value
0.86] for 2005 and 2010 respectively, our instruments can considered valid (orthogonal to
the error terms of the structural model). In addition, in order to test for orthogonality
of our instrument variable (United Nations Voting Affinity Score), we run a reduced form
regression to check if it is related with travel. The result of this exercise is shown in
Table B.4 for 2005 and 2010 in the appendix. In columns 1 and 2, we do not include the
endogenous variable (visa) and find that the instrumental variable (UN voting affinity) is
related with travel. However, once we control for visa in column 3 and 4, the instrument
becomes insignificant indicating that any potential impact of the instrument is mediated
through visas.
16The ‘Anderson LM’ and ‘Cragg-Donald’ tests of weak instruments reported with the first stage (Table
B.5 in the appendix) are also reported in Table 3.8 for convenience.
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3.5 Results and Discussion: Visas and Cross-boder Travel
3.5.1 Determinants of Visa Policies
Passport and visa systems are the primary tools to control the cross-border mobility of
people. The passport has evolved from being a tool of the sovereign state to a fundamental
instrument of an individual’s cross-border mobility. The passport uniquely identifies each
traveller, indicates their point of origin, and the country to which they can be deported if
needed. As such the passport can be viewed as a document by which a sovereign country
requests another sovereign country to protect the bearer (Salter, 2003).
A visa is a tool used by a sovereign country to allow or deny access to bearers of
a passport. As such countries face the dilemma of allowing more people access to their
borders and hence gain more tourism revenue, facilitate trade, and FDI among other
factors. In addition, closing their borders to citizens of other countries for security and
social-economic reasons such as foreigner competing for jobs, and diseases transmission
(Salter, 2003; Neumayer, 2008).
To enhance mobility, a number of countries have bilateral agreements to exempt visa-
free entry to passport holders of their partners. Some countries also exempt visa require-
ment for passport holders of certain countries unitarily, usually from developed countries
to enhance tourism. Some regional trade agreements such as the EU and the ECOWAS
also allow visa-free access to passport holders from member states. However, a systematic
study of the determinants of visa policies is scare. To our knowledge Neumayer (2006) is
the only study that attempts to explore the role of socio-economic, historical, and geo-
graphic factors on bilateral visa policy systematically. Neumayer (2006) finds that poorer,
less democratic, and conflict-prone countries are more likely to face higher visa restrictions
while trade and regional ties enhance visa exemptions.
In political science, the international relations, and political economy literature, the
similarity of voting in the United Nations General Assembly has been used as a measure of
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the quality of bilateral ties among countries. Some early studies on group or block voting
behaviour in the UN General Assembly include Ball (1951) and Lijphart (1963). More
recently, Alesina and Dollar (2000) use voting behaviour in analysing the determinants
of the direction of foreign aid. Neumayer (2008) use an index constructed from the UN
voting affinity data to measure a nation’s ideological affinity.
We argue that countries with stronger bilateral ties as reflected in the degree of simil-
arity in voting, reflects the strength of their foreign relations and hence is likely to affect
their visa policies with each other. Countries that vote similarly are the ones with stronger
foreign relations, and hence more likely to visa exempt each other’s citizens.
We rely on the first stage regression estimates based on equation (3.5) reported in
Table 3.7 to analyse the determinants of visa policies. However, we modify the first stage
estimates to exclude the selection term, lambda, and to include the full set of observations
including those with zeros in travel. We do this because selection is not a problem in the
visa policy data, unlike the travel data which is characterised by a large number of zeros.17
Since visa policy is a binary variable taking a value of either 0 or 1, OLS estimation is
equivalent to estimating a linear probability model (LPM) in this case.
In both 2005 and 2010, a one unit increase in the voting affinity for countries with
the average level of affinity decreases the probability of imposing visas on each other by
10 and 13 percentage points in 2005 and 2010 respectively.18 The average affinity score
in 2010 is 0.66 with a standard deviation (SD) of 0.31. An increase in one SD of affinity
implies that reduction in the probability of imposing a visa by 4 percentage points. A one
SD increase in affinity in the sample corresponds to a change from the Danish-Armeniam
affinity score, which is 0.66 (equivalent to the mean score) to Danish-Belgian affinity
17Both the actual first stage estimates (Table B.5 in the appendix) that take into consideration selection
in travel and the modified estimates (Table 3.7) provide largely similar results.
18The corresponding figures for the actual first stage reported in Table B.5 in the appendix are 22
percentage points in both 2005 and 2010
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scores (0.97). Hence, a change in the quality of the bilateral relationship from the Danish-
Aremeniam to Danish-Belgian reduces the probability of imposing visas between each
partner country by 4 percentage points.19
Poorer countries of origin and destination have slightly higher visa restrictions than
their richer counterparts as shown by the 2005 and 2010 estimates. Focusing on the 2010
estimates for countries of origin, a 10% increases in GDP per capita implies a decrease in
the probability of visa restriction of 0.06 of a percentage point.
Sharing a common border (contiguity) reduces the probability of visa restriction by
about 16 and 15 percentage points in 2005 and 2010 respectively. Having a common
language between origin and destination reduces the probability of visa restriction by 15
and 11 percentage points in 2005 and 2010 respectively. WTO and Schengen members
face a reduced probability of visa restriction compared to non-members.
Countries that are located far apart are more likely to impose visas on each other.
Countries with bigger geographic size are more likely to impose visa restrictions on others.
This could be due to many smaller countries in terms of geographic size (such as islands)
that depend on tourism are less likely to impose visas on visitors compared to others.
In summary, bilateral foreign policy measured by the similarity of voting in the UN
general assembly, geographic and historical ties, and customs unions strongly affect bilat-
eral visa policies while the role of GDP is modest.
3.5.2 Determinants of Bilateral Cross-Border Travel
In this section, we discuss the determinants of cross-border travel with a focus on the role
of visa policies.
Due to the endogeneity of visas, our analysis focuses on the results of the IV estimates
19With a mean visa restriction of 0.69 in 2010 (imposing visa restriction in 69% of the 159 countries
included in the study), a 0.04 percentage point reduction in visa restriction equivalent to lifting visa
restrictions for travellers from about nice countries.
84
Table 3.7: Determinants of Visa Policies: LPM (Modified First Stage)
2005 2010
DEP. VAR. VISA VISA
(1) (2)
UN VOTE AFFINITY -0.099*** -0.129***
(0.014) (0.014)
LGDP PC ORIGIN -0.061*** -0.060***
(0.003) (0.003)
LGDP PC DEST -0.039*** -0.078***
(0.003) (0.003)
CONTIGUITY -0.159*** -0.148***
(0.032) (0.033)
LDISTANCE 0.053*** 0.044***
(0.006) (0.006)
LPOP ORIGIN -0.013*** -0.021***
(0.004) (0.004)
LPOP DEST -0.011*** 0.008***
(0.003) (0.003)
LAREA ORIGIN -0.009*** -0.000
(0.003) (0.003)
LAREA DEST 0.065*** 0.059***
(0.003) (0.002)
COMMON LANGUAGE -0.145*** -0.114***
(0.012) (0.011)
COLONY -0.040 -0.045
(0.038) (0.036)
WTO -0.179*** -0.077***
(0.009) (0.008)
SCHENGEN ORIGIN -0.061*** -0.055***
(0.013) (0.011)
SCHENGEN DEST -0.041** -0.065***
(0.017) (0.017)
CONSTANT 0.853*** 1.063***
(0.092) (0.083)
Observations 11637 11637
R-squared 0.215 0.297
Note
Robust Standard errors in parentheses.
***, **, * indicate Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level
This is a modified version of the first stage of the IV estimation as it excludes the selection term
(selection is not an issue with visas) and uses the full set of observations including those with zero
travel.
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provided in Table 3.8. Columns 1 and 3 report the selection estimations. We mainly
focus on columns 2 and 4, which report the IV estimates for 2005 and 2010 respectively
accounting for selection by Heckman two-step procedure.20
Comparing two countries one imposing visas on travellers from an origin country and
another waiving visa for travellers from the same country implies that the country that
requires visas has 80% and 73% fewer travellers from the origin country. Other studies
that find a detrimental effect of restrictive visa policies on travel and associated activities
include Neumayer (2010) and Song et al. (2012). Neumayer (2010) finds imposing visa
reduces inbound travel by 52% - 63% without instrumenting visa policy. His results are
comparable to our OLS estimates provided in columns 3 and 6 of Table 3.6 which report
an effect of visa restriction to be 65% and 58% respectively. Song et al. (2012) finds strict
visa regulations that followed the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests resulted in reduction
in inbound travel to China by 21.1%-33% from major countries of origin.
The role of GDP per capita of origin and destination countries has been found to be a
significant predictor of travel in previous studies. ceteris paribus, a 10% increase in GDP
per capita results in roughly a 6% increase in outbound travel in both 2005 and 2010. Our
results of the role of origin GDP are not statistically different from Culiuc (2014) who
finds origin country GDP to have an elasticity of 0.5 - 0.6 on tourism using an extensive
panel dataset of countries spanning over a decade or more. The positive role of income in
origin country potentially reflects the ability to afford tourism. The income of the country
of destination also has a strong positive role in attracting visitors in both years. Richer
economies have more developed tourism infrastructure and promotion system.
Other determinants of the direction of travel identified in the literature and confirmed
by our analysis are common border (contiguity); having a common official language; having
20The results are reasonably comparable to the OLS estimates based on Heckman selection reported in
Table 3.6.
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Table 3.8: Determinants of Cross-border Travel: IV with Heckman Selection
2005 2010
ESTIMATION METHOD SELECTION HECKMAN SELECTION HECKMAN
EQUATION IV EQUATION IV
(PROBIT) (PROBIT)
DEP.VAR OUTBOUND P LOUTBOUND OUTBOUND P LOUTBOUND
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VISA -1.589*** -1.311***
(0.370) (0.374)
LGDP PC ORIGIN 0.274*** 0.593*** 0.274*** 0.576***
(0.012) (0.044) (0.012) (0.045)
LGDP PC DEST 0.309*** 0.392*** 0.351*** 0.284***
(0.011) (0.040) (0.011) (0.053)
CONTIGUITY 0.243** 1.577*** 0.235* 1.492***
(0.122) (0.181) (0.123) (0.177)
LDISTSANCE -0.547*** -1.055*** -0.556*** -0.994***
(0.021) (0.071) (0.021) (0.077)
LPOP ORIGIN 0.239*** 0.732*** 0.234*** 0.716***
(0.015) (0.033) (0.015) (0.033)
LPOP DEST 0.289*** 0.603*** 0.264*** 0.554***
(0.012) (0.042) (0.012) (0.037)
LAREA DEST -0.080*** 0.014 -0.061*** -0.006
(0.011) (0.026) (0.011) (0.029)
COMMON
LANGUAGE 0.466*** 0.718*** 0.481*** -0.052**
(0.040) (0.088) (0.041) (0.023)
COLONY 0.067 0.990*** 0.075 -0.026
(0.127) (0.167) (0.128) (0.041)
WTO 0.248*** 0.063 0.272*** -0.153***
(0.032) (0.119) (0.032) (0.016)
SCHENGEN ORIGIN 0.151*** 0.163** 0.179*** 0.010
(0.042) (0.070) (0.042) (0.018)
SCHENGEN DEST -1.189*** 0.140 -1.230*** -0.089**
(0.059) (0.151) (0.059) (0.039)
LAREA ORIGIN 0.026** 0.029**
(0.012) (0.012)
UN VOTE AFFINITY 0.101** 0.035
(0.048) (0.051)
LAMBDA -0.743*** -0.911***
(0.216) (0.210)
CONSTANT -8.128*** -8.242***
(0.317) (0.325)
OBSERVATIONS 11637 4139 11637 4139
R-SQUARED 0.751 0.735
CRAGG-DONALD STATISTIC 66.04 67.99
ANDERSON LM STATISTIC 109.5 100.8
HANSEN J STATISTIC 0.702 0.0308
HANSEN P-VALUE 0.402 0.861
Note
Standard errors in parentheses.
***, **, * indicate Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level
OUTBOUND P is a dummy variable that takes one for non-zero outbound travel, and zero for zero
outbound travel
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a colonial relationship in the past, and being a member of WTO. All positively affect travel.
Being a member of the Schengen area has a mixed effect on travel. The 2005 data shows
that being a member of the Schengen area is associated with higher travel. It is, however,
puzzling to observe that in 2010 destinations which are members of the Schengen area had
fewer inbound travellers. One possible explanation is that travellers to Schengen area are
only recorded at the point of first entry to the area, but not if they travel to other member
states within it. This may result in under-reporting of travel within the Schengen area.
On the other hand, distance has a detrimental effect on the volume of travel.
As a robustness check of the Heckman-based models, we conduct regression by contin-
ent to explore the role of heterogeneity in travel and other characteristics across continents.
The results are shown in Tables B.6 and B.7 in the appendix B. The results are compar-
able to our main models. The negative impact of restrictive visa on outbound travel is
apparent in all continents with travellers from Africa and Asia being the most sensitive to
visa policies in destination countries.
In summary, the role of visa policies on cross-border travel is sizable. In fact, it
is stronger than that of GDP and comparable to the effects of geographic location and
historical ties like distance and common language respectively.
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3.5.3 Alternative Models: Poisson and Zero-Inflated Poisson Regres-
sions
Since cross-border travel data are discrete, non-negative count distributions such as a
Poisson can be used to model them (see, for example, Cameron and Trivedi (2013) and
Winkelmann (2013) for a discussion of count models in general, and Silva and Tenreyro
(2006) for trade flows). The Zero-Inflated Poisson is a variant of the Poisson model de-
signed to tackle the presence of a large number of zeros (see Greene (1994) for a discussion
of Zero-Inflated Poisson models).
Results of the Poisson and Zero-Inflated Poisson along with their IV versions are given
in Table B.8 and B.9 in the appendix respectively. They are in comport with the results
of the Instrumental variable estimation with Heckman selection. This indicates that the
main results are robust to different specifications and estimation techniques.
A potential downside of the Poisson distribution in the context of the cross-border
travel in our data is heterogeneity in travel by region. Some regions such as Europe have
particularly high outbound travel compared to countries in Africa and Asia. As robustness
check we estimate Poisson and Zero-Inflated Poisson models by continent as shown in
Tables B.10 and B.11 in the appendix. The results remain robust to this disaggregation.
In summary, several estimations techniques have shown that stringent visa policies
have adverse effects on the cross-border movement of people potentially restricting revenue
from the travel and tourism sector, associated employment, cross-border trade, FDI, and
technology transfer. Below we explore the impact of restrictive visa on travel and tourism-
related revenue and employment.
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3.6 The Role of Visa Policies on Tourism Expenditure and
Employment
Travel and tourism is one of the fastest growing sectors in many economies. In 2013,
the direct share of travel and tourism in world GDP was about 3%. In the same year,
including the indirect benefits (including wider effects from investment and supply chain)
the share of travel and tourism expenditure to GDP was 9.5%. Similarly, in the same,
year it contributed around 3.4% of employment directly, and 8.5% of employment including
indirect sectors (WTTC, 2014).
In this section, we explore the role of visa restrictions on travel and tourism-related
expenditures and employment at an aggregate (country) level. Visa is defined in this
section as the average visa restrictions a country imposes on other countries in the world
(can be taken as a visa restrictionction index). For example, a country that imposes a
visa on all other countries in the world would have a measure of ‘1’ while a country that
does not require a visa for any other countries would have ‘0’. A country that imposes
visa on half of the world countries has an average of 0.5 visa score. In our sample country,
the mean visa score is 0.72, which mean countries require a visa from visitors from more
than two-thirds of origin countries.
The travel and tourism-related expenditure is in billions of US dollars. We measure
travel and tourism employment in thousands.
We run two OLS estimations for travel and tourism related expenditure (EXP) and
employment (EMP)
ln(EXPi) = η + βVi + γ
′Xi + φ′Di + i (3.6)
ln(EMPi) = µ+ αVi + κ
′Xi + θ′Di + υi (3.7)
Where ln(EXPi) and ln(EMPi) are logarithms of travel and tourism-related expendit-
ures and Employment respectively in country i; V is an index of visa restriction in country
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i ; Xi a vector geographic and socio-economic characteristics of country i (GDP per capita,
population, area size, WTO membership); D captures continent dummies for the location
of country i. i is the destination country.
The results are reported in Table 3.9. The first column indicates expenditure estimates
while the second column is for employment. In line with the bilateral analysis, restrictive
visa policies have a detrimental impact on aggregate inbound travel, tourism expenditure
and employment. ceteris paribus, on average a 10 percentage point increase in visa re-
quirements reduces travel and tourism related revenues and employment by 11% and 8.6%
respectively. For example, Uganda required visas for 82% of countries of origin which is
equal to the average visa restriction level in our sample for 2010 (the aggregate analysis
of expenditure and employment). Ukraine requires visas for 72% of countries of origin
of its inbound travellers. Hence, a 10 percentage point increase in visa restriction corres-
ponds to a change from a visa policy like Ukraine to that of Uganda. Therefore, ceteris
paribus, compared to an average country with a mean level of visa restriction such as
Ukraine, Uganda would have 11% and 8.6% less travel and tourism related revenues and
employment respectively due to its restrictive visa policy.
An alternative way of looking at this is that a 10 point increase in visa restriction
for the average country (with mean visa restriction value of 0.72) corresponds to a 14%
increases in visa restriction. With a sample of 127 countries, this corresponds to additional
visa restriction in 18 countries.21 Neumayer (2011) finds a detrimental impact of restrictive
visa policies on trade and FDI. Li and Song (2013) also find a significant economic loss in
China due to visa restrictions introduced following the 1989 Tian’an Men Square episode
and the 2008 Beijing Olympic games.
The results of the aggregate analysis are only suggestive, as we have not dealt with
21This interpretation of the regression coefficients assumes that destinations are not substitutes for each
other. However, since there exists some form substitutability, the role of visa policies can be slightly lower
than those reported.
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potential endogeneity of visas due to lack of a suitable instruments. The UN voting affinity
instrument is only valid in the context of bilateral data as opposed to aggregate data. In
addition, the specification of the employment equation is arguably incomplete as other
factors are likely to be important in its determination (e.g. local wages rates etc).
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Table 3.9: Visas, Tourism Expenditure, and Employment in 2010
DEP.VAR TRAVEL & TOURISM TRAVEL & TOURISM
EXPENDITURE EMPLOYMENT Mean Values
VISA -1.050** -0.859** 0.721***
(0.405) (0.333) (0.019)
LGDP PC DEST 0.886*** 0.230*** 7.996***
(0.088) (0.060) (0.135)
LPOP DEST 0.711*** 1.011*** 16.058***
(0.061) (0.055) (0.167)
LAREA DEST -0.043 -0.098* 11.876***
(0.053) (0.052) (0.204)
WTO DEST -0.182 -0.365** 0.858***
(0.251) (0.178) (0.031)
NORTH AMERICA DEST -0.286 0.470 0.024*
(0.214) (0.360) (0.014)
SOUTH AMERICA DEST -0.915*** 0.204 0.087***
(0.252) (0.174) (0.025)
OCEANIA DEST 0.196 0.721* 0.031**
(0.421) (0.387) (0.016)
ASIA DEST 0.051 0.381* 0.213***
(0.240) (0.204) (0.036)
AFRICA DEST -0.457 0.127 0.276***
(0.319) (0.236) (0.040)
CARIBBEAN DEST -0.042 0.477** 0.094***
(0.239) (0.230) (0.026)
LTOURISM
EXPENDITURE DEST 0.413**
(0.179)
LTOURISM
EMPLOYMENT DEST 4.785***
(0.158)
CONSTANT -16.459*** -11.397***
(1.257) (0.916)
OBSERVATIONS 127 127 127
R-SQUARED 0.853 0.879
Note
The dependent variables (TRAVEL & TOURISM EXPENDITURE AND EMPLOYMENT) are in
logarithmic form
Robust Standard errors in parentheses.
***, **, * indicate Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level
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3.7 Conclusions and Recommendations
This chapter has studied the determinants of cross-border flows of people for tourism,
personal, and business purposes lasting from one night up to one year. We particularly
focus on the role of visa policies in cross-border travel.
We use instrumental variable estimation methods for outbound travel to a cross-section
of countries for 2005 and 2010. We use the UN General Assembly Affinity Index, a measure
of the quality of bilateral relations between nations, to instrument for bilateral visa policy.
The need to instrument for visa policy arises due to possible omitted variable bias from
potential unobserved factors driving both travel flows and visa policies. Moreover, even
though bilateral visa policies tend to be reciprocal, there is an observed tendency for richer
countries to be unilaterally visa exempted while imposing visas for travellers from poorer
countries.
We use a Heckman two-step procedure to correct for potential selection bias due to the
existence of many ‘zeros’ in bilateral travel data. The zeros arise from the fact that many
countries do not necessarily have travellers to all other countries. On average, a typical
country in our sample had outbound traveller to only a third of the world’s nations. Hence,
correcting for potential selection bias in necessary. In addition to a Heckman model, we
also use Poisson and Zero-Inflated Poisson models. We find consistent results regardless
of the procedure we use.
We find that, ceteris paribus, imposing visa requirements reduces travel by about 80%
and 73% in 2005 and 2010 respectively. Using aggregate country-level data, we also find
an adverse impact of restrictive visa policies on travel and tourism-related revenues and
employment.
Regarding the determinants of visa policies, we find that a strong bilateral foreign-
relation between countries explains 22% of the quality of bilateral visa policies. Specifically,
countries with opposing votes in the UN general assembly imposed visas among each other
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in nearly all cases, while countries that voted similarly exempted visas for each other in
22% of cases in 2005 and 2010.
Other determinants of the direction of travel include a common border (contiguity),
GDP of origin and destination country, historical and cultural ties (having a common
official language and a colonial relationship post-1945), integration (WTO) all of which
affect travel positively. On the other hand, distance has a detrimental effect on travel.
These results are broadly in line with previous research.
Our findings highlight that countries can pursue flexible visa policies through bilateral
negotiations, and thereby not only boost their tourism sector directly, but also potentially
enhance knowledge transfer, trade, and FDI flows. However, we acknowledge these latter
issues have not been the subject of investigation here, and should be treated explicitly as
part of an agenda for future research.
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Chapter 4
The Role of the United States
Visa Waiver Program on
Cross-border Travel
4.1 Introduction
The United States (US) travel and tourism sector comprises 2.6% of gross domestic product
(GDP) and 3.6% of total direct employment; with indirect contributions to GDP and
employment of 8% and 9.3% respectively. The share of the travel and tourism sector to
GDP and employment has been steadily increasing since 2009 after the economy started
to recover from the great recession and is forecast to grow in the coming years (WTTC,
2015).
Many countries bilaterally or unilaterally exempt visa requirements for holders of pass-
ports from certain countries to enhance their travel and tourism sector. Hence, the ability
to cross the borders of other countries with or without a visa depends on the passport of
the traveller. Passport holders from the developed world have the easiest access to other
countries. Figure C.1 in the appendix is a map of the power of passports in terms of
visa-free access; it reveals a clear pattern that richer countries such as those in Europe,
North America, and Australia have easier access to the borders of other countries than
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the rest of the world.
The US Visa Waiver Program (VWP) scheme allows visa-free access into the US for
citizens of eligible countries and aims at boosting the travel and tourism sector (Monger
and Barr, 2009). The Immigration Reform and Control Act 1986 established the VWP
as a temporary pilot ‘B-visa’ program, formally known as ‘Visa Waiver Pilot Program’
(VWPP) (Public Law 99-603, 1986). This was made permanent on the 30th October
2000 through the Visa Waiver Permanent Act (Siskin, 2014). The ‘B-Visa’ refers to the
temporary business and tourism category of visas. Visitors from eligible countries are
allowed to stay in the US for up to 90 days for business and leisure purposes. Hence, the
waiver only relates to the ’B-visa’ category. Thus, the VWP waivers the need for a visa
for temporary non-immigrant visitors.
As of January 2014 there are 38 countries (30 in Europe) eligible for the visa waiver
(see Table C.1 for the current list of eligible countries). Eight of them were admitted to
the VWP in 2008. Visitors from VWP countries are only required to authorise their visit
online through the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA). Therefore, they
circumvent the screening process in the consular offices which otherwise would have been
conducted.
The inclusion of countries into the VWP is done through negotiations between the US
authorities and partner countries that want to benefit from the program. The main criteria
for qualifying for the VWP program include the offer of reciprocal benefits for US citizens,
a visa refusal of less than 3% for the previous year or an average of no more than 2% for
the previous two years, issuance of machine-readable passports, and other security related
agreements. However, in 2008 when the US admitted eight countries to its VWP, the two
criteria relating to refusal rates were temporarily lifted from October 2008 to November
2009 (Siskin, 2011). For the period 2004-2012, VWP countries contributed about a third
of all inbound travel to the USA.
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The eight countries admitted to the VWP in 2008 are the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia, and South Korea. Since all eight countries
were formally admitted into the VWP between November and December 2008, the refusal
rate criteria did not apply to them. At this time, ten other applicants (namely, Argentina,
Brazil, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Israel, Malaysia, Poland, Romania, Turkey, and Uruguay), - and
designated ‘roadmap countries’ by US authorities, were in the process of negotiations to
join the program (Siskin, 2014).1
Even though the VWP is a significant institutional tool for enhancing travel to the
US and has sizable potential economic benefits, we are not aware of any published studies
that have systematically evaluated the impact of the program. In this chapter, focusing
on the period 2004-12, we employ Difference-in-Difference (Diff-in-Diff) estimation with
panel data on US inbound travel from the eight countries newly admitted to the program
in 2008 (treatment group), versus several comparison (control) groups. The comparison
groups include the ‘roadmap’ countries; the rest of the world, which are not in the VWP;
and the rest of the world excluding those admitted in 2008. Note that the control group
categorised as ‘the rest of the world, which are not in the VWP’ refers to all countries,
not in the VWP. For example, the UK is not included in this control group as it has been
in the VWP since the end of the 1980s. It refers to countries not in the VWP in 2008 or
before. The control group categorised as ‘the rest of the world excluding those admitted
in 2008’ applies to all countries except those admitted to the VWP in the year 2008. For
example, the UK is included in this group as it was admitted to the VWP before 2008.
Moreover, Ethiopia is also included in this group as it has not been admitted to the VWP.
We also restrict the treatment and comparison groups to countries in Europe to reduce
potential bias of estimates arising from heterogeneity and unobserved country character-
istics.
1Argentina and Uruguay were previously in VWP in 1996-2002 and 1999-2003 respectively.
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(countries not in the VWP in 2008 or before, for example the UK is excluded) (this
includes countries admitted to the VWP before 2008, for example, UK)
In the previous chapter of this thesis, we attempted to identify the causal impact of
visa policies using instrumental variable estimation methods. The current study develops
the approach adopted in the previous chapter by focusing on the impact of the US VWP
on inbound travel. The approach investigates the impact of the VWP on inbound travel
by treating the policy as a quasi-natural experiment. This allows a neater identification
of the impact of visa policies on travel compared to the previous chapter.
We find that, ceteris paribus, admitting a country to the program increases inbound
travel from that country to the US by between 29% - 44% depending on the comparison
group selected.
The chapter is organised as follows. In section 4.2, we present an overview of US
visa policies and the VWP. Section 4.3 provides a review of the literature and is followed
by section 4.4, which describes the data and presents some descriptive analysis. The
econometric model is outlined in section 4.5. Section 4.6 presents the results and an
accompanying discussion. Section 4.7 offers some concluding remarks.2
4.2 Overview of US Visa Policy and the VWP Program
Under the US Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) foreigners wishing to enter the
US are categorised as either immigrants or non-immigrants. The immigrant category,
also known, as Legal Permanent Resident, comprises people admitted to the US perman-
ently, mainly including family-based and employment based migrants. The non-immigrant
category consists of visitors who come to the US temporarily such as tourists, business
visitors, international students, and diplomats (Wasem, 2011).
Since its establishment in 1986, the VWP has been admitting countries to the program
2The statistical software used to estimate the models in this chapter is Stata 13 (StataCorp, 2013).
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at various times to enhance tourism, trade, and improve bilateral cooperation with other
nations. The United Kingdom was the first country to be admitted in July 1988, followed
by Japan in December 1988. The program initially planned to admit only eight countries.
The US Congress passed several amendments to the VWPP until it was made permanent
in October 2000 through the Visa Waiver Permanent Act. One of the changes was the
Immigration Act of 1990, which lifted the restriction on the number of countries that
can be admitted to the program (Siskin, 2014). See Table 4.1 for a chronology of major
regulations and reforms pertaining to the VWP.
Citizens from non-VWP countries need to apply for a valid visa to enter the US, which
involves among other things interviews in the consular offices abroad. In addition to an
interview, consular officers are required to screen visa applications using the Consular
Consolidated Database, Consular Lookout and Support System and TIPOFF database (a
database containing a list of potential terrorists) to check the background of the applicants
and their admissibility (Wasem, 2010; Siskin, 2014).
Except for the B-visa category, which is waived for citizens of the VWP eligible coun-
tries, foreigners from all countries not legally residing in the US, require a visa to enter the
US. The INA provides the laws, regulations, policies, and criteria for eligibility of visa and
entry to the US. Currently, the Department of State, the Department of Homeland Secur-
ity (DHS), and the Department of Justice are the key US government bodies mandated
with administering the laws and policies on the admission of foreigners to the country
(Wasem, 2010).
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US, the Enhanced Border Security and Visa
Entry Reform Act of 2002 was signed into law and was aimed at strengthening border
security against potential threats posed by inbound travellers. The law affected both
VWP participating and non-participating countries. Some of the provisions of the law
include increased visa processing fees, and longer processing times due to higher scrutiny
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Table 4.1: Major Reforms Regarding the VWP
Year Act Description
1986 Immigration Reform Established the Visa Waiver Pilot Program
and Control Act of 1986
1999 Immigration Act of 1990 Further requirements for the program
and removed the limit on the number
of countries that could participate
in the program
2000 Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act The VWP signed into law
2002 Enhanced Border Security and The VWP members report the theft of blank
Visa Entry Reform Act passports, and required, prior to admission
in the United States, that all aliens
who enter under the VWP are checked
against a lookout system
2008 Eight countries admitted to the VWP Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia, and South Korea
Source: Siskin (2014)
for those who require valid visas to enter the US. The law also stipulated that federal
law enforcement and intelligence agencies share data on admissibility and deportation of
foreigners with the Immigration and Naturalization Service and have a full integration
of database systems. Moreover, the law requires that all foreign nationals entering the
US under the VWP present machine-readable, tamper-resistant passports with biomet-
ric information.3 Regarding travellers to or from the US, commercial aircraft or vessels
arriving at, or departing from, the US provide border officers with passenger and crew
information.4
Whether the VWP exposes the US to security threats or not is an ongoing debate.
The fact visitors from VWP participating countries bypass background screening at the US
consular offices abroad led some to express concern that terrorists can use the opportunity
to enter the US with ease (Siskin, 2014). The ESTA enhances security by screening
travellers electronically before they embark on their travel to the US. However, there
3The initial deadline for machine-readable passport with biometric information was October 2005.
4See Neiman and Swagel (2009) for a review and an impact of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa
Entry Reform Act of 2002 on inbound travel to the US.
101
is a concern that its name-based system is incompatible with biometric-based databases
such as the DHS’s Automated Biometric Identification System and the FBI’s Integrated
Automated Fingerprint Identification System.
On the other hand, proponents of the VWP such as the Heritage Foundation argue that
by enhancing information sharing with partner countries any potential security threats are
more likely to be curbed in advance.5 Moreover, the stringent passport security standards
required by VWP participants such as machine-readability of the passports are less likely
to be forged. They also contend that the US can revoke the VWP status for any country
if the security risk is deemed unacceptable and travellers violate US immigration laws (as
was done for Argentina and Uruguay). Griswold (2007) argues that visa-free access to the
pool of less security risk countries frees resources to be reallocated to consular offices in
countries where security concerns are more likely to arise.
The Visa Waiver Program Office manages the compliance of the current VWP countries
to rules and regulations and the processes of admitting new countries to the program. A
report produced by the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) outlines the interim
procedures the DHS uses to admit a new country to the VWP.6 The Department of
the Secretary of State (DSS) can nominate a country for the VWP after determining
the country meets the essential criteria for visa exemption including a low refusal rate,
reciprocal privilege for US citizens, the historical patterns of passport and visa abuses,
the state of terrorism, and the potential impact on US national security of including the
country in the program (see Box C.1 in the appendix for a detailed list of the entry
criteria to the VWP). The DSS also ensures the statutory requirements of the VWP are
met, and the country demonstrates the US law enforcement and security interests are not
5http://www.heritage.org/research/factsheets/the-visa-waiver-program-a-security-partnership, ac-
cessed on 6 July 2015.
6The report by GAO regarding admission procedures can be accessed from
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-835R (Accessed on 25 June 2015).
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compromised. Then, the DHS sends a team to a site visit of the candidate country to
review the countrys political, social, and economic conditions, security of passports, the
state of border control, and information related to its immigration and national security
laws. Using the review from site visits and information from various other sources, the
DHS, in consultation with the DSS, decides whether or not to admit a country. The US
GAO reviews the procedures followed by the DHS in admitting a new country.
In 2005, the US government started providing countries aspiring to join the VWP
with roadmaps to aid them in meeting the program criteria (Siskin, 2011). As of 2005
there were eighteen countries in the roadmap scheme, eight of which were admitted to the
program in 2008.7 As discussed in preceding sections, in 2008 when the eight countries
were admitted the refusal rate criteria was temporarily relaxed (from October 2008 to
November 2009). In November 2009, the criteria were reinstated and provide some of the
hurdles for the admission of the roadmap countries into the VWP.
Four of the roadmap countries namely Bulgaria, Cyprus, Poland, and Romania are
members of the European Union (EU). As documented in Wilson (2007) and Siskin (2011),
the exclusion of some EU members from the VWP raises concerns, as EU laws require
treatment of all EU members equally. The concern is exacerbated as the Schengen Area
of which these four countries are members, does not require a visa for US citizens to visit
for up to 90 days for tourism and business purposes. This raises obvious reciprocity issues.
Poland is among the countries that have been critical of the delay to their inclusion into
the VWP. However, its visa refusal rate has been over 3%. For example, in 2013 the refusal
rate of Polish applicants for US visas was 10.8%. Hence, the INA will have to amend the
criteria if the ‘roadmap’ countries are to be included in the VWP (Siskin, 2011, 2014).
7Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia, and South Korea were admitted
to the VWP in 2008; the ten countries still in the roadmap category are Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cyprus,
Israel, Malaysia, Poland, Romania, Turkey, and Uruguay.
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4.3 Empirical Literature Review
As noted in the previous chapter, the primary factors determining international cross-
border travel and tourism identified in the literature includes income of origin countries;
relative prices measured by price indices or exchange rates; and transportation costs (in
some cases approximated by distance). See, for example, Crouch (1995), Lim (1999), Eilat
and Einav (2004), Culiuc (2014), and the previous chapter of the this thesis for a review
of the major determinants of these flows.
In this section, we focus on recent studies that explore the determinants of US inbound
travel. Using a consumer’s choice model between spending at home (Canada) and a foreign
country (US), Vilasuso and Menz (1998) found the country of origin prices and exchange
rates to be the main factors that influenced the choice of tourism spending in the US by
Canadians for the period between 1980 and 1995. Similarly, Ekanayake et al. (2012) using
panel cointegration methods for the period 1986 to 2011 found that the country of origin
income, tourism-related prices, the cost of travel, and exchange rates significantly affected
tourism demand. Bonham et al. (2006) argues prolonged visa process and difficulties
associated with it as well as higher visa fees potentially contributed to the decline in US
inbound travel after the 9/11 terrorist attack implying the decline was mainly from those
that required visas. Visa application fees to the US sharply increased after 2001, but
whether the price hike affected the decline in US inbound travel remains debatable (see,
for example, Rose (2004)). Neiman and Swagel (2009) suggest that longer waiting times
for visa processing and the extra inconvenience associated with increased security scrutiny
on arrival are two factors that have accounted for the sharp decline in US inbound travel
following the 9/11 terrorist attack from both VWP and non-VWP countries alike. Hence,
the Neiman and Swagel (2009) finding implies that since the decline was observed from
origins under the VWP and those that require visas to enter the US alike, the primary
factor for the decline was the increased scrutiny of inbound travellers.
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From various anecdotal sources, Goodrich (2002) asserts that the 9/11 attacks resulted
in a significant increase in waiting times at airports, higher costs on the airline industry due
to increased costs of enhanced security measures, such as strengthening aircraft cockpit
doors, and surveillance monitors in aircraft. These led to significant layoffs in the airline
industry and related sectors.
The Travel & Tourism Competitiveness Report of 2015 compiled by the World Eco-
nomic Forum ranks the US at number five out of 141 countries included in the report.
Despite a high competitiveness of the US in international tourism and its growing contri-
bution to the economy, studies on the determinants of US inbound travel is very limited.8
Similarly, despite visa policies being the main institutional tools for controlling the
cross-border flow of people, a systematic study of their quantitative impact is limited.
The studies that incorporated a visa in the context of travel and tourism that we are
aware of are Neiman and Swagel (2009), Neumayer (2006) , Neumayer (2010), and Li
and Song (2013). Neumayer (2006) and Neumayer (2010) investigate the role of visas on
the cross-border flow of people, and detect a detrimental impact of visa restrictions on
travel. Li and Song (2013) find a significant economic loss in China due to visa restrictions
introduced following the 1989 Tian’an Men Square Incident and the 2008 Beijing Olympic
games.9
The US VWP aims to facilitate travel to the United States for tourism and business
purposes without threatening its security. By providing visa-free access to citizens of
8Brewton and Withiam (1998) argues that the decline of the US international tourism flow in the 1990s
was primarily caused by lack of coherent federal travel policy. Moreover, he argues that a cut in government
spending in the tourism sector as one of the reasons why the US was not a member of the United Nations
World Tourism Organization (UNWTO). The US is not a member of the UNWTO currently.
9Two notable studies that address student visas are Jena and Reilly (2013) who examine the determ-
inants of the demand for UK student visas, and Shih (2016) who investigate the role of H-1B visa (a
non-immigrant visa that allows US companies to employ foreign workers) on incoming students to the US.
Jena and Reilly (2013) find bilateral exchange rate to be a more important factor than GDP of the source
country for demand for a student visa while visa costs are not statistically significant determinants. Shih
(2016) finds that issuance of H-1B visa to a country significantly increases the number of international
students from that country implying that flexible visa policies encourage inbound student mobility.
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eligible countries, the program is intended to enhance tourism and commerce between the
US and those countries, and boost airline revenues for US carriers. Moreover, the program
helps the US to shift more resources to visa-issuing consular offices in high-risk countries
(Wilson, 2007; Ford, 2010; Siskin, 2014).
4.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
4.4.1 Data Sources and Definitions
Adopting the United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) definition of short-
term travel, we measured annual sojourns in the US by the number of visitors - a concept
that includes business, tourism, and other private visits from the rest of the world who
stay from between one night up to a year. The travel data employed by the study are also
derived from UNWTO (UNWTO, 2014).
We use the real exchange rate as a measure of relative prices between the country of
origin and the US. We define and compute real exchange rate as the ratio of the official
exchange rate to the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) conversion factor for a given country
of origin relative to the US following Rodrik (2008). Data on the official exchange rate,
PPP conversion factors, and GDP in countries of origin came from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators (World Bank, 2013). The population of countries of origin are
derived from Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPPI).10
A description of primary variables of interest is shown in Table 4.2.
4.4.2 Treatment and Comparison Groups
Our main treatment group sample contains the eight countries added to the VWP in 2008.
The different set of comparison groups against which we compare travel from the treated
countries includes the ten ‘roadmap’ countries that are in the process of negotiating to
10Available at http://www.cepii.fr
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Table 4.2: Variable Definitions
Name Definition
LINBOUND Log of inbound flows to the US consisting of travellers for tourism,
business, and personal purposes
V Treatment group: Takes a value of 1 if country is admitted to the VWP in 2008,
zero otherwise
V*P2008 Treatment Indicator: Interaction between the treatment dummy (V) )
and post-treatment period (2009-12)
LRGDP Per Capita Log of Real GDP Per Capita (At year 2000 Prices) in country of origin
LEXCHANGERATE Log of the ratio of the Official Exchange Rate to PPP conversion factor,
defined in terms of the currency of country of origin per US Dollar
LPOPULATION Log of population of country of origin
enter to the VWP, the rest of the world that are not currently in the VWP, and the rest
of the world including the roadmap countries and countries admitted to the VWP prior
to 2008. Thus, the last category of countries excludes only the countries accepted in 2008
(i.e. the treatment group).
The reason for choosing the ‘roadmap’ countries that are in the process of negotiations
to enter the VWP is that they are deemed eligible to start the process to join the VWP
by US authorities. Hence, comparing countries that joined the VWP and countries on
the verge of joining attenuates potential dissimilarities between the treatment and control
groups for the VWP given the VWP criteria. The other two sets of controls, namely, the
rest of the world not currently included in the VWP, and the rest of the world including
the roadmap countries but not admitted to the VWP prior to 2008 provide robustness
checks in case factors peculiar to the ‘roadmap’ countries are driving the results.
Furthermore, we also restrict the treated and comparison groups only to European
countries focusing on those with similar economic history, levels of economic performance,
and institutional structures. Given that Europe’s recovery from the great recession of
2007-2009 was slower, and some countries suffered a second crisis around 2011, focusing
on a sub-sample of European countries helps overcome potential biases resulting from the
financial crisis on cross-border travel to the US. The analysis with European treatment
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Table 4.3: Pre-Program Comparison of Treatment and Comparison Groups
Control Treatment Difference
(2008 Roadmap) (2008 VWP)
Mean Mean
LRGDP Per Capita 8.945*** (0.115) 9.404*** (0.077) -0.459*** (0.146)
LEXCHANGE RATE 0.521*** (0.07) 0.4*** (0.02) 0.121 (0.082)
LPOPULATION 16.671*** (0.34) 15.258*** (0.35) 1.413*** (0.488)
LDISTW 9.0*** (0.077) 8.94*** (0.06) 0.13 (0.09)
Note
Data are average for the 2004 - 2007 period
T-test of group means , standard errors are reported in parenthesis
and comparison groups focuses on seven of the eight countries admitted to the VWP in
2008 and four of the ‘roadmap’ countries in the same year.
We provide a comparison of pre-treatment characteristics of the main treatment group
(2008-VWP) and the main comparison group (2008 ‘roadmap’ countries) based on ob-
servable characteristics in Table 4.3. The treatment group tends to be richer in terms
of GDP per capita but smaller in population than the comparison group. This can have
implications for external validity in terms the potential effect the VWP when rolled-out
to include more heterogeneous countries. There is no difference regarding real exchange
rate levels and distance to the US. Never the less, we acknowledge the potential threat to
external validity associated with the statistical difference between the treatment and con-
trol groups with respect to GDP and Population. In the context of difference-in-difference
estimation, the essential element that needs to be addressed is the existence of a parallel
trend in travel levels to the US. This is the case in our models as is shown in forthcoming
sections graphically and by formal testing.
The use of different sets of treatment and comparison groups helps ensure that our
analysis is not driven by the characteristics of a certain group of countries. The lists of
treatment and comparison groups for our analysis are provided in Tables C.2, C.3, and
C.4 of the appendix.
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The visa waiver programme applies to visits of up to 90 days while the dependent
variable, namely, inbound travel to the US includes all visits of up to one year. This can
potentially create inconsistency when comparing visitors that are eligible to the VWP and
others who travel with visas who may stay longer than 90 days. However, for the period
2004-2012, the average length of stay in the US by travellers included in out data is about
17 days UNWTO (UNWTO, 2014). The UNWTO (UNWTO, 2014) data only provides
the average stay of travellers and not the whole distribution of stay of travellers in the
US. However, given that the average stay is only 17 days, we do not expect a significant
number of travellers to stay more than 90 days. Hence, while in principle our travel
measure includes all travellers who stay for less than a year, the number of individuals
who stay for more than 90 days is likely to be vanishingly small and hence is not likely to
significantly affect the conclusions of our study.
The summary statistics for the main variables of interest are given in Table 4.4, which
contains mean values and their corresponding standard deviations for the different sets
of treatment and comparison groups for 2004-12. A detailed set of summary statistics
showing the between and within variation for the various sets of treatment and comparison
groups is given in Tables C.5, C.6, C.7, and C.8 in the appendix.
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Table 4.4: Summary Statistics: Mean 2004-12
Variable Worldwide Europe
Treatment (V) 2008 VWP 2008 VWP 2008 VWP 2008 VWP in Europe
Comparison 2008 Roadmap Non-VWP Rest of the World 2008 Roadmap Europe
LINBOUND 10.677 8.956 9.414 9.886
(1.53) (2.43) (2.61) (0.98)
V 0.471 0.055 0.047 0.636
V*P 2008 0.209 0.024 0.021 0.283
LRGDP Per Capita 9.17 7.76 8.15 9.2
(1.50) (0.49) (1.4) (0.43)
LEXCHAGERATE -0.448 -0.778 -0.658 -0.441
(0.25) (0.38) (0.47) (0.21)
LPOPULATION 15.952 15.605 15.659 15.308
(1.59) (2.05) (2.00) (1.30)
OBSERVATIONS 153 1318 1534 99
Note
Standard Deviations are reported in parenthesis for continuous variables only
The first three columns contain the countries admitted to the VWP in 2008 as treatment and
the various groups as the comparison category. The fourth column restricts the treatment and
comparison groups to Europe.
4.4.3 An Overview of Outbound Travel to the US
Comparing travel and tourism flows to the US from the newly admitted countries and other
countries with similar socio-economic characteristics but not admitted to the VWP, can
provide a portrait of the impact of visa waiver programs on cross-border travel. A visual
inspection of inbound travel to the US from the treated and the comparison countries
reveals a marked difference after 2008 (the year the treated countries were included into
the VWP) as shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. In Figure 4.1, we compare travel to the US from
the countries that entered into the VWP in 2008 with those in the ‘roadmap’ set in the
same period. In Figure 4.2, we compare the travel to the US from the countries in Europe,
which entered the VWP in 2008 with those European countries in the ‘roadmap’ group
for the same period. Both Figures 4.1 and 4.2 reveal a decline in travel to the US from
the ‘roadmap’ countries in 2008. This may be due to the global financial crisis although
travel from the treated countries did not decline in the same year. The potential impact
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of the VWP is most apparent and persistent when the treatment and comparison groups
are restricted to Europe (Central and Eastern Europe) as shown in Figure 4.2, as both
categories were likely to suffer from comparable economic shocks. Similar comparisons
between various categories of treatment and comparison groups are shown in Figures C.2
and C.3 in the appendix. The figures show that travel from the treated countries tends to
decline from around 2011 compared to the various comparison groups. One explanation
is that seven of the treated countries are found in Europe, which was most affected by the
financial crisis and where the recovery was slower (as shown in Figure 4.3). The recovery
process in Europe was halted at the end of 2010 when the European economy started to
slow down again in contrast to elsewhere.
A visual inspection of Figures 4.1 and 4.2 also indicates that before the treatment
period, the treated and comparison group exhibit common parallel trends, which is an
essential identification assumption for the estimation procedure subsequently deployed.
We formally test this proposition in a subsequent section. However, a parallel trend in the
case of Figure C.2 is less apparent. Possible explanations are either the existence of high
heterogeneity or outliers in the comparison group.
The great recession of 2007 to 2009 saw output plunge in many countries especially
those in the developed world. Travel and tourism flow declined over this period. Figure
C.4 of the Appendix shows inbound tourism trends in four developed countries. The fall
in travel and tourism inflows is evident in all four countries. However, the decline in
inflows to the US was not only smaller but also more transient. One explanation for the
faster recovery of the US travel inflows is the faster revival of the US economy. Another
potential factor that may partly explain the difference in the figure is the accession of
eight new countries into the VWP program, and the resultant increase of travellers from
these countries to the US post-2008.
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Figure 4.1: Inbound Travel to the US from Treated (2008 VWP) and Compar-
ison (2008 Roadmap) Groups
Figure 4.2: Inbound Travel to the US from Treated (2008 Europe VWP) and
Comparison (2008 Europe Roadmap) Groups
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Figure 4.3: Global Patterns of Economic Growth: 2004-12
As a preliminary indicator of the role of admitting a country into the VWP, we compare
travellers to the US from Hungary, a country admitted to the VWP in 2008 with travellers
from Romania, which was in the roadmap category to join the VWP in the same year.
Both are located in the same region and were centrally planned economies for much of
the post-war period up to 1990. Moreover, both recently became members of the EU.
The two countries had comparable travel levels to the US in the 2004 -08 period, with
Romania having slightly higher levels compared to Hungary. In 2008, both countries were
affected by the global financial crisis, which also affected travel levels to the US. However,
Hungary was admitted to the US VWP in 2008. Despite the 2008 crisis, travel to the US
from Hungary continued to rise while travel from Romania started to decline in 2008 as
shown in Figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.4: Inbound Travel to the US from Selected Countries
A more precise impact of admission to the VWP on travel to the US requires the use
of econometric techniques, to which attention now turns.
4.5 Econometric Methods and Identification Strategy
We conduct panel data analysis of US inbound travel between 2004 and 2012 using
standard Difference-in-Difference estimation procedures (see, for example, Bertrand et al.
(2004)). Our model is specified as:
ln(Ti) = ρc + Pt + β(Vi ∗ Pi2008) + γ′Xit + εit (4.1)
where Ti is inbound travel to the USA in period t from country i. Vi is a dummy variable
for whether country i has been admitted to the VWP in 2008 (treatment indicator).
Pi2008 a dummy variable for the post 2008 period. The parameters ρc and Pt capture
origin country fixed effects and time dummies respectively, Xit is a vector of covariates. β
captures the average effect of the accession to the WVP in terms of US inbound travel.11
11Since we use panel data fixed effect estimator Vi does not appear in (4.1) on its own
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For a year-by-year effect of the program after its implementation, we include year
dummies for 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012 interacted with the treatment indicator. In other
words we include ‘year leads’ interacted with the treatment indicator. Hence, we estimate
ln(Ti) = ρc + Pt +
2012∑
t=2009
α′(Vi ∗ Pit) + λ′Xit + ξit (4.2)
where α′ is a vector capturing the effect of the program in year 1 (2009), year 2 (2010),
year 3 (2011), and year 4 (2012). Both ρc and Pt are defined as in Equation (4.1).
A fundamental assumption of the Difference-in-Difference method is the presence of
parallel trends between treatment and comparison groups, which implies that in the ab-
sence of the program intervention the difference between the treated and comparison group
is constant. To test this, we extend Equation (4.1) to include trend and treatment interac-
tions with all the periods, essentially not limiting the program period to just 2008. Hence,
we are creating placebo programs in all years. In addition to the ‘year leads’ introduced in
Equation (4.2), we also include ‘year lags’. If the assumption of parallel trends holds for
the treated and comparison groups for the period before 2008, the estimates correspond-
ing to the interaction of the treatment group with the ‘year lags’ should be statistically
insignificant. The regression for checking the parallel trends assumption is specified as:
ln(Ti) = ρc + Pt +
2008∑
t=2004
κ′(Vi ∗ Pit) +
2012∑
t=2009
θ′(Vi ∗ Pit) + δ′Xit + ζit (4.3)
where the parameters and variables are defined as in (4.1) and (4.2). The null hypo-
thesis of similar trend is κ′ = 0
As Moulton (1990) shows in regressions with a mixture of individuals and grouped data,
such as in Differences-in-Differences where individual country outcomes are regressed on
policies that apply to groups, standard errors can be downward biased. Moreover Bertrand
et al. (2004) argue that most Differences-in-Differences estimations, particularly those with
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an extended period, yield biased standard errors due to high serial correlations. Test of
serial correlation for linear panel data model due to Wooldridge (2002) strongly reject the
null of no serial correlation. To mitigate these issues, we estimate our models based on
robust standard errors clustered at origin country level. Besides, we also report one of
Bertrand et al. (2004)’s proposed solutions, which is to ignore the time series information.
We average the data before and after the program periods and run Equation (4.1) on a
panel of length two.
4.6 Results and Discussion
4.6.1 Main Results
The main regression results for the Difference -in-Difference models are reported in Tables
4.5 and 4.6. The results indicate a marked increase in inbound travel to the US from
countries admitted to the VWP in 2008 compared to an otherwise similar set of countries
and a comparison group comprised of the rest of the world.
In columns 1-3 of Tables 4.5 and 4.6 the treatment group consists of the eight countries
admitted to the VWP in 2008. In column 4 of the tables, the treated and comparison
groups are restricted to Europe.12
Table 4.5 reports the impact of the VWP by comparing pre and post 2008 inbound
travel. The primary variable of interest (V*POST2008) captures the role of the VWP.
The estimates for these key variables using the different sets of controls are significant at
conventional levels. The magnitudes can be interpreted as follows. Focusing on columns
1-3, on average, ceteris paribus, a country admitted to the VWP in 2008 exhibited an
increase in travel to the US of 40% compared to a typical ‘roadmap’ country; 36% more
compared to the rest of the world, not in the VWP; and 29% more compared to the rest
12As indicated in preceding sections, the complete list of treated and comparison groups is given in Table
C of the appendix.
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Table 4.5: Determinants of Inbound Travel (2004-2012): Diff-in-Diff Estimation
- Pre and Post Admission
VARIABLES WORLDWIDE EUROPE
TREATMENT (V) 2008 VWP 2008 VWP 2008 VWP 2008 VWP
COMPARISON 2008 ROADMAP NON-VWP REST OF THE 2008 EUROPE
WORLD ROADMAP
DEP. VARIABLE Linbound Linbound Linbound Linbound
(1) (2) (3) (4)
V*POST2008 0.338** 0.311*** 0.253** 0.364*
(0.128) (0.103) (0.102) (0.191)
LRGDP Per Capita 0.244 0.771*** 0.621*** 0.267
(0.663) (0.212) (0.194) (0.958)
LEXCHANGE RATE -0.974** -0.430*** -0.365*** -0.614
(0.373) (0.139) (0.132) (0.566)
LPOPULATION 1.197 1.243*** 1.022*** 1.686
(1.72) (0.269) (0.287) (2.916)
YEAR FIXED EFF Yes Yes Yes Yes
OBSERVATIONS 153 1318 1534 99
R-SQUARED (within) 0.557 0.373 0.379 0.490
SIGMA 0.834 1.844 1.654 1.261
SIGMA E 0.188 0.259 0.246 0.206
Note
Clustered Robust Standard errors in parentheses. SIGMA and SIGMA E indicate standard deviations of residuals within groups
(panel level) and that of overall error term respectively
***, **, * indicate Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level
of the world including countries admitted to the VWP prior to 2008.
In column 4, we restrict the treatment and comparison groups to Europe. This helps to
effectively control for the potential heterogeneity of countries in terms of unobserved socio-
economic characteristics that may potentially bias the estimates. Since seven out of the
eight countries admitted to the VWP in 2008 are in Europe, restricting both treatment
and comparison groups to Europe is a worthwhile exercise to control for an observed
characteristic that may drive the results.
Again the results in column 4 suggest very similar quantitative effects of the VWP to
columns 1-3. In percentage terms, on average and ceteris paribus, a European country
admitted to the VWP in 2008 saw an increase in travel to the US by 44% compared to a
typical European country in the roadmap group.
We now briefly turn to the other estimates. The elasticity of origin income travel to
the US is about 0.6 - 0.8 (see columns 2 and 3). This is similar to estimates provided in
Culiuc (2014) and Neumayer (2010), while slightly lower than the findings of other studies
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reporting an elasticity of close to one or slightly above one such as Eilat and Einav (2004).13
Income is not a significant determinant of inbound travel to the US in the columns 1 and
4 perhaps due to the similarity in GDP levels among the treated and comparison groups
in those columns.14
The real exchange rate is negatively related to travel to the US as expected and in
line with findings in related research on the role of costs associated with travel. A higher
exchange reflects higher relative prices of goods and services in the USA compared to
countries of origin of travellers. The size of a country, measured by its population, does
not yield a significant effect on travel travel to the US.
The year-by-year effects of admission to the VWP on travel are reported in Table 4.6.
Columns 1-3 of Table 4.6 compare the 2008 VWP countries with the same comparison
groups worldwide as in Table 4.5. The results show that the effect was positive in the two
years after the program. The effect after the two years depends on the specifications (the
type of treated and comparison groups). Hence, our results point to a modest persistent
effect of the program.
Our results suggest that less restrictive visa policies enhance the number of potential
visitors due to reduced uncertainty, inconvenience, and costs associated with a visa ap-
plication. Corroboration can be obtained from other studies already cited in the literature
review, which found that restrictive visa policies had a detrimental effect on travel (for
example, see Neumayer (2006), Neumayer (2010). Neumayer (2010) finds that restrictive
visa policies reduce travel by between 52% and 63% depending on the specification. This
is not directly comparable to our estimates as it deals with restrictions rather than relax-
ation of visa policy. However, the sizable magnitude of the effect is resonant of the effect
13Using T-tests, we find that difference between the elasticity of travel to origin income from our model
are not different from the ones obtained by Culiuc (2014) and Neumayer (2010) respectively at conventional
significance levels. The t-values are 1.16 and 0.56 respectively.
14A similar estimation as (4.5) using real GDP per capita instead of real GDP (not reported) reveals
similar coefficients for the program effect.
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Table 4.6: Determinants of Inbound Travel (2004-2012): Diff-in-Diff Estimation
- Year-by-Year Effect
VARIABLES WORLDWIDE WORLDWIDE EUROPE
TREATMENT (V) 2008 VWP 2008 VWP 2008 VWP
2008 VWP
EUROPE
COMPARISON 2008 ROADMAP NON-VWP
REST OF THE
WORLD
2008 EUROPE
ROADMAP
DEP. VARIABLE Linbound Linbound Linbound Linbound
(1) (2) (3) (4)
V*P2009 0.399*** 0.377*** 0.337*** 0.436**
(0.122) (0.094) (0.092) (0.159)
V*P2010 0.357*** 0.308*** 0.253*** 0.344*
(0.120) (0.075) (0.072) (0.170)
V*P2011 0.292 0.268* 0.201 0.325
(0.171) (0.156) (0.155) (0.235)
V*P2012 0.284 0.287* 0.218 0.362
(0.178) (0.172) (0.171) (0.245)
LRGDP Per Capita 0.258 0.772*** 0.623*** 0.301
(0.665) (0.212) (0.194) (0.953)
LEXCHANGE RATE -0.954** -0.426*** -0.361*** -0.592
(0.378) (0.140) (0.133) (0.559)
LPOPULATION 1.096 1.236*** 1.014*** 1.646
(1.639) (0.269) (0.289) (2.197)
YEAR FIXED EFF Yes Yes Yes Yes
OBSERVATIONS 153 1318 1534 99
R-SQUARED (within) 0.561 0.374 0.380 0.493
SIGMA 0.750 1.836 1.648 1.204
SIGMA E 0.190 0.259 0.246 0.210
Note
Clustered Robust Standard errors in parentheses. SIGMA and SIGMA E indicate standard deviations of residuals within groups
(panel level) and that of overall error term respectively
***, **, * indicate Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level
reported in this chapter in Table 4.5. Similarly, Li and Song (2013) also find a significant
economic loss in China due to visa restrictions introduced following the student demon-
strations in 1989 Tian’an Men Square and the 2008 Beijing Olympic games. For example,
they find that visa restrictions reduced potential visitors to China during the 2008 Beijing
Olympic games by 270.381 thousand and tourism receipts by $294.185 million.
As shown in the previous chapter, restrictive visa policies are also associated with lower
tourism related revenues and employment. Conversely, the VWP program investigated
here is thus potentially associated with higher tourism related revenues and employment.
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4.6.2 Sensitivity Checks
To test for parallel trends between the treatment and comparison groups for the pre
program period, we estimate Equation (4.3). The results are reported in Table 4.7. The
estimates suggest that we cannot reject the null of similar trends between the comparison
and the treated groups for 2004-2008 (pre-program period). Both the individual t-tests
and the joint F-tests (shown at the bottom of Table 4.7) are statistically insignificant.15
This provides a sound basis for the identification strategy used in this chapter.
Following Bertrand et al. (2004), we re-estimate Equation (4.1) by averaging the data
pre and post the program periods using a panel of length two. Regression results based
on this exercises are reported in Table C.9 in the appendix . The results are consistent
with our main findings.
15Due to unavailability of data on real exchange rate Argentina, one of the ten-roadmap countries in
2008, was dropped from our main analysis. We ran regressions similar to Tables 4.5 and 4.6 without the
real exchange rate to include Argentina (not shown here). The results remain robust.
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Table 4.7: Determinants of Inbound Travel (2004-2012): Diff-in-Diff Estimation
- Test of Parallel Trends
VARIABLES WORLDWIDE EUROPE
TREATMENT (V) 2008 VWP 2008 VWP 2008 VWP
2008 VWP
(EUROPE)
COMPARISON 2008 ROADMAP NON-VWP REST OF 2008 EUROPE
THE WORLD ROADMAP
DEP. VARIABLE Linbound Linbound Linbound Linbound
(1) (2) (3) (4)
V*P2005 0.060 -0.004 -0.009 0.017
(0.042) (0.031) (0.029) (0.053)
V*P2006 0.086 0.009 -0.002 0.024
(0.082) (0.050) (0.049) (0.095)
V*P2007 0.153 0.056 0.041 0.115
(0.094) (0.052) (0.053) (0.116)
V*P2008 0.195 0.125* 0.083 0.101
(0.125) (0.071) (0.071) (0.133)
V*P2009 0.499*** 0.415*** 0.360*** 0.486**
(0.165) (0.122) (0.120) (0.196)
V*P2010 0.462** 0.346*** 0.277*** 0.394*
(0.162) (0.103) (0.101) (0.202)
V*P2011 0.399* 0.306* 0.224 0.376
(0.197) (0.177) (0.177) (0.261)
V*P2012 0.394* 0.326* 0.241 0.413
(0.203) (0.193) (0.192) (0.276)
LRGDP Per Capita 0.187 0.770*** 0.622*** 0.290
(0.679) (0.212) (0.194) (0.998)
LEXCHANGE RATE -0.999** -0.426*** -0.360*** -0.609
(0.392) (0.140) (0.133) (0.570)
LPOPULATION 1.258 1.253*** 1.024*** 1.668
(1.748) (0.269) (0.289) (3.022)
YEAR FIXED EFF Yes Yes Yes Yes
OBSERVATIONS 153 1318 1534 99
R-SQUARED (within) 0.570 0.374 0.380 0.497
SIGMA 0.901 1.855 1.656 1.227
SIGMA E 0.191 0.259 0.246 0.215
F-TEST FOR PAR. TREND 1.64 0.92 1.78 0.45
(0.213) (0.45) (0.20) (0.775)
Note
Clustered Robust Standard errors in parentheses. SIGMA and SIGMA E indicate standard
deviations of residuals within groups (panel level) and that of overall error term respectively
***, **, * indicate Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level
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4.7 Conclusions and Recommendations
This chapter has investigated the impact of the US VWP on cross-border travel. The US
has benefited in terms of boosting inbound travel from its VWP. Our analysis reveals that
visa exemptions greatly enhance travel. Using a Difference-in-Difference procedure with
panel data, we find that, ceteris paribus, admitting a country into the VWP increases in-
bound travel from that country to the US by about 40%. With regards to the persistence
of the program, its effect in the first two years of the program is positive in all specifica-
tions. The effect after two years, however, depends on the specification (the treated and
comparison groups). Hence, our results suggest a mildly persistent effect of the program
over time.
A notable peculiarity of the treated and comparison groups in the current analysis
is that the treated groups are, on average smaller in terms of population size. This can
potentially affect whether the program will have a similar effect if rolled out to other
countries. For example, the average population of the eight countries admitted into the
VWP in 2008 was 10 million while that of the roadmap countries was 40 million in the
same year. Comparing the population size of the treated with the other comparison groups
also indicates a similarly significant disparity. However, population size is not a significant
predictor of inbound travel the US according to our results. Hence, the population size
of future entrants to the VWP program may not have a significant role in terms of the
program effect. However, other factors that can affect the impact of rolling out the program
to cover new entrants include the current visa acceptance rate, income of the countries of
origin, and the nature of the bilateral foreign relation between the US and the aspirant
country among others.
A caveat of this study is that it focused on the role of the VWP on enhancing travel,
but does not consider any potential risks or benefits of the program concerning security.
While anecdotal evidence from previous studies suggests that the VWP has also increased
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US security due to information sharing with VWP countries and freeing of resources to
consular offices in more risky countries, a more comprehensive evaluation of the VWP
along the security dimension is clearly required. This is especially relevant as the US
Congress is currently considering reforms to the VWP in the wake of the November 2015
Paris Terrorist attacks. The reform notably proposes screening of passengers entering
under the VWP based on any past travel to a country known as a terrorist sanctuary. 16
16See USA Today’s report on the reform being considered at
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2015/11/30/us-tightens-visa-waiver-program-response-
paris-terror-attacks/76564038/
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
The thesis consists of three self-contained empirical papers. It examines the impact of
institutions and cross-border policies on socio-economic outcomes. Each paper addresses
a particular institutional aspect or policy and examines its impact on a particular socio-
economic outcome. Focusing on specific institutions and policies helps understand the
mechanism through which they matter for economic performance.
In line with North (1989), Acemoglu et al. (2000), Acemoglu et al. (2002), Hall and
Jones (1999), and Rodrik et al. (2004), the thesis finds a significant role of institutions and
policies on socio-economic outcomes. In comport with Acemoglu et al. (2005a), Rodrik
(2005), and Bardhan (2005), unbundling the various types of institutions helps to bet-
ter understand the mechanisms through which institutions and policies matter for socio-
economic outcomes.
Using rich survey data from rural Ethiopia, the second chapter of this thesis finds
evidence for distinctive determinants of overall life satisfaction and momentary happiness.
Broader socio-economic factors such as consumption, religiosity, trust and political gov-
ernance strongly predict life satisfaction, while primarily the economic situation drives
momentary happiness. In line with Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975) individuals take after-life
utility into account when evaluating their overall well-being as reflected in religiosity being
a predictor of life satisfaction but not momentary happiness. The differential impact of in-
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stitutions on life satisfaction and momentary happiness is in comport with the proposition
of Deaton (2008) and Stevenson and Wolfers (2008) that life satisfaction and happiness are
not synonymous, as assumed by several studies of well-being in the economics literature.
Hence, a key lesson from this study is that separately addressing the various measures of
subjective well-being helps to understand better the factors at play.
Like any other cross-sectional analysis, a limitation of the first chapter is the inability
to control adequately for unobserved individual heterogeneity such as personality that can
be particularly relevant in the SWB research. However, the Ethiopian Rural Household
Survey has religion information only in the 2004 round and hence does not permit panel
data analysis for the current research. Future research can investigate the determinants
of SWB in rural areas using panel data methods as data becomes available for subsequent
years.
Chapters Three and Four focus on the impact of more formal cross-border institutional
regulations, namely visa policies on cross-border travel and associated benefits. Despite
visa policies being the main institutional tools for countries to control cross-border flow
of people, research on the extent of the impact of such policies on travel, and related
employment and revenues is scarce. In Chapter three, we find a significant negative
impact of restrictive visa policies on cross-border travel and associated income and jobs
in destinations countries using cross-country data. Conversely, in Chapter Four, we find
a significant positive role of the USA visa waiver program on inbound travel to the USA.
A key lesson from the two chapters is that by flexing bilateral visa policies, countries can
benefit from increased travel in the form of revenue and employment.
Potential extensions of chapters three and four include investigating the role of visa
policy on cross-border travel and associated technology transfer, FDI, and trade among
others. The role of visa policy on technology transfer is perhaps better studied when
disaggregated data on travel by purpose is available as business travellers are likely to
125
play a greater role in technology transfer than tourists. The role of visa policies on FDI
and trade is likely to be mediated through its effect on travel. Since the determinants of
travel, FDI and trade are likely to be similar, identification becomes difficult. However,
with a proper instrument for any of the variables of interest (i.e. travel, FDI, and trade),
the impact of visa policies can be explored.
Moreover, future research can look at the role of the VWP on US security especially
in light of VWP reform being considered by the US Congress in the wake of the Novem-
ber 2015 Paris Terrorist attacks. Other related extensions of the current study include
examining the role of the VWP in improving trade and FDI flows between the US and
its partners. Moreover, a similar study of the role of related visa policies on travel and
tourism in other countries can boost our understanding of the role of visa policies and its
determinants.
We have attempted to overcome endogeneity in Chapters Three and Four, but we
can not fully claim that our findings reflect pure causality. Our results highlight signi-
ficant effects of formal and informal institutions and policies on socio-economic outcomes
and point to the need to do further research by unbundling institutions and policies and
investigate their roles on specific socio-economic issues.
This thesis has dealt with cross-cutting issues from economics, political economy, psy-
chology, and sociology and highlights the need for more multi-disciplinary research in
development studies. In light of the increasing availability of data in the various discip-
lines in social science coupled with enhanced computing power, and recent advances in
research methods, rigorous multi-disciplines research has become feasible.
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Chapter 2 Appendix
A.1 Chapter 2 Appendix Tables
Table A.1: Religiosity Across Selected Countries
How often do you attend religious services (%)
Colombia Ethiopia Egypt United States
More than once a week 10.8 37.3 31 11.3
Once a week 34.5 39.9 24.6 23.2
Once a month 18.8 9.7 3.8 12.3
Only holy days 7.6 4.1 11 8.5
Once a year 5.9 0.3 0.6 4.4
Less often 10.7 6.1 9.4 11.5
Never 11.2 2.6 19.5 24.5
Missing; Not asked by the interviewer 0 0 0 3.5
No answer 0 0 0.1 0.8
Dont know 0.5 0 0 0
Observations (Number) 3,025 1,500 3,051 1,249
Source
World Values Survey Wave 5: 2005-2009, available at www.worldvaluessurvey.org
Table A.2: Aversion to Divorce Across Selected Countries
Justifiable: divorce
Colombia Ethiopia Egypt United States
Never justifiable 37.2 54.9 28.5 5.4
2 4 15.3 2 3.5
3 3 2.8 3.7 5.8
4 3.5 1.2 4.7 5.3
5 12.9 6.9 16.5 31.9
6 5.8 2.1 8 7.9
7 5.5 1.5 10.7 8.7
8 7.5 1.7 10.9 9.2
9 5 1.3 5.8 3.9
Always justifiable 15.2 9.7 8.8 11.6
Missing; Not asked by the interviewer 0 0 0 3.7
No answer 0 1.1 0.2 3.2
Dont know 0.4 1.5 0.1 0
Observations (Number) 3025 1500 3051 1249
Source
World Values Survey Wave 5: 2005-2009, available at www.worldvaluessurvey.org
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Table A.3: District/Woreda Level Socio-Economic Characteristics
District Villages Region Major Religion Satisfaction Happiness Trust POLITICAL TRUST Religiosity Main Crops
Atsbi Haresaw Tigray Orthodox 1.09 (0.79) 0.88(0.75) 5.09 4.84 11.27 Cereals/Food
Subha-ssahssie Geblen Tigray Orthodox 0.86(0.76) 0.76(0.66) 4.68 4.5 6.94 Cereals/Food
Ankober Dinki Amhara Mixed 1.22(0.73) 0.92(0.64) 5.15 4.05 5.15 Cereals/Food
Bassona Worana Debre Berhan Amhara Orthodox 1.31(0.63) 0.99(0.63) 4.92 4.52 3.72 Cereals/Food
Enemay Yetmen Amhara Orthodox 1.04(0.63) 0.67(0.59) 4.33 4.18 6.27 Cereals/Food
Bugna Shumsheha Amhara Orthodox 0.79(0.66) 0.57(0.63) 4.19 4.42 10.2 Cereals/Food
Adaa Sirbana Goditi Oromia Orthodox 0.89(0.83) 0.84(0.68) 3.73 3.98 2.11 Cereals/Food
Kersa / Alemaya Adele Kere Oromia Muslim 1.03(0.78) 1.1(0.64) 4.17 3.4 10.6 Cash crops
Dodota Koro Degaga Oromia Muslim 0.67(0.73) 0.5(0.54) 3.72 4.18 5.94 Cereals/Food
Shashemene Tirurfe Oromia Mixed 0.94(0.75) 0.79(0.65) 3.89 4.33 4.14 Cash crops
Cheha Imdibir SNNP Mixed 0.87(0.66) 0.4(0.50) 3.54 2.67 6.42 Cash crops
Kedida Gamela Aze Deboa SNNP Protestant 1.03(0.73) 1.06(0.58) 3.49 3.48 5.52 Cash crops
Bule Adado SNNP Protestant 0.65(0.57) 0.56(0.60) 4.73 4.28 6.43 Cash crops
Boloso Sorie Gara Godo SNNP Mixed 0.82(0.74) 0.82(0.54) 4.57 4.68 6.01 Cash crops
Daramalo/Gardula Doma SNNP Protestant 0.56(0.66) 0.6(0.63) 4.73 4.58 5.31 Cash crops
Overall 0.93(0.73) 0.77(0.65) 4.33 4.14 6.39 -
Note
Data on main crop column is obtained from Dercon and Hoddinott (2011)
Remaining data are authors’ computations from the ERHS
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Table A.4: Ordered Probit Estimation with Consumption Quantiles
DEP.VAR Satisfaction Happiness
CONSTANT -2.31*** -0.98*
Welfare Metrics
LRCONSUMPTION PC 0.49*** 0.21*
LLIVESTOCK 0.52*** 0.49***
Institutions
TRUST 0.11*** 0.05**
POLITICAL TRUST 0.07*** 0.04
PARTICIPATION 0.22** 0.01
Religion and Religiosity
RELIGIOSITY 0.00 0.00
CATHOLIC -0.14 0.30
MUSLIM -0.34** -0.13
PROTESTANT -0.15 0.02
CATHOLIC*RELIGIOSITY -0.00 -0.02
MUSLIM*RELIGIOSITY 0.02* 0.00
PROTESTANT*RELIGIOSITY 0.04** 0.03*
Relative Income (Consumption) Quartile
QUARTILE 2 0.03 0.03
QUARTILE 3 -0.19 -0.05
QUARTILE 4 -0.49** -0.06
VILLAGE CONTROLS Yes Yes
Mu(1) 1.49*** 1.81***
OBSERVATIONS 1112 1112
pseudo R-sq 0.139 0.131
Table A.5: Robustness of Variables of Interest to Inclusion of Controls
DEP.VARIABLE Satisfaction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CONSTANT -0.67*** 0.58*** 0.70*** 0.23** -0.01 -1.55***
LRCONSUMPTION PC 0.28*** 0.20***
RELIGIOSITY 0.01** -0.01 -0.00
CATHOLIC -0.43*** -0.58*** -0.20
MUSLIM -0.25*** -0.49*** -0.22*
PROTESTANT -0.32*** -0.48*** -0.26*
CATHOLIC*RELIGIOSITY 0.03 0.03
MUSLIM*RELIGIOSITY 0.04*** 0.03***
PROTSTNT*RELIGIOSITY 0.03 0.04**
POLITICAL TRUST 0.07*** 0.04**
TRSUT 0.12*** 0.12***
LLIVSTIK 0.45***
LAND PC 0.03
SINGLE -0.27
WIDOWED -0.40***
DIVORCED -0.14
PARTICIPATION 0.20**
ILLNESS -0.28***
VILLAGE CONTROL No No No No No No
MU(1) 1.26*** 1.24*** 1.25*** 1.24*** 1.25*** 1.41***
N 1114 1114 1114 1114 1114 1114
pseudo R-sq 0.019 0.011 0.017 0.005 0.016 0.103
Note
Note: control variables not reported include land holding size, education, gender, age, number
of younger and older children
***, **, * indicate Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level
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Adopted from Dercon and Hoddinott (2011)
Figure A.1: Map of the ERHS Survey Area
149
A.3 Derivation of the Heteroscedasticity Test
The Heteroscedasticity test used in this chapter are Adopted from Machin and Stewart
(1990).
In ordered probit models residuals can not readily be estimated as they are not directly
observed from y∗i − x′iβ due to the latent dependent variable, y∗i , being not directly
estimated. However, we do have y∗i distribution conditional on xi estimated by maximum
likelihood method from which we can obtain the generalised residuals, uˆi, in accordance
with Gourieroux et al. (1987).
uˆ
(1)
i = E(y
∗
i − x′iβ|yi = j, xi) =
φ(θj−1 − x′iβ)− φ(θj − x′iβ)
Φ(θj − x′iβ)− φ(θj−1 − x′iβ)
(A.1)
Where φ(.) and Φ(.) represent the standard normal PDF and the CDF operators for
standard normal respectively. The uˆi’s are score contributions of the constant term (β0).
Multiplying the remaining elements of β with xi yields their respective score contributions.
The threshold score contributions are given by
ηij =

φ(θj−x′iβ)
Φ(θj−x′iβ)−Φ(θj−1−x′iβ) ifyi = j
−φ(θj−x′iβ)
Φ(θj+1−x′iβ)−Φ(θj−x′iβ) ifyi = j + 1
0 otherwise
(A.2)
For j = 2, , J − 1
Higher-order moments residuals for testing higher ordered adequacy of the model are
derived from a higher-order conditional moments specified in accordance with Stewart
(1983) as cited in Machin and Stewart (1990) as
Mτi =
W r(j−1)iφ(θj−1 − x′iβ)−W rjiφ(θj − x′iβ)
Φ(θj − x′iβ)− Φ(θj−1 − x′iβ)
(A.3)
The first four moments residuals of Chesher and Irish (1987) and the conditional
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moments can then be related as
uˆ
(1)
i = Mˆ01
uˆ
(2)
i = Mˆ1i
uˆ
(3)
i = 2uˆ
(1)
i + Mˆ2i
uˆ
(4)
i = 3uˆ
(2)
i + Mˆ3i
We run tests for heteroscedasticity using test statistics that take the following general
form
ξ = 1′Z(Z ′Z)−1Z ′1 (A.4)
Where 1 is an n-dimensional vector of ones and Z is a matrix with row order n . Each
row contains the score contributions for all parameters of the model.
We set up assuming a variance of u being 1. In the event of heteroscedastic errors, on
the other hand, the variance is specified as
σ2i = 1 + q
′
iv
The rows of z for the null of v = 0 are
Zi = (uˆ
(1)
i xi, ηˆ2i, ..., ηˆ(J−1)i, uˆ
2
i qi) (A.5)
Under the null, ξ ∼ χ2(k)
In the case of heteroscedastic ordered probit incorporating the variance function re-
moves the heteroscedasticity; hence there is no need to conduct a formal test of heteros-
cedasticity.
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Table B.1: List of Countries Included in the Study
List of Countries included in the Study
Albania Denmark Laos Russian Federation
Algeria Dominica Latvia Rwanda
Angola Dominican Rep. Lebanon Saudi Arabia
Antigua & Barbuda Ecuador Lesotho Senegal
Argentina Egypt Liberia Seychelles
Armenia El Salvador Lithuania Sierra Leone
Australia Equa. Guinea Luxembourg Singapore
Austria Eritrea Madagascar Slovakia
Azerbaijan Estonia Malawi Slovenia
Bahamas Ethiopia Malaysia South Africa
Bangladesh Fiji Maldives Spain
Belarus Finland Mali Sri Lanka
Belgium France Malta Sudan
Belize Gabon Marshall Islands Swaziland
Benin Gambia Mauritania Sweden
Bhutan Georgia Mauritius Switzerland
Bolivia Germany Mexico Syrian Arab Rep.
Bosnia & Herzegovina Ghana Micronesia, Fe. Sta TFYR of Macedonia
Botswana Greece Mongolia Tajikistan
Brazil Grenada Morocco Thailand
Bulgaria Guatemala Mozambique Togo
Burkina Faso Guinea Namibia Tonga
Burundi Guinea-Bissau Nepal Trinidad & Tobago
Cambodia Guyana Netherlands Tunisia
Cameroon Haiti Nicaragua Turkey
Canada Honduras Niger Turkmenistan
Cape Verde Hungary Nigeria Uganda
Central African Rep. Iceland Norway Ukraine
Chad India Pakistan United Arab Emirates
Chile Indonesia Palau United Kingdom
China Ireland Panama Tanzania
Colombia Israel Papua New Guinea United States
Comoros Italy Paraguay Uruguay
Congo Jamaica Peru Uzbekistan
Costa Rica Japan Philippines Vanuatu
Croatia Jordan Poland Venezuela
Cyprus Kazakhstan Portugal Viet Nam
Czech Republic Kenya Rep. of Moldova Zambia
Cte d’Ivoire Korea, Rep. of Romania Zimbabwe
Dem. Rep. of Congo Kyrgyzstan
Note
Number of countries in the sample is 158
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Table B.2: Determinants of Cross-border Travel: OLS with Heckman Selection
with Full Set of Observations
2005 2010
ESTIMATION METHOD OLS Selection Heckman OLS Selection Heckman
Dep. Var. loutbound outbound p loutbound loutbound outbound p loutbound
VISA -0.723*** -0.145*** -1.049*** -1.006*** -0.190*** -0.865***
(0.060) (0.031) (0.069) (0.072) (0.036) (0.068)
LGDP PC ORIGIN 0.809*** 0.258*** 0.646*** 0.814*** 0.260*** 0.606***
(0.021) (0.011) (0.036) (0.022) (0.012) (0.035)
LGDP PC DEST 0.707*** 0.302*** 0.424*** 0.755*** 0.337*** 0.317***
(0.022) (0.011) (0.038) (0.023) (0.011) (0.040)
CONTIGUITY 2.697*** 0.216* 1.653*** 2.558*** 0.211* 1.547***
(0.299) (0.122) (0.173) (0.300) (0.123) (0.169)
LDISTSANCE -1.482*** -0.545*** -1.119*** -1.520*** -0.548*** -1.028***
(0.043) (0.021) (0.066) (0.044) (0.021) (0.065)
LPOP ORIGIN 0.774*** 0.234*** 0.746*** 0.780*** 0.231*** 0.719***
(0.027) (0.015) (0.033) (0.028) (0.015) (0.032)
LPOP DEST 0.705*** 0.288*** 0.606*** 0.695*** 0.265*** 0.549***
(0.022) (0.012) (0.040) (0.023) (0.012) (0.036)
LAREA ORIGIN 0.000 0.027** 0.012 0.029**
(0.021) (0.012) (0.022) (0.012)
LAREA DEST -0.178*** -0.070*** -0.018 -0.146*** -0.049*** -0.033**
(0.019) (0.011) (0.018) (0.020) (0.011) (0.017)
COMMON
LANGUAGE 1.173*** 0.450*** 0.756*** 1.191*** 0.461*** 0.548***
(0.076) (0.041) (0.087) (0.079) (0.041) (0.086)
COLONY 1.296*** 0.047 1.009*** 1.266*** 0.064 0.971***
(0.341) (0.127) (0.166) (0.346) (0.128) (0.156)
WTO 0.261*** 0.220*** 0.223*** 0.402*** 0.250*** 0.380***
(0.057) (0.032) (0.071) (0.059) (0.032) (0.071)
SCHENGEN ORIGIN 0.374*** 0.140*** 0.159** 0.468*** 0.175*** 0.122*
(0.095) (0.042) (0.068) (0.097) (0.042) (0.066)
SCHENGEN DEST -1.868*** -1.195*** 0.133 -2.104*** -1.254*** 0.285*
(0.128) (0.059) (0.148) (0.132) (0.060) (0.148)
LAMBDA -0.683*** -0.932***
(0.210) (0.203)
CONSTANT -17.19*** -7.84*** -13.23*** -17.66*** -8.02*** -10.95***
(0.602) (0.301) (1.205) (0.631) (0.305) (1.174)
OBSERVATIONS 11637 11637 4139 11637 11637 4139
R-SQUARED 0.517 0.754 0.512 0.737
Note
Robust Standard errors in parentheses.
***, **, * indicate Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level
outbound p is a dummy variable that takes one for non-zero outbound travel, and zero for zero out-
bound travel
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Table B.3: Durban-Wu-Hausman Test of Exogeneity of Visas
DWH Test of Exogeneity of Visas
DEP. VAR LOUTBOUND LOUTBOUND
2005 2010
VISA -0.874*** -1.166***
(0.102) (0.107)
VISA RES -2.376*** -0.927***
(0.231) (0.240)
LGDP PC ORIGIN 0.518*** 0.574***
(0.029) (0.029)
LGDP PC DEST 0.216*** 0.158***
(0.033) (0.038)
OBSERVATIONS 4139 4139
R-squared 0.267 0.231
Note
Durban-Wu-Hausman test of exogeneity of visas based on the Davidson and MacKinnon (1993)
augmented regression
Robust Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table B.4: Test of Orthogonality of the Instrument
Without visa With visa
2005 2010 2005 2010
ESTIMATION METHOD OLS OLS OLS OLS
DEP.VAR LOUTBOUND LOUTBOUND LOUTBOUND LOUTBOUND
VISA -1.087*** -0.946***
(0.067) (0.065)
UN VOTE AFFINITY 0.393*** 0.290*** 0.147 0.082
(0.091) (0.090) (0.096) (0.085)
LGDP PC ORIGIN 0.868*** 0.835*** 0.754*** 0.743***
(0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023)
LGDP PC DEST 0.595*** 0.568*** 0.536*** 0.480***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.022)
CONTIGUITY 1.788*** 1.636*** 1.659*** 1.538***
(0.187) (0.186) (0.179) (0.176)
LDISTSANCE -1.388*** -1.378*** -1.308*** -1.299***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.035) (0.036)
LPOP ORIGIN 0.851*** 0.839*** 0.844*** 0.832***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026)
LPOP DEST 0.697*** 0.685*** 0.714*** 0.685***
(0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
LAREA ORIGIN 0.021 0.039* 0.006 0.023
(0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022)
LAREA DEST -0.102*** -0.116*** -0.044*** -0.057***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
COMMON LANGUAGE 0.983*** 0.853*** 0.936*** 0.792***
(0.068) (0.068) (0.065) (0.067)
COLONY 1.066*** 0.998*** 1.007*** 0.973***
(0.176) (0.169) (0.169) (0.160)
WTO 0.608*** 0.649*** 0.300*** 0.498***
(0.067) (0.068) (0.068) (0.066)
SCHENGEN ORIGIN 0.193*** 0.220*** 0.213*** 0.224***
(0.071) (0.069) (0.069) (0.067)
SCHENGEN DEST -0.365*** -0.283*** -0.332*** -0.337***
(0.090) (0.089) (0.089) (0.088)
CONSTANT -18.151*** -17.208*** -17.176*** -15.997***
(0.578) (0.580) (0.557) (0.576)
OBSERVATIONS 4139 4139 4139 4139
R-SQUARED 0.735 0.722 0.754 0.736
Note
Robust Standard errors in parentheses.
***, **, * indicate Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level
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Table B.5: Determinants of Visa Policies: LPM (First Stage)
2005 2010
DEP. VAR.
Visa
(1)
Visa
(2)
UN VOTE AFFINITY -0.224*** -0.219***
(0.020) (0.021)
LGDP PC ORIGIN -0.095*** -0.090***
(0.009) (0.009)
LGDP PC DEST 0.050*** 0.060***
(0.004) (0.004)
CONTIG -0.119*** -0.104***
(0.036) (0.038)
LDISTW 0.053*** 0.069***
(0.019) (0.018)
LPOP ORIGIN 0.002 -0.001
(0.010) (0.009)
LPOP DEST 0.027*** 0.008
(0.010) (0.009)
LAREA ORIGIN -0.012** -0.016***
(0.005) (0.005)
LAREA DEST -0.025 -0.052**
(0.023) (0.023)
COMMON LANGUAGE -0.025 -0.052**
(0.023) (0.023)
COLONY -0.055 -0.026
(0.041) (0.041)
WTO -0.275*** -0.153***
(0.016) (0.016)
SCHENGEN ORIGIN 0.025 0.010
(0.017) (0.018)
SCHENGEN DEST -0.012 -0.089**
(0.040) (0.039)
LAMBDA 0.068 0.049
(0.057) (0.052)
CONSTANT 0.547* 1.021***
(0.316) (0.316)
OBSERVATIONS 4139 4139
R-SQUARED 0.379 0.420
CRAGG-DONALD STATISTIC 66.04 67.99
ANDERSON LM STATISTIC 109.5 100.8
Note
Robust Standard errors in parentheses.
***, **, * indicate Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level
Table B.6: Determinants of Travel: Regression by OLS by Continent
Africa Asia Europe Caribbean South America
VISA -1.155*** -1.362*** -0.827*** -0.406*** -0.706***
(0.114) (0.148) (0.062) (0.101) (0.104)
CONTROLS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
OBSERVATIONS 1640 766 3614 1000 872
R-squared 0.663 0.684 0.701 0.860 0.793
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Table B.7: Determinants of Travel: OLS with Heckman by Continent
Africa Asia Europe Caribbean South America
VISA -1.105*** -1.176*** -0.741*** -0.400*** -0.615***
(0.114) (0.16) (0.07) (0.101) (0.111)
LAMBDA 2.185*** -1.036*** -0.525*** 0.199 -0.897**
(0.456) (0.349) (0.190) (0.302) (0.378)
CONTROLS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
OBSERVATIONS 1638 760 3614 1000 872
R-squared 0.666 0.685 0.702 0.860 0.793
Table B.8: Determinants of Cross-border Travel: Poisson and IV-Poisson
ESTIMATION
METHOD
POISSON IVPOISSON
2005 2010 2005 2010
DEP.VAR OUTBOUND OUTBOUND OUTBOUND OUTBOUND
VISA -1.679*** -0.988*** -3.779*** -1.268***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001)
LGDP PC ORIGIN 0.598*** 0.617*** 0.567*** 0.635***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LGDP PC DEST 0.287*** 0.249*** 0.160*** 0.220***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CONTIGUITY 0.902*** 0.895*** 0.468*** 0.715***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LDISTSANCE -1.283*** -1.319*** -1.110*** -1.311***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LPOP ORIGIN 0.828*** 0.616*** 0.676*** 0.553***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LPOP DEST 0.565*** 0.610*** 0.437*** 0.565***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LAREA ORIGIN -0.027*** 0.160*** 0.062*** 0.193***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LAREA DEST 0.260*** 0.131*** 0.483*** 0.197***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
COMMON
LANGUAGE -0.062*** -0.049*** -0.662*** -0.187***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
COLONY 0.975*** 0.689*** 0.745*** 0.675***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
WTO -0.481*** -0.118*** -0.495*** 0.037***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SCHENGEN ORIGIN -0.366*** -0.274*** -0.703*** -0.371***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SCHENGEN DEST 0.300*** 0.148*** 0.195*** 0.151***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CONSTANT -12.502*** -10.199*** -10.340*** -9.377***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
OBSERVATIONS 11637 11637 11637 11637
Note
Standard errors in parentheses.
***, **, * indicate Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level
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Table B.9: Determinants of Cross-border Travel: Zero Inflated Poisson and
IV-Poisson
ESTIMATION METHOD
ZERO INFLATED
POISSON
ZERO INFLATED
IVPOISSON
2005 2010 2005 2010
DEP.VAR OUTBOUND OUTBOUND OUTBOUND OUTBOUND
VISA -1.602*** -0.890*** -2.069*** 0.229***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001)
LGDP PC ORIGIN 0.560*** 0.558*** 0.586*** 0.615***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LGDP PC DEST 0.267*** 0.252*** 0.220*** 0.329***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CONTIGUITY 0.931*** 1.081*** 0.857*** 1.146***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LDISTSANCE -1.202*** -1.075*** -1.043*** -1.129***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LPOP ORIGIN 0.180*** 0.124*** 0.094*** 0.048***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LPOP DEST 0.267*** 0.274*** 0.184*** 0.144***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LAREA DEST 0.255*** 0.148*** 0.374*** 0.122***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
COMMON
LANGUAGE -0.000*** -0.004*** -0.370*** 0.024***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
COLONY 0.911*** 0.678*** 0.793*** 0.727***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
WTO -0.520*** -0.240*** -0.301*** -0.009***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SCHENGEN ORIGIN -0.390*** -0.396*** -0.648*** -0.402***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SCHENGEN DEST 0.396*** 0.285*** 0.392*** 0.426***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CONSTANT -10.717*** -9.186*** -9.655*** -9.087***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
INFLATE
LAREA ORIGIN -0.179*** -0.180*** -0.179*** -0.180***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
OBSERVATIONS 11637 11637 11637 11637
Note
Standard errors in parentheses.
***, **, * indicate Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level
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Table B.10: Determinants of Travel: Poisson Estimation by Continent
Poisson
Africa Asia Europe Caribbean South America
DEP.VAR outbound outbound outbound outbound outbound
VISA -1.049*** -1.116*** -1.692*** 0.026 -1.540***
(0.295) (0.185) (0.197) (0.087) (0.296)
CONTROLS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
OBSERVATIONS 5832 2104 7489 4176 3054
Note
Robust Standard errors in parentheses.
***, **, * indicate Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level
Table B.11: Determinants of Travel: Zero Inflated Poisson Estimation by Con-
tinent
Zero Inflated Poisson
Africa Asia Europe Caribbean South America
DEP.VAR. outbound outbound outbound outbound outbound
VISA -0.908*** -0.966*** -1.649*** 0.015 -1.228***
(0.307) (0.171) (0.200) (0.082) (0.286)
INFLATE
LAREA O -0.127*** -0.221*** -0.178*** -0.346*** -0.210***
(0.018) (0.026) (0.016) (0.019) (0.029)
CONTROLS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
OBSERVATIONS 5832 2104 7480 4174 3054
Note
Robust Standard errors in parentheses.
***, **, * indicate Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level
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Note: Log of GDP per capital (at 2005 constant prices) and Mean UN Voting Affinity Scores for the main sample fo countries: 2010.
Source: Computed from World Bank (2013) and Lawson and Lemke (2012).
Figure B.1: Scatter Plot of GDP per capita and Voting Affinity Scores: 2010
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B.2 Chapter 3 Appendix Figures
Figure B.2: Visa and Travel within Continents
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C.1 VWP Qualifying Criteria
In order to qualify for the VWP program, a country must (Siskin (2014))
• offer reciprocal privileges to US citizens;
• a non-immigrant refusal rate of less than 3% for the previous year or an average of
no more than 2% over the past two years with neither year going above 2.5%;
• issue machine-readable passports (all aliens entering under the VWP must possess
a machine-readable passport);
• certify that it has established a program to issue to its nationals machine-readable
passports that are tamper-resistant and incorporate a biometric identifier (all pass-
ports issued after October 26, 2006, presented by aliens entering under the VWP
have to be machine-readable and contain a biometric identifier);
• certify that it is developing a program to issue tamper-resident, machine-readable
visa documents that incorporate biometric identifiers which are verifiable at the
countrys port of entry;
• enter into an agreement with the United States to report or make available through
International Criminal of any citizen, former citizen, or national against whom a
final order of removal is issued no later than three weeks after the order is issued;
• enter into an agreement with the United States to share information regarding
whether a national of that country traveling to the United States represents a threat
to U.S. security or welfare; and
• be determined, by the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the
Secretary of State, not to compromise the law enforcement or security interests of
the United States by its inclusion in the program.
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Table C.1: List of Eligible countries for VWP Countries and Date of Admission
as of June 2015
Current list of VWP countries (June, 2015)
Andorra (1991) Liechtenstein (1991)
Australia (1996) Lithuania (2008)
Austria (1991) Luxembourg (1991)
Belgium (1991) Malta (2008)
Brunei (1993) Monaco (1991)
Chile (2014) Netherlands (1989)
Czech Republic (2008) New Zealand (1991)
Denmark (1991) Norway (1991)
Estonia (2008) Portugal (1999)
Finland (1991) San Marino (1991)
France (1989) Singapore (1999)
Germany (1989) Slovakia (2008)
Greece (2010) Slovenia (1997)
Hungary (2008) South Korea (2008)
Iceland (1991) Spain (1991)
Ireland (1995) Sweden (1989)
Italy (1989) Switzerland (1989)
Japan (1988) Taiwan (2012)
Latvia (2008) United Kingdom (1988)
Note
Argentina and Uruguay were initially admitted to the VWP in 1996 and 1999 respectively;
however both were withdrawn in 2002 and 2003 respectively
Source
United States Travel Authorization Application Website, www.esta.us, accessed 30 June, 2015
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Table C.2: Sample of Countries in Treatment and Comparison Groups: A
Countries entered
the VWP in 2008 (Treated)
Roadmap countries
in 2008 (comparison 1
Czech Rep. Brazil
Estonia Bulgaria
Hungary Cyprus
S.Korea Israel
Latvia Malaysia
Lithuania Poland
Malta Romania
Slovakia Turkey
Uruguay
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Table C.3: Sample of Countries in Treatment and Comparison Group: B
Countries not in the VWP currently (Comparison 2)
Afghanistan Ecuador Mauritania Tunisia
Albania Egypt Mauritius Turkey
Algeria El Salvador Mexico Turkmenistan
Angola Eq. Guinea Morocco Tuvalu
Antig & Barb Eritrea Mozambique Uganda
Armenia Ethiopia Namibia Ukraine
Azerbaijan Fiji Nepal UAE
Bahamas Gabon Nicaragua Tanzania
Bahrain Gambia Niger Uruguay
Bangladesh Georgia Nigeria Uzbekistan
Barbados Ghana Oman Vanuatu
Belarus Grenada Pakistan Venezuela
Benin Guatemala Panama Viet Nam
Bermuda Guinea Papua New Guinea Yemen
Bhutan Guinea-Bissau Paraguay Zambia
Bolivia Guyana Peru Zimbabwe
Bos and Herze Haiti Philippines
Botswana Honduras Poland
Brazil Hong Kong Qatar
Bulgaria India Republic of Moldova
Burkina Faso Indonesia Romania
Burundi Iran Russia
Cambodia Iraq Rwanda
Cameroon Israel St. Kitts & Nevis
Canada Jordan Saint Lucia
Cape Verde Kazakhstan Samoa
C. African Republic Kenya Sao Tome and Principe
Chad Kiribati S. Arabia
Chile Kuwait Senegal
China Kyrgyzstan Seychelles
Colombia Lao Sierra Leone
Comoros Lebanon S.Africa
Congo Lesotho Sri Lanka
Costa Rica Liberia Sudan
Cte d’Ivoire Libya Suriname
Croatia Macao Swaziland
Cuba Madagascar Tajikistan
Cyprus Malawi Thailand
Djibouti Malaysia Togo
Dominica Maldives Tonga
Dom Rep Mali Trin & Tob
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Table C.4: The Rest of the World Except the 2008 VWP
The Rest of the World except countries entered the VWP in 2008 (Comparison 3
Afghanistan Cyprus Kuwait St. Kitts & Nevis
Albania Denmark Kyrgyzstan Saint Lucia
Algeria Djibouti Lao Samoa
Angola Dominica Lebanon Sao Tome and Principe
Antig & Barb Dom Rep Lesotho S.Arabia
Armenia Ecuador Liberia Senegal
Australia Egypt Libya Seychelles
Austria El Salvador Luxembourg Sierra Leone
Azerbaijan Equat. Guinea Macao, China Singapore
Bahamas Eritrea Madagascar Slovenia
Bahrain Ethiopia Malawi South Africa
Bangladesh Fiji Malaysia Spain
Barbados Finland Maldives Sri Lanka
Belarus France Mali Sudan
Belgium Gabon Mauritania Suriname
Benin Gambia Mauritius Swaziland
Bermuda Georgia Mexico Sweden
Bhutan Germany Morocco Switzerland
Bolivia Ghana Mozambique Tajikistan
Bos and Herze Greece Namibia Thailand
Botswana Grenada Nepal Togo
Brazil Guatemala Netherlands Tonga
Brunei Darussalam Guinea New Zealand Trin & Tob
Bulgaria Guinea-Bissau Nicaragua Tunisia
Burkina Faso Guyana Niger Turkey
Burundi Haiti Nigeria Turkmenistan
Cambodia Honduras Norway Tuvalu
Cameroon Hong Kong Oman Uganda
Canada Iceland Pakistan Ukraine
Cape Verde India Panama UAE
C.African Republic Indonesia Papua New Guinea UK
Chad Iran Paraguay Tanzania
Chile Iraq Peru Uruguay
China Ireland Philippines Uzbekistan
Colombia Israel Poland Vanuatu
Comoros Italy Portugal Venezuela
Congo Japan Qatar Viet Nam
Costa Rica Jordan Republic of Moldova Yemen
Cte d’Ivoire Kazakhstan Romania Zambia
Croatia Kenya Russia Zimbabwe
Cuba Kiribati Rwanda
Table C.5: Summary Statistics: Treatment (2008 VWP) and Comparison (2008
Roadmap)
Variable Category Mean SD Min. Max. Obs.
TREAT overall 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00 N = 153
between 0.51 0.00 1.00 n = 17
within 0.00 0.47 0.47 T = 9
TREAT*POST2008 overall 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 N = 153
between 0.23 0.00 0.44 n = 17
within 0.34 -0.24 0.76 T = 9
LINBOUND overall 10.68 1.53 8.23 14.40 N = 153
between 1.55 8.52 13.66 n = 17
within 0.26 9.94 11.48 T = 9
LRGDP Per Capita overall 9.17 0.49 8.16 10.06 N = 153
between 0.5 8.35 9.96 n = 17
within 0.09 8.95 9.38 T = 9
LEXCHAGERATE overall 0.45 0.25 -0.1 1.11 N = 153
between 0.22 0.04 0.91 n = 17
within 0.13 0.08 0.98 T = 9
LPOP overall 15.95 1.59 12.90 19.11 N = 153
between 1.63 12.92 19.07 n = 17
within 0.03 15.88 16.03 T = 9
LDIST overall 9.11 0.16 8.97 9.61 N =153
between 0.16 8.97 9.61 n = 17
within 0.00 9.11 9.11 T = 9
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Table C.6: Summary Statistics: Treatment (2008 VWP) and Comparison (The
Rest of the World not in the VWP)
Variable Category Mean SD Min. Max. Obs.
TREAT overall 0.05 0.23 0.00 1.00 N = 1318
between 0.23 0.00 1.00 n = 147
within 0.00 0.05 0.05 T = 9
TREAT*POST2008 overall 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00 N = 1318
between 0.10 0.00 0.44 n = 147
within 0.12 -0.42 0.58 T = 9
LINBOUND overall 8.96 2.43 1.79 16.94 N = 1318
between 2.42 2.82 16.70 n = 147
within 0.31 7.28 10.38 T = 9
LRGDP Per Capita overall 7.76 1.4 5 11.32 N = 1318
between 1.4 5 11.25 n = 147
within 0.10 7 8.17 T = 9
LEXCHAGERATE overall 0.78 0.38 -0.47 1.89 N = 1318
between 0.35 -0.45 1.52 n = 147
within 0.15 0.26 1.44 T = 9
LPOP overall 15.61 2.05 9.17 21.02 N = 1318
between 2.05 9.19 21.00 n = 147
within 0.06 15.03 16.07 T = 9
LDIST overall 9.10 0.47 7.64 9.71 N = 1318
between 0.47 7.64 9.71 n = 147
within 0.00 9.10 9.10 T = 9
Table C.7: Summary Statistics: Treatment (2008 VWP) and Comparison (The
Rest of the World except the Treatment Group)
Variable Category Mean SD Min. Max. Obs.
TREAT overall 0.05 0.23 0.00 1.00 N = 1318
between 0.23 0.00 1.00 n =147
within 0.00 0.05 0.05 T = 9
TREAT*POST2008 overall 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00 N = 1318
between 0.10 0.00 0.44 n = 147
within 0.12 -0.42 0.58 T = 9
LINBOUND overall 8.96 2.43 1.79 16.94 N = 1318
between 2.42 2.82 16.70 n = 147
within 0.31 7.28 10.38 T = 9
LRGDP Per Capita overall 8.15 1.61 4.97 11.38 N = 1318
between 1.61 5 11.3 n = 147
within 0.1 7.38 8.55 T = 9
LEXCHAGERATE overall 0.66 0.47 -0.57 1.89 N = 1318
between 0.45 -0.45 1.52 n = 147
within 0.15 1.4 1.32 T = 9
LPOP overall 15.61 2.05 9.17 21.02 N = 1318
between 2.05 9.19 21.00 n = 147
within 0.06 15.03 16.07 T = 9
LDIST overall 9.10 0.47 7.64 9.71 N = 1318
between 0.47 7.64 9.71 n = 147
within 0.00 9.10 9.10 T = 9
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Table C.8: Summary Statistics: Treatment (2008 VWP in Europe) and Com-
parison (2008 Roadmap in Europe)
Variable Category Mean SD Min. Max. Obs.
TREAT overall 0.64 0.48 0.00 1.00 N = 99
between 0.50 0.00 1.00 n = 11
within 0.00 0.64 0.64 T = 9
TREAT*POST2008 overall 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 N = 99
between 0.22 0.00 0.44 n = 11
within 0.40 -0.16 0.84 T = 9
LINBOUND overall 9.89 0.98 8.23 11.90 N = 99
between 0.99 8.52 11.74 n = 11
within 0.25 9.19 10.53 T = 9
LRGDP Per Capita overall 9.2 0.43 8.16 9.8 N = 99
between 0.43 8.35 9.74 n = 11
within 0.09 8.99 9.34 T = 9
LEXCHAGERATE overall 0.44 0.21 -0.004 1.00 N = 99
between 0.20 0.08 0.84 n = 11
within 0.10 0.2 0.70 T = 9
LPOP overall 15.31 1.30 12.90 17.47 N = 99
between 1.36 12.92 17.46 n = 11
within 0.02 15.24 15.37 T = 9
LDIST overall 9.05 0.07 8.97 9.23 N = 99
between 0.08 8.97 9.23 n = 11
within 0.00 9.05 9.05 T = 9
Table C.9: Determinants of Inbound Travel (2004-2012): Diff-in-Diff Estimation
- Pre and Post-program Averages
VARIABLES WORLDWIDE EUROPE
TREATMENT (V) 2008 VWP 2008 VWP 2008 VWP 2008 VWP
EUROPE
COMPARISON 2008 ROADMAP NON-VWP REST OF 2008 EUROPE
THE WORLD ROADMAP
DEP. VARIABLE Linbound Linbound Linbound Linbound
(1) (2) (3) (4)
V POST2008 0.355*** 0.335*** 0.339*** 0.382**
(0.100) (0.104) (0.103) (0.128)
LRGDP Per Capita 0.105 0.641** 0.624** 0.228
(0.680) (0.287) (0.278) (0.874)
LEXCHANGE RATE -0.997* -0.523** -0.505** -0.329
(0.547) (0.250) (0.236) (0.988)
LPOPULATION 0.953 1.14*** 1.238** 0.995
(1.486) (0.255) (0.226) (2.522)
OBSERVATIONS 34 294 342 22
R-SQUARED (within) 0.645 0.453 0.441 0.605
SIGMA 0.718 1.811 1.822 0.502
SIGMA E 0.209 0.265 0.256 0.232
Note
Robust Standard errors in parentheses. SIGMA and SIGMA E indicate standard
deviations of residuals within groups (panel level) and that of overall error term respectively
***, **, * indicate Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level
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C.3 Chapter 4 Appendix Figures
Figure C.1: The Power of Passports in 2014
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Figure C.2: Inbound Travel to the US from Treated (2008 VWP) and Com-
parison (Rest of the World not in VWP)
Figure C.3: Travel to the US from Treated (2008 VWP) and Comparison (Rest
of the World including Pre 2008 VWP)
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Figure C.4: Inbound Travel Trends to Selected Developed Countries
